Friday, 4 January 2019

My blog ebook: Research Thoughts on... Spinoza - Volume 3






Research Thoughts on... 
Spinoza - Volume 3

 A Feminist Approach to Spinoza's Political Treatise 

Liba Kaucky 



Series: Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 3

Sole author: Liba Kaucky

Copyright © Liba (Libuse) Kaucky 2019 (Copyright acquired automatically under UK law)

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First published 2019 by Liba (Libuse) Kaucky as a blog ebook on blogger.com at My Spinoza Research Diary blog, available at:
http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.co.uk/ 


Liba Kaucky ResearcherID: P-2484-2016


Liba Kaucky ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1598-0833 



First edition.

Editor: Liba Kaucky

Cover photo: Copyright © Liba (Libuse) Kaucky (photographer) 24th September 2013

All rights reserved. No reproduction without written permission from Liba Kaucky. No part of this ebook or the blog ebook version may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means now known or hereafter invented including printing, photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from Liba Kaucky. You must not circulate this ebook in any way other than by referring people to read it on these sites:


Practitioners and researchers must rely on themselves in evaluating and using any information and methods described herein and do so at their own risk. 
To the fullest extent of the law, the publisher, author, editor does not assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, including negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein.

Current titles in this series 'My Research Thoughts on...': 


Titles in series 1 on Spinoza:

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 1
Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 2

Titles in series 2 on Lady Mary Shepherd:


Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd – Volume 1

Forthcoming titles:

Titles in series 1 on Spinoza:

 Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 4

Titles in series 2 on Lady Mary Shepherd:


Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd - Volume 2


Titles in series 3 on Margaret Lucas Cavendish:

Research Thoughts on… Margaret Lucas Cavendish – Volume 1

I would like to dedicate this book to my mother, Jana, without whose endless love, continual encouragement and support this book would not have been possible. I want to take this opportunity to thank her for always being there for me throughout life’s ups and downs and for always having total belief in me and giving me the confidence to follow my dreams. I love you!

I should also like to dedicate this volume in particular to Professor Susan James, who always encouraged all students to “read” and understand Spinoza’s philosophy in a positive light throughout his writings. This is something I try to do in my series on Spinoza. She is an exceptional philosopher, political philosopher, fellow feminist / feminist philosopher, member of the sisterhood whom I both respect and admire.  


Contents





Author’s Note




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Preface


I’d like to thank my mother, who brought me up as a feminist from the cradle. She created an environment where I could be free from gender stereotypes, be it toys, games, clothes, attitudes or interests so I did not grow up with gendered notions about myself or others. As I grew older, we would chat about everything together and she would let me explore ideas for myself and form my own opinions and support me in developing my knowledge of feminist theory, feminist psychology/counselling, the history of women, women in politics, women artists/feminist art and feminism in everyday life. We’ve attended feminist conferences, events and talks together for over 20 years. I still remember the excitement I felt when we would go to Central London to buy books at Silver Moon, the feminist bookshop! I was gutted when it ended up as a small section at Foyles before closing down. We both go to marches in London which support women’s rights and fight for women’s freedom from violence/domestic violence, such as Women’s March London, Million Women Rise. Last year, we were also part of the Procession mass artwork to commemorate 100 years since certain women were given the right to vote. We were in the purple group!

I have proudly called myself a feminist for as long as I can remember, certainly since around the time I was 8 years old, well over two decades ago. It never bothered me whether the word feminism was considered a dirty word by some. Much as I loved the phrase ‘girl power’ in the 1990’s, I still additionally strongly identified as a feminist and saw myself as being part of a larger sisterhood of loyal feminists, actively defending women’s rights for themselves and each other, no matter how similar or different they are from each other. I therefore have always found that feminism comes naturally to me and I see it as full of positivity and inclusivity. Hence, when I was studying Sociology at A Level, I chose modules which included various feminist theories, to deepen my academic knowledge of feminism, including studies on women’s condition and the Patriarchal structure of society. I also chose modules in English Literature A Level which included women writers with feminist thought in their works, namely, Carol Ann Duffy’s The World’s Wife and Margaret Attwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, alongside Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew. The latter also deepened my knowledge and appreciation of feminist interpretations in secondary literature, in this case, feminist readings of the characters of Kate and Petruchio. I’d previously undertaken a feminist reading of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre in my early teens, so I already had a good idea of how to go about this.

