A passage in Spinoza’s TP
sometimes sparks negative controversy and fierce debate[i]
in the history of philosophy over his apparently sexist views on whether women
should be politically, freely active and/or be rulers equally on par with men[ii].
However, I shall suggest an
Analytical-Jewish-Feminist reading of this passage which takes the more
positive side of the debate. I think this contributes to diversifying the canon
in general, irrespective of how one chooses to read his views on women.
Contrary to the portrayal of Spinoza as yet another man with patriarchal
societal privilege[iii],
I maintain that, given that he was an Hispanic Jew in 17th century
Holland as a result of the anti-Semitic expulsion of his family from their
homeland, Spinoza could not be further from a privileged societal position.
Countries, such as England, did not even admit Jews, thus restricting their options
when fleeing persecution and forced conversion. Although 17th
century Holland admitted Jews, they could not acquire citizenship in the same
way as the Dutch, whereas women were recognised as citizens, especially if they
belonged to the higher or middle classes[iv].
Jews, in contrast, had the unusual situation of having to buy their Dutch
citizenship because they could not inherit it through descent. Thus, Spinoza’s
social group was on the receiving end of discrimination and inequality so, I
argue, he would not wish to perpetrate it against other disadvantaged groups. Moreover,
I suggest that feminist history of philosophy should attempt to avoid mis-representing
Spinoza as a privileged, white man easily accepted into mainstream Western
culture because this supresses his cultural, religious and racial background
running alongside his Dutch identity. Additionally, teleology is introduced
into this methodological approach by trying to make him conform to Anglo-American ethnocentric feminism. This is because one would need to extrapolate his 17th
century concepts out of his societal and Jewish context, as well as his historical
era, in order to criticise and object to his philosophy through the lens of contemporary Anglo-American ethnocentric feminist theory. Besides, if
Spinoza were a 21st century feminist, he would most likely be an
Orthodox Jewish feminist, responding to the specific issues and needs of women
within Orthodox Judaism (such as religious rights at the Western Wall, an issue
I discuss in section 2 on political instability in my volume 1 of this series on
Spinoza) and anti-Semitism in wider society. In this way, and given Spinoza's intersecting identities as a Dutch Hispanic (religious) Jew, this does not preclude intersectional feminism from taking inspiration from Spinoza's philosophy, especially concerning justice, human rights and toleration, as I argue in chapter 8.
First, I think one needs to be
cautious of jumping to conclusions about Spinoza’s views on women based on this
passage alone. It is worth remembering that this passage comes right at the end
of his unfinished political treatise so we cannot be sure whether he would have
rewritten this unfinished copy in light of further thinking. For instance,
later in the same year that he died, William and Mary of Orange, as they became
known, married and in 1689 they both succeeded to the vacant English throne as
joint rulers by a Parliamentary Declaration of Right. This is relevant because
Spinoza’s stated methodology at the beginning of his TP means he focuses on “not
what is new and unheard of, but only such things as agree with best practice.”[v]
Thus, which practical examples are available to Spinoza is particularly
pertinent to the formulation of his theory. If he had gone on to decide to keep
the topic of gender parity issues in his TP, he may have included William and
Mary of Orange in a rewrite of his discussions of monarchy or democracy in his
TP to remain relevant and show practical application for his era. It is not
obvious whether the example of William and Mary of Orange would support or
refute any claims that men and women cannot rule alike or co-rule. On the one
hand, they show that a man and a woman can co-rule peacefully because they were
joint monarchs of England, Scotland and Ireland. On the other hand, Queen Mary
was not fully his equal despite being presumptive heir to the UK throne,
whereas William was only fourth in line. She should have ruled alone but
William managed to become King through marrying her and Parliament giving him
the power to become King. Although she was a good, powerful leader, they divided
their rule so that Queen Mary only had full authority as Queen when she acted
alone in his absence while King William was abroad in a military capacity. This
supports Spinoza’s observation that women have less power than men, including
in relation to leadership roles, and that history shows that they are prone to
defer to men so do not “rule alike”[vi].
