Chapter 9:
Spinoza’s Appendix 2 in his Short Treatise : ‘On the Human Soul’
In Appendix 2, Spinoza aims to
rationally discover and explain the essence of (nature of) the human soul[i].
Appendix 2 reiterates many of the concepts he’s previously explored in chapter
23 and his preface to part 2, which I have discussed in my part 2 of this volume. So I shall
focus on definitions and arguments which give a deeper layer of meaning or another
angle of perspective to analyse what Appendix 2 adds and how it makes use of
some key concepts and other definitions stated earlier in the Short Treatise.
Spinoza starts by highlighting that,
amongst other things, humans are a “created finite thing” before going on to
deduce what logically “necessarily follows from that”[ii].
What does the concept of being created and finite mean and what assumptions
does it carry? As I mentioned in my chapter 7, one can read finite here as
meaning that humans have not existed for eternity. For current purposes, I
shall take eternity to simply signify, as Wolf put it in his accompanying
commentary to the Short Treatise, “reality independently of time or beyond it”[iii].
This coheres with Wolf’s quotation of Spinoza’s Metaphysical Thoughts later in
his commentary[iv]
where Spinoza seems to conceptualise eternity as being non-sequential and
unchanging. So, one cannot pick out a time slice, say, afterwards at time X,
because eternity does not function like this. Given, as I mentioned in chapter
7, humans came into existence after other things, their existence is not
eternal but sequential (ie in relation to when other things existed, unlike,
for instance God who is eternal). How should one understand Spinoza’s concept
that humans are created? Spinoza defines creation (no longer occurring in
Nature) early in the Short Treatise as referring to both a thing’s essence, its
nature, as well as existence[v]. Maybe,
I suggest, Spinoza does not discuss creation ex nihilo in the way philosophers
expect him to because he does not use the term create to refer to creation from
nothing but rather from something pre-existing[vi]. What
one thinks of as constant creation, Spinoza terms generation (which only refers
to its existence and he thinks still occurs in Nature)[vii].
Not only does Spinoza assume these concepts later but, in Appendix 2, Spinoza
also refers readers back to his chapter 9, part 1, where he depicts an idea as
being something God created and objectively has the formal essence of
everything in it[viii].
All created things’ essences are contained in God[ix].
Putting this together, it makes sense that, given an idea has essence, it is
created because creation denotes a thing’s essence and existence.
Breaking down the terminology further,
one can relate Spinoza writing that an idea objectively has formal essence to
how he goes on to define formal essence and objective essence. Formal essence
combines the attribute of thought with the object and objective essence which denotes
the real existence of idea[x].
However, the terms objective and subjective now mean the opposite of what they
meant in the Early Modern period[xi],
so it is easy for the contemporary reader to misunderstand them. In Spinoza’s
day, objective meant an object of thought, unlike contemporary usage where
things relating to thought are termed subjective[xii].
This helps to make sense of Spinoza’s statement that objective essence is
understood through the idea[xiii],
since ideas are thoughts of a mind. Whereas the term subjective, for Early
Modern philosophers, took its meaning from the prefix sub, suggesting something beneath. Hence it was
used to describe the reality underpinning the properties of a thing or subject[xiv].
Thus, when we predicate[xv]
something as being true of someone, eg person A is a Y (Y is predicated of
person A) we are saying something about the reality underpinning the property Y
that person A possesses so we learn something real about that person. Reality
is a pivotal concept in the term essence. Here, I shall be working with the
concise definition of this complex term provided by Wolf in his commentary on
the text, namely, “that the essence of a thing is its share of, or
participation in, ultimate reality”[xvi].
Since God is the Supreme, Ultimate Being, it follows that ultimate reality
refers to God. In this way, our essence partakes in God and is enjoined to God.