I continue to expand my knowledge of feminism, for example, by pursuing courses, such as, ‘Beyond the Ballot: Women’s Rights and Suffrage from 1866 to Today’ (Royal Holloway, London University, FutureLearn 2018) and 'Understanding Violence Against Women: Myths and Realities' (University of Strathclyde, FutureLearn 2018), as well as reading and studying gender and sexuality.

Having thoroughly enjoyed studying feminist theory both for my own pleasure and for qualifications, I wanted to make feminist philosophy part of my degree. I then looked forward to having the freedom to explore and research feminist issues in the history of philosophy after I graduated and this volume is the result of me following my passion for this field.



Introduction


Structure of this ebook: My Analytic-Jewish-Feminist Interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Treatise (TP)



This is my third volume in the series ‘My Research Thoughts on…Spinoza’, a series of books dedicated to Spinoza (labelled series 1) which is situated within my overarching series on the History of Philosophy, entitled ‘My Research Thoughts on…’.  This volume 3 continues where my previous second volume on Spinoza left off. Volume 2 ended on the topic of how we hold in tension being an unique individual as well as being part of a collective society. Volume 3 furthers this tension by placing it into the realm of political philosophy and women: How does political, legal and social life impact on the life and death of people and states? A key question for Spinoza, which informed his purpose of delineating philosophy from theology when writing the TTP[i], was: What are the parameters of individual freedom within a collective society in which there are diverse opinions? Using my Analytic-Jewish-Feminist interpretation, I shall examine the political life and death of women in his unfinished Political Treatise (TP). 

Barbone and Rice view the TP as being a treatise on political science (unlike the TTP) therefore it examines “organisation and equilibrium”[ii]. However, on my interpretation of Spinoza, I shall not be treating the TP as a work of political science but rather as a ground-breaking work in political philosophy. A Machiavelli Spinoza is not.

Machiavelli worked in “the inner circles of government” (and held the high position of being the Republic’s chancellor/secretary) where he could directly observe political systems first-hand[iii]. Such empirical data formed the backbone of his political theory and writings. It is widely accepted in scholarship that Machiavelli’s political career “provided the raw material for his later life as a writer”[iv] and that his “diplomatic experiences thus had a direct influence upon the development of his political theory”[v]. The reason Machiavelli can retrospectively be seen as a political scientist is that “the weight of classical authority” (and “historians”) is always present in his works but tempered by direct observation”[vi]. In other words, classical and historical practical examples are not enough to classify a work as political science.

Spinoza, on the contrary, never worked for the government or in politics. So he cannot work from raw data gathered through his own direct observational experience which, I argue, is a requirement for undertaking research in political science. Hence, unlike Machiavelli, Spinoza’s empirical element in the TP does rely solely on classical and historical examples. Likewise, I also use practical examples (classical, historical, contemporary) to support my arguments but this does not mean my work thereby shifts discipline from political philosophy to political science (a relatively new discipline which analyses data rather than philosophical arguments).