(To this day, the status of a UK Queen is automatically lower than that of a
King. Hence, the present Queen Elizabeth II’s husband is not given the title of
King but Prince Consort of the UK and the Commonwealth otherwise he would rank
higher than her despite not being the heir to the throne. Additionally, upper-class
titles such as Lord and Lady are acquired by patrilineal inheritance so a husband
and father has the power and status to transfer his upper-class titles to his
children and wife whereas a wife and mother cannot do likewise to elevate the
status of her husband and children.) In addition to ruling as King of England,
Scotland and Ireland, William of Orange was also Captain-General, Grand-Admiral
and Stadholder of the United Provinces (Netherlands), following the murder of
the de Witt brothers in 1672. (Johan de
Witt was the liberal political leader of the whole of the Dutch Republic and a
personal friend of Spinoza.) Their murder not only was deeply, indescribably
distressing for Spinoza but also placed him in danger, having been a prominent
advocate of de Witt’s liberal Republican leadership which believed in the value
of true freedom.
Given that Spinoza was very much
at the heart of the liberal politics of Republican freedom, I think it is
unlikely that he would be ideologically opposed to women’s freedom, franchise
and political leadership. However, since Spinoza was not constructing political
theory based on ideology, or suggesting ideal, utopian forms of state, what
Spinoza may have held as ideological beliefs is not relevant to the TP. His
stated intentions in the opening introductory chapter of the TP show that he is
attempting to address the criticism aimed at political philosophy that it is ‘pie
in the sky’ and therefore unworkable because, compared to the political
writings of statesmen, it is not translatable into society[vii].
In this way, Spinoza hopes to approach political theory in an objective, mathematically
scientific manner, presenting what is the case, rather than how he would like
things to be[viii].
He has thereby “laboured carefully, not to mock, lament, or execrate, but to
understand human actions;” and has “looked upon the passions … not in the light
of vices of human nature, but as properties”[ix].
Thus, I suggest, it is not in the spirit of Spinoza’s authorial intentions to
interpret him as loathing or denigrating women. Indeed, Spinoza is very opposed
to oppression of any kind and sees the over-competitive oppressor as causing
harm. Textual evidence for this in his TP is when he further writes in the
introductory chapter “And so it comes to pass, that, as all are equally eager
to be first, they fall to strife, and do their utmost mutually to oppress one
another...”[x] I discuss this further in chapter 7.
Furthermore, one cannot jump to
conclusions about Spinoza’s outlook at the end of his TP because it may not
represent his views accurately or fairly since he did not have the chance to
finish his overarching argument. Is the conclusion to this passage a final conclusion
or a sub-conclusion within a broader argument? Although he may have set aside
the role of women for politics, he nevertheless could have continued discussing
gender relations. His TP ends mid-argument here so it is impossible to know
with certainty what his overall thesis about gender and politics concludes.
Therefore, second, I shall
analytically examine the possible layers of meaning in the Latin text we have
available.
My following interlineal translation
illustrates the many possible readings of Spinoza’s claims about women in his penultimate
as well as his final paragraph. In his penultimate paragraph 3, Spinoza
clarifies that he will leave out some forms of democracy and only deal with
those relating to people who have an “allegiance to the laws of the country
only, and are further independent and of respectable life…”[xi].
Spinoza then explains how the independence criteria impacts on women[xii]:
Addidi
|
Praeterea:
|
quod
|
praeterquam
|
I insert
|
in addition:
|
everyone
|
except
|
legibus
|
imperii
|
teneantur,
|
in
|
By the law/statute/condition
|
of the state/ command/authority/ rule/ supreme power
|
being held/possessed/
comprehended/ being master
|
according to the
|
reliquis
|
sui
|
iuris
|
sint,
|
available/remaining/surviving
|
of
oneself/one another
|
right/duty/justice/ binding oath
|
(that) exists
|
ut
|
mulieres
|
et
|
servos
|
even if
|
woman/wife/mistress
|
and
|
slaves
|
secluderem
|
qui
|
in
|
potestate
|
kept apart/secluded/isolated/left out
|
who/whereby
|
in the midst of (the)
|
power/rule/force/ strength/ability/ chance/opportunity
|
virorum
|
et
|
dominorum,
|
……..
