Chapter 7: My Logic Framework Analysis of
Spinoza’s Preface to Part 2 of his Short Treatise
Chapter 23 of Spinoza’s Short
Treatise[i],
which I have analysed in my previous chapter, appears in part 2 of this
Treatise. The relevance of which part chapter 23 appears in is that, in the
preface to part 2 of his Short Treatise, Spinoza states he will only examine
things to do with human beings in part 2, having focused on God in part 1[ii].
So, when Spinoza talks about the immortality of the soul in chapter 23[iii],
this should be read as Spinoza arguing for the immortality of the human soul
specifically. Then, at the end of part 2, Spinoza expands on this topic with
the only other section he dedicates to the soul, his appendix 2, entitled ‘On
the Human Soul’[iv].
Before going on to examine Spinoza’s appendix 2[v]
later in this volume, I shall, in this chapter, reconstruct his preface to Part
2 of his Short Treatise[vi]
by bringing out the metaphysical notions and logical structure of his
arguments. In my following chapter (chapter 8), I evaluate Spinoza’s detailed
discussion of the human soul in his preface to part 2, because it provides a
useful point of reference between chapter 23 and appendix 2[vii].
Spinoza’s preface to part 2[viii]
is structured such that the reader has two parallel texts, the main text and
the subtext in footnotes underneath. Both are self-contained yet closely
related to one another, with the subtext expanding on the main text’s reference
to the soul.
The main text[ix]
explains that knowledge of particulars rests on the existence and knowledge of
God, which is possibly why Spinoza philosophised about God in part 1 before
thinking through knowledge of finite particulars which depend on God, namely
humans, in part 2. Spinoza sees humans as finite, not because their souls
cannot achieve immortality, but because they have not existed for eternity[x].
For Spinoza, humans are, what I shall call, a cluster of modes which flow from
the two attributes of thought and extension, which in turn come from the one
substance, God[xi].
In this preface, Spinoza explicitly rejects the notion propounded by
philosophers that humans are a substance, maintaining that proofs of them being
substance are based on “false suppositions”[xii].
In this way, when understanding human nature, one must bear in mind several
notions. One, the human body came into existence after the nature of matter or
body in general so the nature of matter or body cannot simply equate to the
nature of the human body because it predates it[xiii].
Two, which forms the conclusion of his preface and is stated as a rule, that we
know the nature of a particular by understanding the things without which the
particular could neither exist nor be understood[xiv].
Similarly, one must stick to using predicates which could neither exist nor be
intelligible without the particular whose nature one is examining[xv].
In logic, this means that Spinoza thinks that one understands human nature by
stating, asserting, affirming and denying things (for example facts and
arguments) about humans by only using that which is an extremely good fit for
what is true of humans. Thus, Spinoza shall begin the first chapter of part 2
with the “modes” “of which” humans “consist”[xvi].
This relates back to the opening passage of the preface where Spinoza sets out
his stance that a human being “consists of certain modes”, not a substance in
their own right, when he discusses in turn that humans may be made up of
“spirit, soul or body”[xvii].
At this point in the opening
passage of his preface[xviii],
the subtext provides an insight into the proof behind his usage of the word
soul and why he argues that the soul is a mode, not a substance. First, Spinoza
argues using logic, structuring his opening sub-argument, labelled 1[xix],
in the format of denying the disjunct, otherwise known as process of elimination
(see my explanation of this in previous chapter). My reconstruction of
Spinoza’s premise 1 in his footnotes[xx]
is:
P1.i. Either the soul is a
substance or a mode (QvR)
(as argued earlier in his Short
Treatise, substance is not finite so)
ii. the soul is not a substance
(not the first, formalised as ~Q)
Conclusion: Hence, the soul is a
mode
(so the second, formalised as Ⱶ R)
Spinoza follows this with another
process of elimination in his following statement in 2[xxi],
which I suggest takes the form of:
P2. i. The soul (as mode) is either
substantial extension or substantial thought (TvY)
ii. it is not substantial extension
(not the first, formalised as ~T)
Conclusion: Hence, the soul is substantial
thought
(so the second, ⱵY)
Then for the next step in his
argument, Spinoza builds on his previous conclusions that substance is infinite
and thought is an attribute of God, who is the one and only substance[xxii],
which I characterise as the definition:
P3. Substantial thought is an
“attribute of God” which is infinitely perfect
This leads Spinoza to give a
relevant definition of perfect thought, highlighting a necessary condition for
thought to qualify as being perfect[xxiii],
which I think is reminiscent of omniscience:
P4. A necessary condition for
perfect thought is for it to know, have an idea or mode of thought of
absolutely all real things, including substance and modes.