I suggest the conflation between political philosophy and political science may arise because both can value a scientific methodology. However, they carry this out in different ways. Spinoza aims “to deduce from certain and undoubted course of argument, or to deduce from the very conditions of human nature, not what is new and unheard of, but only such things as agree best with practice”[vii]. Maths underpins Spinoza’s methodology because it gives him “freedom” to “understand human actions” more objectively as properties not as vices[viii]. In this way, Spinoza attempts to fill a research gap in political philosophy in the 17th century. He is somewhat dissatisfied with philosophers’ approach to politics, as being too fixated on vices and advocating an unrealistic account of human nature while engaging in “verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists”[ix]. Spinoza is equally unimpressed that statesmen are “more crafty than learned”, “are suspected of plotting against mankind, rather than consulting their interests” but “have written about politics far more happily than philosophers”[x]. So, at a fundamental level, Spinoza would be unimpressed with Machiavelli’s overall acceptance of political dirty dealings. Thus, Spinoza tries to find a middle ground for political philosophy which neither falls into moralising, nor collapses into corruption. He achieves this by balancing a variety of philosophical methodological approaches. One, he draws on a mathematical, analytical philosophical method, to guard against descending into mere outrage. However, unlike Descartes, Spinoza rejects that one could “by meditation discover in this matter anything not yet tried and ascertained”[xi]. So two, Spinoza draws on past events for practical examples to bridge the gap between theory and practice so his political philosophy, unlike prior philosophical attempts, has the potential to be “turned to use”[xii]. Indeed, as a scientist himself, Spinoza was always drawing on mathematical and scientific methodology throughout his philosophy, and taking into account how hypotheses work in practice. Hence, I maintain it is only consistent for him to continue to do so in his political philosophy.

My overarching philosophical aim in this volume is to flesh out the feminist strand of my interpretation of Spinoza in relation to his hitherto under-researched Political Treatise. Throughout, I offer a positive and charitable reading of Spinoza’s original Latin, by analytically demonstrating how his philosophy should not be dismissed as expressing sexist ideas about women. Where pertinent, I provide an historical context to his concepts and arguments to illustrate and examine how the cogs of his political philosophy arguments work. Furthermore, I elaborate on how Spinoza can inform the philosophy of gender as well as feminist philosophy, feminist jurisprudence and feminism, especially intersectional feminism. This is not to use Spinoza’s philosophy in a teleological way, as merely a means to end. The purpose of this is manifold: 

  •  I aim to uncover truths in his philosophy and demonstrate how they function; 
  • to support his arguments with empirical evidence of them working, or potentially working, successfully in practice (historically or currently);
  • to provide a closer reading of Spinoza’s original Latin texts so his political philosophy and attitudes towards women can be better understood; 
  • to expand on how feminism (alongside Jewish philosophy, analytic philosophy, contextual/history of philosophy approach) can contribute to an accurate representation and interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy
  • to shed light on Spinoza’s on-going relevance to today and how his philosophy can be a constant source of inspiration and wisdom.






[i] Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, Dover Philosophical Classics (Mineola, New York, USA: Dover Publications Inc, 2004).
[ii] Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Introduction’, in Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 27.
[iii] Lucille Margaret Kekewich and Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘Introduction’, in The Prince., ed. Tom Griffith, trans. C. E Detmold, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 2013), vii, https://www.hoopladigital.com/title/11406095.
[iv] Kekewich and Machiavelli, vii.
[v] Peter Bondanella, Mark Musa, and Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘Introduction An Essay on Machiavelli’, in The Portable Machiavelli, The Viking Portable Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 14.
[vi] Bondanella, Musa, and Machiavelli, 12.
[vii] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, 288.
[viii] Spinoza, 288.
[ix] Spinoza, 287.
[x] Spinoza, 287–88.
[xi] Spinoza, 288.
[xii] Spinoza, 287.



