On Thursday (1/03/18) I battled
my way through the snow and freezing wind to attend Dr. Daniel Whistler’s talk
at the London Spinoza Circle. For details about the talk and his abstract see:
Listening to Whistler’s paper has
given me lots of food for thought and drawn my attention to research areas in
Spinoza I haven’t specifically focused on so far. I expected his topic of how Spinoza
talks about eternity and Ethics V to be the most interesting for me because it
is something I have thought about a great deal, especially since writing my
abstract on life and death in Spinoza, available at:
Nevertheless, I found myself drawn
to and more fascinated by two other topics in his paper. So I discussed these
with him and would like to share what I learnt and how it relates to my philosophy
research.
One topic which Whistler touched
on was Spinoza writing about methodology in his ‘Tractatus de Intellectus
Emendatione’ (On the Improvement of the Understanding) and in particular,
Spinoza’s tool analogy. He was interested in the question of:
Who Spinoza was responding to and
why?
He suggested that the person who
made most sense was Descartes but, if Spinoza was indeed criticising Descartes,
then what does this tell us about Spinoza and Descartes on methodology?
If I understand Whistler
correctly, his impression of Spinoza’s tool analogy is:
Spinoza’s aim is to resolve the
tension in the seemingly circular 4th rule that Descartes expounds
where he, as Whistler puts it, “presupposes what you need”. Furthermore,
Spinoza seems to be arguing against someone (most probably Descartes) who is
claiming that we need to equip ourselves with a method for philosophising ab
initio (ie from the very beginning) before we embark on the activity of
philosophising. In contrast, Spinoza is advocating that, given that we are
always philosophising we can’t help but use a method all the time. Hence,
starting a methodology ab initio is impossible. It is better to reflect on our
methodology as we philosophise. This is illustrated by his analogy of the tool
needing a hammer and vice versa and so on ad infinitum. So the only way to go
from the beginning when we have no tools (or method) to having tools and a
hammer, is to improve what we do have as we go along and thus merely aim to
make progress rather than create everything at once before beginning.
Although this was a relatively
brief passage in Whistler’s paper, this got me thinking. I vaguely remembered
reading something on Descartes over 10 years ago which likened Descartes’s take
on methodology as being like apples in a cart: there are good and rotten apples
all mixed up together and the most efficient way to make sure we separate the
two is by emptying the cart completely and then making sure we only put the
good apples in the cart. So similarly, although we are already and continually
philosophising, we are using a mixture of both good and bad methodology so we
are not consistently reaching only clear and distinct ideas. So it is best to
empty our minds of all we have learnt beforehand, and start afresh from the
beginning and only accept solid methodologies which lead us to clear and
distinct ideas. My worry was that, if this captures Descartes correctly, this
would make Whistler’s account of Spinoza and Descartes seem more similar than
he had wanted. So I asked him about this and discovered that Whistler did agree
that the apple analogy was representative of Descartes on methodology. So then
his concern was that, if Descartes is not similar to the person Spinoza seems
to be refuting, then who is Spinoza arguing against? So he concluded that it is
perhaps best to think of Descartes himself and the Cartesian-like person
Spinoza is arguing against as being distinct from one another, realising that
Descartes may not have held the exact same views as Spinoza is refuting, and
hopefully, this does not adversely affect the overall analysis of Spinoza’s tool
analogy.
Whistler’s question to me: If
Spinoza is not arguing against Descartes, then who is he responding to? stayed with
me on my journey home so I decided to research this further the next day by
examining the primary texts. I found two open access resources to make it
easier to refer to passages from Descartes and Spinoza on this blog:
Descartes, ‘Rules of the Direction of the Mind’, (cited as
RDM) section in an eBook available at: https://ia801600.us.archive.org/6/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.547481/2015.547481.Rules-for.pdf
Spinoza ‘Of the Improvement of the Understanding’, (cited as
TIE) eBook available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1016/1016-h/1016-h.htm
The tool passage in Spinoza’s TIE is
concentrated into [30] – [31] and states:
“[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. (2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is, in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. (3) By such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about in a similar way. (5) For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. (6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron.