|
of men/husbands
|
and
|
owner/lord/master
|
So one could read this sentence
as signifying that Spinoza wishes to set aside people who are not master of
themselves under the laws/statutes that exist in a given state (which constitute
a right/duty that is binding on oneself/others) even if (that means) wives…who
(are) caught in the middle of their husband’s power are left out (secluderem)
of his examples of democracies.
This reading based on my interlineal
translation options, I suggest, matches up with the realities of women’s social
condition in 17th century Holland. On marriage, they could either
gain Dutch citizenship from their husband or lose their existing Dutch
citizenship if they marry a man who isn’t Dutch and might then acquire his
country’s citizenship instead. This is a tenuous situation men didn’t have to
think about and is problematic for being politically active or a political
leader. I bring out the translation option of wife rather than woman in this
sentence because I think it is striking that this is the only time Spinoza uses
the word mulieres to denote women. After this, in this controversial passage,
Spinoza uses the noun femina/feminae which only means female/woman but not
wife. So, was Spinoza seemingly demoting women in virtue of their biological
category of woman or was it due to citizenship requirements for married women? It
is unlikely that Spinoza would randomly change the word for women on a whim and
at such a crucial point in his argument. The Latin word he uses for man can
mean husband or man generally so one cannot assess their marital status by
changes in Spinoza’s choice of word for men. Hence, I suggest that Spinoza
proceeded from the following premise. Since married women’s citizenship status
is tenuous and changeable, even in one of the most progressive countries in the
world for women in the 17th century, it would be true of everywhere and would
cause major problems of political obligation/duty and what laws are binding on
women at any given stage of their adult, marriageable lifetime. So Spinoza may
have concluded that this might give rise to political instability should, for
instance, a female political leader start her leadership as a Dutch citizen
with legal and political obligations and duties to the Dutch state but cease to
be under the Dutch legal and political system once married to a non-Dutch
citizen. This would, in effect, make her a foreign subject, a category Spinoza
has also left out of his examples of democracies because they are also subject
to foreign systems and allegiances. During her leadership, her allegiances
could then switch from Holland to a different country (which may or may not be
in conflict with Holland at the time). This would cause major political
upheaval and instability which is a central concern for Spinoza, as can be seen
when he earlier states “the virtue of a state is its security.”[xiii]
It is also not clear that, in
this sentence, Spinoza is explicitly meaning exclusion when he uses the word
secluderem, from secludo, secludere. Secludo contains the prefix se- which
carries the notion of something being separated or apart from something.
Therefore, Spinoza may be merely writing that he shall leave out complicated
examples of democracies in which women who may marry and change citizenship are
politically active or political leaders. I suggest one cannot automatically
assume that secluderem refers to preventing women from being politically
engaged. Had Spinoza intended to specify the concept of excluding women, he
could have chosen one of four possible words. The obvious choice would have
been excludo, excludere, to signify exclude, hinder, prevent. Perhaps it is sometimes taken to mean that Spinoza is referring to excluding women as opposed to excluding
them from his examples of democracy because he uses the word secludo again
shortly afterwards at the beginning of section 4. Here, Spinoza seems to be
addressing a possible objection someone may have raised with him about women’s
political role in society. He frames the question as asking if women are “under
men's authority by nature or institution?”[xiv]
This forms the logical disjunct:
either women are under men’s authority by nature or by institution. But what
exactly are the disjunctive options behind the words Spinoza uses? The question
in Latin states[xv]:
num
|
feminae
|
ex
|
natura
|
If/whether
|
women
|
from/according to/
by reason of
|
nature/birth/character/(are naturally)
|
an
|
ex
|
instituto
|
sub
|
or/can it be that (precursor to a further
question or negative answer)
|
from/according to/
by reason of
|
custom/principle/ decree/intention/ arrangement/institution/
habit/plan
|
under
|
potestate
|
virorum
|
sint
|
?