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Sunday, 30 December 2018

Spinoza vol 2 ebook: Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks on Volume 2


Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks on Volume 2

In this blog ebook, I have examined Spinoza’s philosophy of life, death and the immortality of the soul through two of his texts (Ethics and Short Treatise) and one letter (32). In this volume, I narrowed my focus within these primary sources to mainly EVp38 and EVp41s in the Ethics, two analogies in letter 32 and part 2 of his Short Treatise, namely his preface, chapter 23 and Appendix 2. The research topic of life and death in Spinoza has grown out of my 2015 abstract ‘Spinoza on how to live well and die well’ which was written with the time limit and word count restrictions of a presentation in mind and bears the kernel of my stance on this research topic. Although quite broad, I started my research on this topic with a focus on Spinoza’s two main texts, the Ethics and the TTP, which form the backbone of the abstract. This abstract then became the basis for the book outline for this blog ebook. As a book outline rather than a paper abstract, I then had the time and word count to develop my research in new and exciting ways as I discovered more textual material within and across Spinoza’s writings on life and death than I initially expected to find.

So, over the years, I have enjoyed both expanding the scope of my research to include lesser-researched Spinoza texts, as well as narrowing my focus, to flesh out very specific passages. In this way, I hope to further Spinoza scholarship. 

 I have discovered that Spinoza’s early writings are far more mature and decisive than I anticipated because they are often depicted in Spinozian scholarship as lacking the maturity and conviction of his later writings. I maintain they are very similar to his later writings, indeed, I can hear the same voice and fundamental notions across all of Spinoza’s works so do not interpret him as prone to changing his mind or having distinct periods in his philosophy. Thus, I think the earlier works provide important insight into his main works and are a useful interpretative aid for understanding apparently obscure passages in Spinoza, be it in his later works or letters. I have the impression that Spinoza is perhaps assuming that his readers are somewhat familiar with many of the concepts and arguments in his earlier works before they read his latter works. Scholarship sometimes looks upon his Short Treatise as merely an abandoned draft which was rewritten as the Ethics. However, the Short Treatise feels like a very complete and well-thought out and organised, strongly argued treatise which is both valuable as a text in its own right as well as shedding light on his other texts.

In this volume, I have furthered my Analytic-Jewish interpretation of Spinoza. I have drawn on analytic and logic philosophical skills to show the underpinnings, structure and logical progression of ideas in Spinoza’s thought, untangling them from his continuous passages of writing and setting them out in logical form from premises to conclusion.

Additionally, I have discussed Spinoza’s scientifically and mathematically analytical, logical thinking. Previously, in part 3 of volume 1, I showed how science, including Darwin and contemporary genome theory, helps to uncover another layer of meaning to Spinoza’s conatus doctrine. I argue, in both volume 1 and 2, that scientific analysis suits Spinoza’s way of thinking about humans, the world and God. In part 1 of this volume, I explore the relevance of anatomical, biological and psychological theory for understanding Spinoza’s philosophy. In part 2 of this volume, I show how physics and maths have a bearing on interpreting key concepts in Spinoza’s philosophy. Being a scientist and philosopher was not as potentially problematic or contradictory for Jewish philosophers as it was for Christian philosophers and scientists, who faced religious restrictions on the content of their writings for fear that their science would disprove the existence and omnipotence of God. Apart from the famous example of Maimonides (12th century) who had no problems being a philosopher as well as a doctor and astronomer, there were other Jewish philosophers who were also scientists, such as Abraham Bar Hiyya Ha-nasi (11th – 12th century) who was an astrologer, astronomer and mathematician as well as a philosopher and wrote both scientific and philosophical treatises. Likewise, Spinoza not only wrote philosophical works, but it is often forgotten that he also wrote two treatises on physics and maths, ‘Algebraic Calculation of the Rainbow’ and ‘Calculation of Chances’. Spinoza even admits in chapter 9 of his Short Treatise that the topic of motion “more properly belongs to a treatise on Natural Science rather than here”[i]. Although he consequently lays it to one side in this chapter, he goes on to expand on motion and rest when writing about the life, death and the immortality of the soul later in the Short Treatise. So despite being initially tentative about using scientific vocabulary and concepts, simplifying motion to just signifying an “Effect created immediately by God”[ii], he ends up making use of scientific and mathematical language (ratio and proportions of motion and rest) both in the Short Treatise and the Ethics, which even includes diagrams. Perhaps Spinoza did not wish to alienate non-scientific readers of his works so attempted to use natural science in an accessible way. However, I suggest that, by filling in the scientific definitions and concepts assumed by Spinoza in his works draws out a deeper understanding of his philosophical concepts, makes his abstract notions more accessible and helps his readers see consistencies in his thought. This is not an easy task, given that Spinoza is highly knowledgeable about a broad range of natural sciences. He took an interest in chemistry experiments, anatomy and biology (in his letters) and was also an expert in physics and maths, which included plans for telescopes so he must have had a profound understanding of astronomy.