Then in note 5[xxiv],
Spinoza expands on the notion of all real things by specifying this means
knowledge of every particular (metaphysical term for individual things,
objects, qualities etc. and, most relevantly here, humans) which continually
comes into existence:
P5. All real things defines as
all particulars “which are constantly coming into existence”[xxv]
P6. The soul of a particular
(human) is this type of perfect knowledge ie. knowledge of, an idea of or mode
of thought of real particulars
Spinoza furthers this with a
description (perhaps a definition of sorts) of real particulars. He now also
adds the similar but contrasting notion of bodies through the concept of
substantial substance which he introduced in note 2[xxvii]:
P7. All real particulars, in
terms of being substantial substance (bodies) are real due to “motion and rest”[xxviii]
P8. Changes in the proportions
between motion and rest give rise to differences in particulars and what we
predicate of them
In note 9[xxx],
Spinoza continues to expand his notions of motion and rest to draw two further
sub-conclusions in which he now explicitly refers to our body and soul:
P9. i. our human bodily existence
is related to motion and rest (and their proportions)
Spinoza gives more precise,
practical details to illustrate his argument and concepts[xxxii],
especially concerning life and death, which my reconstruction captures thus:
P10. i. Our bodies have different
proportions of motion and rest at different life stages, namely embryonic
stage, post-natal stage and death.
ii. Pre-birth, post-natal and
post-death, there is a knowledge of, idea of, mode of thought “of our body in
the thinking” particular[xxxiii]
iii. this knowledge, idea, mode
of thinking changes in proportion, in relation to motion and rest
P11. Thus, substantial thought
has knowledge, an idea of, mode of thought of our body. And this knowledge etc.
is of an unique body. The knowledge etc., body and soul are all unique to that
individual. Otherwise, the knowledge
would not be true knowledge because it would not be true of that individual.
(So it would fulfil the definition of substantial thought as perfect, infinite
knowledge and as an attribute of God because, otherwise, it would be false ie not true of
that individual.)
Spinoza builds on this in his 12th
note[xxxv],
where he illustrates his notion with his mathematical theory of proportions to
change. Looking at an original manuscript copy of the Short Treatise held by
the Koninklijke Bibliotheek in The Hague, Netherlands, it would seem the
example of proportion used in this preface is being expressed verbally as “van
1 tot 3”[xxxvi]. My understanding of these words in Dutch is
that it means the proportion is from 1 to 3. How should we visualise this
mathematically? I think it is an open question whether this phrase specifies a
ratio 1:3 or ⅓. The advantage of thinking of it as a ratio is that
ratios can help express a scale which would suit the wording of from….to and
how Spinoza talks about life being within this range and death outside of it.
Further textual evidence may support a ratio reading, because shortly after
this preface, in chapter 1 of part 2 of the Short Treatise, Spinoza gives the
example of knowing a mathematical rule which involves the use of ratio
calculations, the Rule of Three[xxxvii].
Moreover, Spinoza explicitly uses the word ratio when discussing motion and
rest in appendix 2 of the Short Treatise[xxxviii].
The possible disadvantage of this is that there are a finite amount of ratios
so ratios produce a limited amount of variety and uniqueness. If one were to
think of Spinoza’s proportion as a fraction, this would eliminate the potential
problem because there are, strictly speaking, an infinite amount of possible
fractions, so the proportion could be unique to each individual. However, this
apparent problem could be resolved by thinking of the proportion 1 to 3 as
merely an aid for calculating when a given person would be dead or alive,
rather than denoting their personal identity, which can be identified and known
by other means. I read Spinoza’s note 12[xxxix]
as setting out the following hypothesis:
P12. Suppose person A has the
proportion 1:3. Then their body and soul will be somewhat capable of change
within this ratio.