[31] (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, complicated mechanisms which they now possess. (31:2) So, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom.” (TIE [30-31])
Assuming I have
the passage in Descartes Whistler had in mind, the title of Rule IV in
Descartes’s ‘Rules of the Direction of the Mind’ states “There is need of a
method for finding out the truth” (RDM page5). Amongst other things, Descartes
expands on this by adding that:
“Moreover by a method I mean certain and simple rules, such that, if a man observe them accurately, he shall never assume what is false as true, and will never spend his mental efforts to no purpose, but will always gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true understanding of all that does not surpass his powers.” (RDM page5)
Descartes
seems concerned that people, including philosophers, chemists and geometricians
“conduct their minds along unexplored routes, having no reason to hope for
success, but being merely willing to risk the experiment” and although such “wanderings”
can unearth “something true” this is mostly due to “luck” (RDM page5). So, to
reduce or eliminate this element of chance in happening upon the truth, Descartes
advocates having a method to avoid “unregulated inquires and confused
reflections” (RDM page5). This would seem to suggest that Descartes thinks of
philosophy as something we are already doing and is on-going, albeit unsatisfactorily
conducted in terms of methodology. However, there is a glimpse of the Descartes
Whistler had in mind and who he thought Spinoza was depicting, when we see Descartes
providing ‘an argument from experience’ to show that we often find that the “mental
powers” of people “who have never taken to letters, give a sounder and clearer
decision about obvious matters than those who have spent all their time in the
schools” (RDM page5). He depicts this vividly when he likens this to “Those who
become accustomed to walk in darkness weaken their eye-sight so much that
afterwards they cannot bear the light of day” (RDM page5). So perhaps Descartes
himself has something in common with the Cartesian-like person Spinoza seems to
be arguing against, in that (although unlike the latter he sees philosophising
as already underway) both Descartes and the person Spinoza may have in mind
both perhaps hold an ab initio approach to philosophy and methodology as an
ideal. This would mean that Whistler may be right in thinking that Spinoza had
Descartes in mind and that his depiction of his views sufficiently captures the
real Descartes to help us examine Spinoza’s passage.
However, on
reading the following few rules Descartes outlines, I started to wonder whether
it would be more helpful to relate Spinoza’s tool analogy to Descartes’s rule
VIII where he tries to build on his three preceding rules, as well as making
use of his other earlier rules. This is because a passage in Descartes’s rule
VIII caught my eye because it bears a striking resemblance to Spinoza’s tool
analogy since Descartes uses the same imagery when he likens methodology to the
mechanical crafts. Like Spinoza, he describes the process of at first being
bereft of any instruments (or as Spinoza would put it, tools) and then
progressing from making use of “a piece of rock instead of a hammer” to making “other
tools” which are more “useful” and advanced before embarking on making objects
eg helmets and swords. This, I think, reflects Descartes’s description of his methodology
in rule IV:
“I, however, conscious of my inadequacy, have resolved that in my investigation into truth I shall follow obstinately such an order as will require me first to start with what is simplest and easiest, and never permit me to proceed farther until in the first sphere there seems to be nothing further to be done.” (RDM page5)
So, this
returns me back to Whistler’s question to me about who Spinoza had in mind. I feel
I still need to research this further before coming to a conclusion about this
and putting forward an interpretation of Spinoza’s TIE. I am also yet to
explore the existing secondary literature discussing this topic in Spinoza and
Descartes, other than listening to Whistler’s paper on Thursday. I shall follow
up his paper by reading the version of it he mentioned he has on his academia
site, although apparently this version focuses on Ethics V, unlike the version
of the paper he read which is larger in scope and explores additional areas.
This shows the value of attending talks rather than just relying on reading
papers and books! I’m pleased I braved the bitter weather to listen to the
version of his paper he presented as it has inspired me to examine aspects of
Spinoza that I previously did not see the direct relevance of in my research.
Although this
aspect of my Spinoza research is still very much a work in progress, my initial
thoughts on this question of who Spinoza had in mind in TIE 30-31, are that Spinoza’s
tool analogy in TIE may be drawing on the analogy that Descartes provides in rule
VIII in his RDM (page13). In particular, Descartes description of a smith
making progress by using the “rough” instruments (RDM page13) around him to
advance his craft into creating ever improving tools leading to complex objects
such as helmets and swords. I would like to further explore the implications of
this, because it seems plausible to me that Spinoza may be agreeing with
Descartes rather than arguing against him, given the similarity of description
between Spinoza’s TIE 30-31 and Descartes’s RDM rule VIII, down to making use
of “instruments supplied by nature” in order to be able to start (TIE [31] (1)).
This has an ab initio aspect to it because it avoids a regress “to infinity” (TIE
[30] (2)) whereby one could never begin because it would mean being stuck in an
infinite regress of needing a tool before having a tool. I suspect that, as
Spinoza does with many philosophers and is known to do with Descartes, he may
be selectively agreeing with some aspects of Descartes’s writings which strike
him as being true and agreeing with his understanding of methodology,
philosophical enquiry and knowledge and his Judaism, while rejecting other
aspects of Cartesian philosophy which do not cohere with his system of thought
and his logical reasoning behind it.
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