I have also furthered the Jewish aspect of my Analytic-Jewish interpretation by situating Spinoza’s account of the immortality of the soul within Jewish philosophy and finding that his philosophy fits in very well alongside theirs. In his commentary, Wolf briefly mentions some fascinating parallels where Spinoza is in agreement with Maimonides and Crescas[iii]. However, I have aimed to add to this by showing how Spinoza’s philosophical accounts of life, death, the soul and immortality are embedded in Jewish thought and Orthodox Judaism. I expanded on this to illustrate how I interpret Spinoza as accounting for both personal and collective immortality.  In life, we hold in tension being an unique individual as well as being part of a collective society, so Spinoza continues this combination of the individual and the collective into his philosophy of death and immortality.  






[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), 57, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[ii] Spinoza, 57.
[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Commentary’, in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910), 165–240, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.


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Arkush, Allan. ‘Immortality: Belief in a Bodiless Existence: Everlasting Life Was Not Always Guaranteed to the Jewish Soul.’ Educational. myjewishlearning.com, Unavailable. https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/immortality-belief-in-a-bodiless-existence/.

Bond, Michael. ‘In the Face of Danger’. New Scientist, 13 May 2017.

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Kaufmann, Kohler. ‘IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL (Late Hebrew, “hasharat Ha-Nefesh”; "ḥayye “Olam")”’. Jewish Encyclopedia. JewishEncyclopedia.com, Web publication date unavailable. Ffom   printed edition 1906. http://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8092-immortality-of-the-soul.

Lin, Martin. ‘Nadler Steven Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Book Review by Lin)’. Notre Dame Philosophical Review, N/A, N/A, no. N/A (4 December 2002): N/A.

‘Lymph’. Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 31 July 2008. https://www.britannica.com/science/lymph.

Nadler, Steven. ‘Eternity and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXVI, no. 1 (2002): 224–44. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4975.261064.

Ripley, George, and Charles A. Dana. ‘Lymph’. Edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. The American Cyclopaedia - Popular Dictionary Of General Knowledge. D. Appleton And Company, 1873. https://chestofbooks.com/reference/American-Cyclopaedia-7/Lymph.html.

Spinoza, Benedict de. Ethics. Edited and translated by Edwin Curley. Penguin Classics, Penguin Books. England, UK: Penguin Books, 1996.

———. Ethics. Translated by W.H. White and A.K. Stirling. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature. Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001.

———. Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Edited by Jonathan Bennett. Pdf ebook. Canada: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com, 2017. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1665part5.pdf.

———. ‘“Korte verhandeling van God, de mensch en desselvs welstand”’. Translated by J. Jelles and J. Monnikhoff. Netherlands, circa 17th/18th century. https://www.kb.nl/en/resources-research-guides/kb-collections/collections-by-theme/benedictus-de-spinoza-collection. https://galerij.kb.nl/kb.html#/nl/spinoza/page/7/zoom/2/lat/-77.87881372624744/lng/-42.1875.

———. Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE. Edited by C.H. Bruder. EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (Google e-Book). Vol. II. III vols. Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844. https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.

———. Opera, Renati des cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata metaphysica  Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Edited by C.H. Bruder. EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-Book). Vol. I. III vols. Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843. https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.

———. Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing. Edited and translated by Abraham Wolf. London: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

———. THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. REVISED EDITION. London, UK. Vol. II. II vols. BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901. http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

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Wolf, Abraham. ‘Commentary’. In Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being, 165–240. London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

———. ‘Introduction: I. The Life of Spinoza, II. History of the Short Treatise’. In Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being, ix–cxxvii. London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
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Saturday, 29 December 2018

Spinoza vol 2 ebook: Chapter 9: Spinoza’s Appendix 2 in his Short Treatise : ‘On the Human Soul’


Chapter 9: Spinoza’s Appendix 2 in his Short Treatise : ‘On the Human Soul’ 

In Appendix 2, Spinoza aims to rationally discover and explain the essence of (nature of) the human soul[i]. Appendix 2 reiterates many of the concepts he’s previously explored in chapter 23 and his preface to part 2, which I have discussed in my part 2 of this volume. So I shall focus on definitions and arguments which give a deeper layer of meaning or another angle of perspective to analyse what Appendix 2 adds and how it makes use of some key concepts and other definitions stated earlier in the Short Treatise.

Spinoza starts by highlighting that, amongst other things, humans are a “created finite thing” before going on to deduce what logically “necessarily follows from that”[ii]. What does the concept of being created and finite mean and what assumptions does it carry? As I mentioned in my chapter 7, one can read finite here as meaning that humans have not existed for eternity. For current purposes, I shall take eternity to simply signify, as Wolf put it in his accompanying commentary to the Short Treatise, “reality independently of time or beyond it”[iii]. This coheres with Wolf’s quotation of Spinoza’s Metaphysical Thoughts later in his commentary[iv] where Spinoza seems to conceptualise eternity as being non-sequential and unchanging. So, one cannot pick out a time slice, say, afterwards at time X, because eternity does not function like this. Given, as I mentioned in chapter 7, humans came into existence after other things, their existence is not eternal but sequential (ie in relation to when other things existed, unlike, for instance God who is eternal). How should one understand Spinoza’s concept that humans are created? Spinoza defines creation (no longer occurring in Nature) early in the Short Treatise as referring to both a thing’s essence, its nature, as well as existence[v]. Maybe, I suggest, Spinoza does not discuss creation ex nihilo in the way philosophers expect him to because he does not use the term create to refer to creation from nothing but rather from something pre-existing[vi]. What one thinks of as constant creation, Spinoza terms generation (which only refers to its existence and he thinks still occurs in Nature)[vii]. Not only does Spinoza assume these concepts later but, in Appendix 2, Spinoza also refers readers back to his chapter 9, part 1, where he depicts an idea as being something God created and objectively has the formal essence of everything in it[viii]. All created things’ essences are contained in God[ix]. Putting this together, it makes sense that, given an idea has essence, it is created because creation denotes a thing’s essence and existence.

Breaking down the terminology further, one can relate Spinoza writing that an idea objectively has formal essence to how he goes on to define formal essence and objective essence. Formal essence combines the attribute of thought with the object and objective essence which denotes the real existence of idea[x]. However, the terms objective and subjective now mean the opposite of what they meant in the Early Modern period[xi], so it is easy for the contemporary reader to misunderstand them. In Spinoza’s day, objective meant an object of thought, unlike contemporary usage where things relating to thought are termed subjective[xii]. This helps to make sense of Spinoza’s statement that objective essence is understood through the idea[xiii], since ideas are thoughts of a mind. Whereas the term subjective, for Early Modern philosophers, took its meaning from the prefix sub, suggesting something beneath. Hence it was used to describe the reality underpinning the properties of a thing or subject[xiv]. Thus, when we predicate[xv] something as being true of someone, eg person A is a Y (Y is predicated of person A) we are saying something about the reality underpinning the property Y that person A possesses so we learn something real about that person. Reality is a pivotal concept in the term essence. Here, I shall be working with the concise definition of this complex term provided by Wolf in his commentary on the text, namely, “that the essence of a thing is its share of, or participation in, ultimate reality”[xvi]. Since God is the Supreme, Ultimate Being, it follows that ultimate reality refers to God. In this way, our essence partakes in God and is enjoined to God. This explains why Spinoza claims in his Metaphysical Thoughts that we understand objects created by God through God’s attributes[xvii] (the attributes of thought and extension because these are the only attributes of God accessible to the human mind). According to Spinoza, the attribute of thought gives rise to the mode thought/soul (pertaining to their essence), the attribute of extension gives rise to the mode of body. [xviii] In this way, if the mode of thought dies, the soul dies with it, although the attribute of thought, belonging to God, never dies, just as God exists eternally[xix]. The same is true of the body’s relation to extension. Although the body dies, God’s attribute of extension does not die[xx].