|
power/rule/force/ strength/ability/ chance/opportunity
|
of men/husbands
|
are
|
What is the question asking? Is
ex natura exploring whether women are subordinate to men naturally, from birth,
due to their female human nature? Or due to their character (which leaves open
the possibility of it being learnt behaviour)? If one reads this as meaning
naturally occurring disposition, then this would bring with it many
accompanying Spinozian concepts of nature, God and natural right. These
concepts lead us back to chapter 2 of the TP where Spinoza states that “the
power whereby natural things exist and operate is the very power of God itself”
so “we easily understand what natural right is.”[xvi]
By natural things Spinoza is including all things in the world so this must
include women. So the women’s natural power to exist and act in the world is
strictly speaking from the power of God rather than their own capacity per se.
Surely this would imply that, if women were naturally less powerful, then it
follows that God is sometimes diminished in his powers to create humans,
specifically when it comes to women? But Spinoza does not believe that God’s
powers and perfection fluctuate or are contingent so this seems an unlikely
thought for Spinoza. In addition, Spinoza relates the notions of power and
natural right when he writes “every natural thing has by nature as much right,
as it has power to exist and operate”[xvii].
Why would women then, despite their conatus striving to persevere and preserve
their being, be weaker and so have less power to exist and act than men? And if
they have the same power as men to exist, then they have as much natural right
as men to act. When discussing in chapter 2 of the TP how most people follow
their appetite more than reason, Spinoza makes no gender distinctions, so why
introduce gender differences now, so late on in the TP? Generally, all things
in nature, and human beings, are treated in accordance with his cohesive
substance monism and his dislike of carving nature up into set categories,
which, as I explained in my volume 2 of this series on Spinoza, is more to do
with people projecting their concepts onto the world and labelling things
accordingly rather than signifying distinctions existing naturally in the world.
So, does Spinoza intend us to
read ex natura in the context of this sentence as character, possibly formed as
a result of education or upbringing? Possible textual evidence to support this
reading is when Spinoza inverts the condition of women to discuss whether men
have ever been in the same social situation. Thus, according to Spinoza, if men
were in women’s shoes they would be “ruled by women, and so brought up, that
they can make less use of their abilities.”[xviii]
The Latin word in question here is educarentur, from educo, educare, meaning
educate, bring up, train which impacts on their ingenio (nature/innate quality/
natural disposition/capacity/character/talent). Given the choice of meanings
for ingenio, I think it is interesting that Spinoza is possibly showing how
education and up-bringing can change one’s innate qualities and natural
dispositions. So even if Spinoza did mean ex natura as natural
disposition/inclination, this would not preclude reading Spinoza as maintaining
in his TP that education and up-bringing shape natural disposition at some
level. This may help to explain why
Spinoza claims that experience points to women’s weakness, possibly specifying
intellectual weakness. Perhaps he meant that, by and large, women’s education
was considerably inferior to men’s, causing ignorance and thus resulting in seemingly
natural intellectual weakness/inferiority. Especially since, according to
Spinoza’s theory in this passage, if men were systematically disadvantaged in
society by the opposite sex, they would also appear intellectually weak. Hence,
I suggest one should keep an open mind as to whether Spinoza meant to say that
women end up subordinate to men in society due to up-bringing and education
giving them a weaker character. If so, this would merely be quite a common
feminist observation and would be more in line with arguments which claim
sexual difference is due to nurture rather than nature. If Spinoza is assuming
character due to nurture rather than natural disposition then this would be the
opposite of the assumptions one is initially led to on reading this apparently
sexist passage.