This explains why Spinoza claims in his Metaphysical Thoughts that we
understand objects created by God through God’s attributes[xvii]
(the attributes of thought and extension because these are the only attributes
of God accessible to the human mind). According to Spinoza, the attribute of
thought gives rise to the mode thought/soul (pertaining to their essence), the
attribute of extension gives rise to the mode of body. [xviii]
In this way, if the mode of thought dies, the soul dies with it, although the attribute
of thought, belonging to God, never dies, just as God exists eternally[xix].
The same is true of the body’s relation to extension. Although the body dies,
God’s attribute of extension does not die[xx].
This asymmetry between objects and
their modes impacts on how Spinoza thinks about what can unite with what.
Therefore, objects who, like us, undergo change and death, do not unite with
attributes which do not change or die, like God[xxi]. Ideas do change and die so are united with
objects because ideas derive their existence from the object[xxii]. On the opening page of Appendix 2, Spinoza
admits that he sees the mind/body union as being due to the soul changing with
the body[xxiii].
This, I maintain, is consistent with what Spinoza claims about how the soul
survives bodily death. During life, the main union is between the soul/idea and
the body. On death, the soul avoids dying with the body by uniting with God,
who exists eternally. God’s attribute of thought is perfect, so gaining true,
adequate ideas during our lifetime helps boost the immortal part of soul, so
helping us unite with God and achieve immortality.
How does all the above help us to
understand Spinoza’s concept of the essence of the soul, which he claims is his
main point in Appendix 2? Spinoza draws the conclusion that the definition of
the essence of the human soul is:
“Therefore the essence of the soul
consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or “objective”
essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which
in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, &c.,
without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of
extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each
its soul, just as in the case of extension.”[xxiv]
The core of this definition is that
the essence of the human soul involves an existing idea or the objective
essence which flows from God’s attribute of thought. Shortly after this passage
in the B version of the manuscript, Spinoza rolls the soul/idea/objective
essence all together when he writes that “the soul, the idea, or objective
essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises…”[xxv].
As I showed earlier in this chapter, objective essence, thought, idea, and the
soul are interconnecting concepts. Objective essence is understood through an
idea and denotes the real existence of an idea. In this way, they are interrelated
and combine into what the soul constitutes. Spinoza maintains in this above definition
of the essence of the soul that the soul is interlinked with the essence of an
object, essence being what partakes in and enjoins to God. I suggest these arguments
help formulate Spinoza’s theory that increasing one's amount of adequate ideas boosts
the part of one's soul which lives on after bodily death (by having a closer union
to God than with the dying body).
When Spinoza expands on what he means
by “in fact exists in Nature”, he briefly explains that he wants to “include” all
the modes of all the attributes of God, not just the two we know about, namely,
thought and extension[xxvi].
Thus, I gather that Spinoza contends that all of God’s attributes have modes,
and each have souls[xxvii].
Hence, although Spinoza spends most of the time arguing for what could be
described as an intellectual soul, it seems to me that, in this brief
statement, he may leave explanatory room
for bodies (the modes of the attribute of extension) to also have a soul. How
many souls does an object have, for Spinoza? One for every mode which flows
from an attribute of God? If both the mode of extension and the mode of thought
have a soul each, then this, I suggest, may be one way of continuing Spinoza’s
mind/body parallelism after death. Indeed, Spinoza goes on to further analyse
the concept of modes of extension, especially because it is already relatively
well understood and we have no knowledge of the other attributes of God so one can
only somewhat glean these through the attributes of God we do know (thought,
extension)[xxviii].
Spinoza runs the following brief argument which makes deductions from what we know
about extension to what we are less familiar with about the essence of the human
body’s soul.
1. Assume (from Spinoza’s aforementioned
arguments in the Short Treatise) that:
extension
has two modes: motion and rest
2.
Every particular material thing’s existence depends on a proportion of both motion
and rest
(not
one or the other)[xxix]
3.
Motion and rest have an “actual ratio”[xxx]
4.