This asymmetry between objects and their modes impacts on how Spinoza thinks about what can unite with what. Therefore, objects who, like us, undergo change and death, do not unite with attributes which do not change or die, like God[xxi].  Ideas do change and die so are united with objects because ideas derive their existence from the object[xxii].  On the opening page of Appendix 2, Spinoza admits that he sees the mind/body union as being due to the soul changing with the body[xxiii]. This, I maintain, is consistent with what Spinoza claims about how the soul survives bodily death. During life, the main union is between the soul/idea and the body. On death, the soul avoids dying with the body by uniting with God, who exists eternally. God’s attribute of thought is perfect, so gaining true, adequate ideas during our lifetime helps boost the immortal part of soul, so helping us unite with God and achieve immortality.

How does all the above help us to understand Spinoza’s concept of the essence of the soul, which he claims is his main point in Appendix 2? Spinoza draws the conclusion that the definition of the essence of the human soul is:

“Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or “objective” essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, &c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension.”[xxiv]

The core of this definition is that the essence of the human soul involves an existing idea or the objective essence which flows from God’s attribute of thought. Shortly after this passage in the B version of the manuscript, Spinoza rolls the soul/idea/objective essence all together when he writes that “the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises…”[xxv]. As I showed earlier in this chapter, objective essence, thought, idea, and the soul are interconnecting concepts. Objective essence is understood through an idea and denotes the real existence of an idea. In this way, they are interrelated and combine into what the soul constitutes. Spinoza maintains in this above definition of the essence of the soul that the soul is interlinked with the essence of an object, essence being what partakes in and enjoins to God. I suggest these arguments help formulate Spinoza’s theory that increasing one's amount of adequate ideas boosts the part of one's soul which lives on after bodily death (by having a closer union to God than with the dying body).

When Spinoza expands on what he means by “in fact exists in Nature”, he briefly explains that he wants to “include” all the modes of all the attributes of God, not just the two we know about, namely, thought and extension[xxvi]. Thus, I gather that Spinoza contends that all of God’s attributes have modes, and each have souls[xxvii]. Hence, although Spinoza spends most of the time arguing for what could be described as an intellectual soul, it seems to me that, in this brief statement,  he may leave explanatory room for bodies (the modes of the attribute of extension) to also have a soul. How many souls does an object have, for Spinoza? One for every mode which flows from an attribute of God? If both the mode of extension and the mode of thought have a soul each, then this, I suggest, may be one way of continuing Spinoza’s mind/body parallelism after death. Indeed, Spinoza goes on to further analyse the concept of modes of extension, especially because it is already relatively well understood and we have no knowledge of the other attributes of God so one can only somewhat glean these through the attributes of God we do know (thought, extension)[xxviii]. Spinoza runs the following brief argument which makes deductions from what we know about extension to what we are less familiar with about the essence of the human body’s soul.