Indeed, there were intellectually
talented, highly educated women in the 17th century. They tended to
be members of the upper classes or royalty, such as Queen Kristina of Sweden (1626-89),
who was given the same education as a male heir to the throne. However,
isolated cases are not helpful to the general condition and advancement of
women because they can equally be held back by the unenlightened men around
them who are unused to highly competent, educated, intelligent women. I don’t
think Spinoza failing to refer to Queen Kristina was an oversight because,
although she’s a good example of an educated woman ruling in her own right, she
abdicated the throne after pressure to marry and produce an heir, despite her
wishes. (She may have also abdicated after acting on bad advice to convert to
Catholicism, a banned religion in Sweden.) Why didn’t she marry? Possible
explanations include she didn’t want to lose her status as Queen by being
married to a man who may try to gain higher status than her by becoming King,
as William of Orange later did in relation to Queen Mary. Or she was possibly a
lesbian? Lesbianism has been around in society since ancient times so nothing
remarkable about her being a lesbian. On an intersectional feminist note, why
focus on Spinoza’s apparent flaw in his argument that he has not included women
politically yet simultaneously ignore his lack of mentioning lesbian or gay
political status or the love relationship and dynamics of same-sex
relationships alongside his mention of men’s heterosexual “love” for women[xix]?
After all, just a century after Spinoza, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832) openly argued that homosexuality should not be against the law.
However, given Spinoza’s more precarious social position as a Jew (and without
the support of the Jewish community) in the 17th century and
struggling enough against censorship and having his works banned, it is not
surprising he did not wish to attract more controversy by making explicitly
feminist and LGBT arguments in his treatises! As to whether Spinoza was homosexual
or bisexual, it is impossible to ascertain so retrospectively, especially given
his unusual Jewish circumstances. Being excommunicated would make him an undesirable
option for a Jewish woman within Jewish Law and Spinoza, not wishing to convert
to Christianity, could not marry a Christian. So he was caught between a rock
and a hard place. In today’s society he would have alternative options so would
not face the same restrictions on who he could date and marry.
Nevertheless, Spinoza is very
disparaging of men’s love of women, depicting it as “merely from the passion of
lust”, contributing to their dismissal of women’s “cleverness and wisdom”[xx].
This, I argue, is an important statement for feminism. It shows that Spinoza
thought women are intelligent and possess wisdom, the pinnacle of knowledge and
intellect, which supports my earlier reading that Spinoza is not intending to
belittle women’s intellectual capabilities or exclude them from public,
political life. Furthermore, I think it places the blame for the lack of
respect and acknowledgement of women’s intellectual achievements and
capabilities firmly on men (even calling them “ill-disposed men”), through
heterosexual relationships which cause power imbalances between the sexes[xxi].
[i] ‘Is There a Flaw in Spinoza’s Argument
about Gender Inequality?’, Q&A, Philosophy, 2 December 2015,
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/30155/is-there-a-flaw-in-spinozas-argument-about-gender-inequality.
[ii] Margaret Gullan-Whur, ‘Spinoza and the
Equality of Women1’, Theoria 68, no. 2 (11 February 2008): 91–111,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2002.tb00123.x.
[iii] Gullan-Whur.
[iv] Willem Frijhoff et al., Dutch Culture
in a European Perspective. (Assen; New York: Royal Van Gorcum ; Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), 221–22.
[v] Benedict de Spinoza, A
Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M.
Elwes, Dover Philosophical Classics (Mineola, New York, USA: Dover Publications
Inc, 2004), 288.
[vi] Spinoza, 387.
[vii] Spinoza, 278–8.
[viii]
Spinoza, 288.
[ix] Spinoza, p288.
[x] Spinoza, 289.
[xi] Spinoza, 386.
[xii] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera: DE
INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., ed. C.H. Bruder,
EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol.
II (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844), 135,
https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.
[xiii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, 290.
[xiv] Spinoza, 386.
[xv] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS
EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:135.
[xvi] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, 291.
[xvii]
Spinoza, 292.
[xviii]
Spinoza, 387.
[xix] Spinoza, 387.
[xx] Spinoza, 387.
[xxi] Spinoza, 387.