Actual ratio has an objective essence (in God’s attribute of thought) which is
the soul of the body[xxxi]
Hence,
the soul/idea of the body changes with the changes of ratio between motion and
rest.[xxxii]
Spinoza also maintains that these
fluctuations in bodily motion and rest trigger biological and psychological feelings
we experience during our lifetime[xxxiii].
He provides examples of physical feelings such as pain, cold, heat and also
accounts for the apparent contractions we experience when different parts of the
body undergo different proportions of motion and rest[xxxiv].
For instance, Spinoza illustrates this by explaining how one part of the body,
eg the eyes, may be more sensitive to pain and more easily injured than another
part, eg the hands[xxxv].
Spinoza also factors in external materials and forces impacting on the body (such as the material
differences between wood and iron and how they produce different levels of pain
in the human body) when calculating differences in motion and rest on the human
body[xxxvi].
He also specifies emotional feelings such as happiness we feel when doing
something we enjoy or when resting when the balance of proportion between
motion and rest are regained[xxxvii].
By understanding feelings, Spinoza argues, one understands oneself better,
including one’s life experiences and one’s faculty of reasoning[xxxviii].
In this way, to conclude Appendix
2, Spinoza ties together both life and death[xxxix].
By analysing feelings which arise from motion and rest, we understand the soul’s
role in how we think and feel during our lifetime and how this relates to
gaining knowledge of ourselves, our thoughts and experiences in life. After
death, through his theory of the soul’s immortality (especially in his preface
to part 2, his chapter 23 and Appendix 2) his readers understand how the soul
becomes immortal by uniting closely with the immanent presence of God after
bodily death. I suggested previously, this includes both collective immortality
and personal immortality. This, I suggest, may have further textual support in
Appendix 2 when Spinoza explains particularity. First he clarifies that
attributes are all equal, as are the essences of modes[xl].
Then he maintains that when modes acquire existence, they are no longer equal with
attributes because they now exist through the attribute so their essence becomes
subject to that attribute[xli].
So when modes exist, they adopt their
own particular essence, thereby becoming a particular rather than being an idea
which does not have particularity, making it in line with Nature, as “there is none
in Nature” [xlii].
Perhaps, I suggest, Spinoza’s explanation of particular modes here in his Appendix
2 of his Short Treatise could shed light on how souls, while they exist during
life and death, can be unique, particular souls which carry through their personal
identity.
[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short
Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf
(London: A. & C. Black, 1910), 161, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[ii] Spinoza, 157.
[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Commentary’, in Spinoza’s
Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C.
Black, 1910), 167,
https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[iv] Wolf, 195.
[v] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 23.
[vi] Spinoza, 24.
[vii] Spinoza, 23.
[viii]
Spinoza, 159–60.
[ix] Spinoza, 157.
[x] Spinoza, 158.
[xi] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short
Treatise’, 168.
[xii] Wolf, 168–69.
[xiii]
Spinoza, Short Treatise, 160.
[xiv] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short
Treatise’, 168.
[xv] Wolf, 168–69.
[xvi] Wolf, 167.
[xvii]
Wolf, 167.
[xviii]
Spinoza, Short Treatise, 157.
[xix] Spinoza, 157.
[xx] Spinoza, 157.
[xxi] Spinoza, 159.
[xxii]
Spinoza, 158.
[xxiii]
Spinoza, 157.
[xxiv]
Spinoza, 159.
[xxv] Spinoza, 160.
[xxvi]
Spinoza, 159.
[xxvii]
Spinoza, 159.
[xxviii]
Spinoza, 161.
[xxix]
Spinoza, 161.
[xxx] Spinoza, 161.
[xxxi]
Spinoza, 161.
[xxxii]
Spinoza, 161.
[xxxiii]
Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxiv]
Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxv]
Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxvi]
Spinoza, 161–62.
[xxxvii]
Spinoza, 162.
[xxxviii]
Spinoza, 162.
[xxxix]
Spinoza, 162.
[xl] Spinoza, 160.
[xli] Spinoza, 160.
[xlii]
Spinoza, 160.
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