So, Spinoza is not relying on knowledge per se
or tracking knowledge X for his account of life, death and immortality. In the
12th to 14th steps of his argument[xl],
Spinoza seems to argue that the exact proportion of motion and rest of an
individual plays a vital role in life and death because a person stays alive
throughout their changes while they stay within their assigned ratios but die
when they go outside of the range of their ratio. Note 13[xli]
I read as claiming:
P13. Change cannot happen without
the soul and the soul undergoes a corresponding change. Other bodies acting on
us prompts change in an individual. The soul is aware of changes the individual
undergoes.
There seems to be some editorial
debate about how to understand the soul’s awareness of change, and without
Spinoza’s own original manuscript it is difficult to come to a definite
conclusion on this. However, it is perhaps interesting to bear in mind the
possibilities mentioned in the editorial footnotes accompanying this edition of
Spinoza’s Short Treatise[xlii].
Boehmer suggests involving the notion of consciousness in this process of the
soul’s awareness, which would imply the soul has consciousness[xliii].
Then there is a choice between calling the change the soul is aware of
“feeling” or “sensibility”[xliv]. Note 14[xlv],
I suggest, argues:
P14. When such external bodies
act so strongly on the individual that they make the individual lose their
ratio of motion and rest, say 1:3, then the individual dies. If the soul were
only capable of having knowledge of, an idea of the body’s motion and rest,
then it would also die, which would constitute “annihilation of the soul”[xlvi].
Spinoza’s note 15[xlvii]
then forms the following conclusion of how the soul can become eternal rather
than die with the material body:
Conclusion. But the soul is a mode of the thinking
substance (God). So it not only knows and loves extension but also this
thinking substance. The thinking substance is always the same and is eternal.
Therefore, the soul can be eternal by uniting with the eternal thinking
substance, God.
[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short
Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf
(London: A. & C. Black, 1910),
https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.
[ii] Spinoza, 63.
[iii] Spinoza, Short Treatise.
[iv] Spinoza.
[v] Spinoza.
[vi] Spinoza.
[vii] Spinoza.
[viii]
Spinoza.
[ix] Spinoza, 63–66.
[x] Spinoza, 64.
[xi] Spinoza, 63.
[xii] Spinoza, 64.
[xiii]
Spinoza, 64–65.
[xiv] Spinoza, 65–66.
[xv] Spinoza, 66.
[xvi] Spinoza, 66.
[xvii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xviii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xix] Spinoza, 63.
[xx] Spinoza, 66.
[xxi] Spinoza, 63.
[xxii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxiii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxiv]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxv] Spinoza, 63.
[xxvi]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxvii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxviii]
Spinoza, 63.
[xxix]
Spinoza, 63–64.
[xxx] Spinoza, 64.
[xxxi]
Spinoza, 64.
[xxxii]
Spinoza, 64.
[xxxiii]
Spinoza, 64.
[xxxiv]
Spinoza, 64.
[xxxv]
Spinoza, 64–65.
[xxxvi]
Benedict de Spinoza, ‘“Korte verhandeling
van God, de mensch en desselvs welstand”’, trans. J. Jelles and J. Monnikhoff
(circa 17th/18th century), 61–62,
https://www.kb.nl/en/resources-research-guides/kb-collections/collections-by-theme/benedictus-de-spinoza-collection,
https://galerij.kb.nl/kb.html#/nl/spinoza/page/7/zoom/2/lat/-77.87881372624744/lng/-42.1875.
[xxxvii]
Spinoza, Short Treatise, 67–68.
[xxxviii]
Spinoza, 161.
[xxxix]
Spinoza, 64–65.
[xl] Spinoza, 64–65.
[xli] Spinoza, 65.
[xlii]
Spinoza, 65.
[xliii]
Spinoza, 65.
[xliv]
Spinoza, 65.
[xlv] Spinoza, 65.
[xlvi]
Spinoza, 65.
[xlvii]
Spinoza, 65.
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