1. Assume (from Spinoza’s aforementioned arguments in the Short Treatise) that:

extension has two modes: motion and rest

2. Every particular material thing’s existence depends on a proportion of both motion and rest

(not one or the other)[xxix]

3. Motion and rest have an “actual ratio”[xxx]

4. Actual ratio has an objective essence (in God’s attribute of thought) which is the soul of the body[xxxi]

Hence, the soul/idea of the body changes with the changes of ratio between motion and rest.[xxxii]

Spinoza also maintains that these fluctuations in bodily motion and rest trigger biological and psychological feelings we experience during our lifetime[xxxiii]. He provides examples of physical feelings such as pain, cold, heat and also accounts for the apparent contractions we experience when different parts of the body undergo different proportions of motion and rest[xxxiv]. For instance, Spinoza illustrates this by explaining how one part of the body, eg the eyes, may be more sensitive to pain and more easily injured than another part, eg the hands[xxxv]. Spinoza also factors in external materials and forces impacting on the body (such as the material differences between wood and iron and how they produce different levels of pain in the human body) when calculating differences in motion and rest on the human body[xxxvi]. He also specifies emotional feelings such as happiness we feel when doing something we enjoy or when resting when the balance of proportion between motion and rest are regained[xxxvii]. By understanding feelings, Spinoza argues, one understands oneself better, including one’s life experiences and one’s faculty of reasoning[xxxviii].

In this way, to conclude Appendix 2, Spinoza ties together both life and death[xxxix]. By analysing feelings which arise from motion and rest, we understand the soul’s role in how we think and feel during our lifetime and how this relates to gaining knowledge of ourselves, our thoughts and experiences in life. After death, through his theory of the soul’s immortality (especially in his preface to part 2, his chapter 23 and Appendix 2) his readers understand how the soul becomes immortal by uniting closely with the immanent presence of God after bodily death. I suggested previously, this includes both collective immortality and personal immortality. This, I suggest, may have further textual support in Appendix 2 when Spinoza explains particularity. First he clarifies that attributes are all equal, as are the essences of modes[xl]. Then he maintains that when modes acquire existence, they are no longer equal with attributes because they now exist through the attribute so their essence becomes subject to that attribute[xli].  So when modes exist, they adopt their own particular essence, thereby becoming a particular rather than being an idea which does not have particularity, making it in line with Nature, as “there is none in Nature” [xlii]. Perhaps, I suggest, Spinoza’s explanation of particular modes here in his Appendix 2 of his Short Treatise could shed light on how souls, while they exist during life and death, can be unique, particular souls which carry through their personal identity.




[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), 161, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[ii] Spinoza, 157.
[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Commentary’, in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910), 167, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[iv] Wolf, 195.
[v] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 23.
[vi] Spinoza, 24.
[vii] Spinoza, 23.
[viii] Spinoza, 159–60.
[ix] Spinoza, 157.
[x] Spinoza, 158.
[xi] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short Treatise’, 168.
[xii] Wolf, 168–69.
[xiii] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 160.
[xiv] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short Treatise’, 168.
[xv] Wolf, 168–69.
[xvi] Wolf, 167.
[xvii] Wolf, 167.
[xviii] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 157.
[xix] Spinoza, 157.
[xx] Spinoza, 157.
[xxi] Spinoza, 159.
[xxii] Spinoza, 158.
[xxiii] Spinoza, 157.
[xxiv] Spinoza, 159.
[xxv] Spinoza, 160.
[xxvi] Spinoza, 159.
[xxvii] Spinoza, 159.
[xxviii] Spinoza, 161.
[xxix] Spinoza, 161.
[xxx] Spinoza, 161.
[xxxi] Spinoza, 161.
[xxxii] Spinoza, 161.
[xxxiii] Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxiv] Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxv] Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxvi] Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxvii] Spinoza, 162.
[xxxviii] Spinoza, 162.
[xxxix] Spinoza, 162.
[xl] Spinoza, 160.
[xli] Spinoza, 160.
[xlii] Spinoza, 160.
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