Spinoza vol 3 ebook: Chapter 7: On Oppression in Spinoza’s TP

Chapter 7: On Oppression in Spinoza’s TP

In this chapter, I shall focus on the topic of oppression since it runs throughout the TP and therefore is pivotal. There is also relatively little Spinozian research on oppression in the TP and when it does arise, oppression is usually addressed through other themes, rather than as a topic in its own right. When it is mentioned in secondary literature, in relation to Spinoza’s other texts, it tends to take on an autocratic, Hobbesian flavour, which I think is a mistake. Like Barbone and Rice[i], I maintain that Spinoza and Hobbes are in no way compatible.

I shall explore and analyse oppression in more depth than hitherto in this volume. My main focus will be on analysing the following passage in chapter 1, section 5 of Spinoza’s TP:

1)“…unde fit, ut, cum omnes pariter appetant primi esse, in contentiones veniant, et quantum possunt

2)nitantur se invicem opprimere, et qui victor evadit, magis glorietur, quod alteri obfuit, quam quod

3)sibi profuit Ɨ. Et quamvis omnes persuasi sint, Religionem contra docere, ut unusquisque proximum 

4)tanquam se ipsum amet, hoc est ut jus alterius perinde ac suum defendat, hanc tamen 

5)persuasionem in affectus parum posse ostendimus Ɨ Ɨ. Valet quidem in articulo mortis, quando 

6)scilicet morbus ipsos affectus vicit, et homo segnis jacet, vel in templis, ubi homines nullum exercent 

7)commercium: at minime in foro vel in aula, ubi maxime necesse esset.”[ii]

(Volten, Land edition 1895; line numbering mine for ease of reference)

Elwes translates this as:

“And so it comes to pass, that, as all are equally eager to be first, they fall to strife, and do their utmost mutually to oppress one another; and he who comes out conqueror is more proud of the harm he has done to the other, than of the good he has done to himself. And although all are persuaded, that religion, on the contrary, teaches every man to love his neighbour as himself, that is to defend another’s right just as much as his own, yet we showed that this persuasion has too little power over the passions. It avails, indeed, in the hour of death, when disease has subdued the very passions, and man lies inert, or in temples, where men hold no traffic, but least of all, where it is most needed, in the law-court or the palace.”[iii]

Shirley words his translation thus:

“Consequently, since all men are equally desirous of pre-eminence, they fall to quarrelling and strive their utmost to best one another; and he who emerges victorious is more elated at having hindered someone else than at having gained an advantage for himself.¹⁶ And although all are convinced that religion, on the other hand, teaches that each should love his neighbour as himself, that is, that he should uphold another’s right just as his own, we have shown that this conviction is of little avail against the passions.¹⁷ It is effective, no doubt, at death’s door, that is, when sickness has subdued the passions and a man lies helpless; or again in places of worship where men have no dealings with one another; but it has no weight in law-court or palace, where it would be needed most of all.”[iv]

Comparing these two translations highlights some features of Spinoza’s Latin text which one needs to bear in mind when interpreting his philosophy and his stance on oppression.

In terms of ensuring the English versions closely represent Spinoza’s meaning, I prefer Elwes’s wording of “first”[v] (see line 1 above) when translating the word primi, rather than Shirley’s choice of “pre-eminence”[vi] because Elwes is showing that primi comes from primus-a-um meaning “first, foremost” but can also specify being the “most distinguished” in “rank” or “station”[vii]. Although pre-eminence somewhat equates to this meaning of being a cut above the rest, I think the word ‘first’ gives the reader a better flavour of the literal sense of the Latin. This raises the question: Who wants to be a cut above the rest? Is it all men (but perhaps not women) or all people? Earlier in line 1 above, the Latin word omnes (from omnis) does not differ between masculine and feminine usages and its general sense gives the notion of entirety, for instance, everything, all of a number, a whole person or thing[viii]. So, although it is not incorrect to translate it as all men, I suggest it is not necessary to emphasise or specify the masculine in the context of this passage in Spinoza’s TP. Readers need to bear in mind a distinction between language being somewhat gendered (such as the habit of referring to all people by using a masculine form of a word, for example, mankind) and Spinoza’s philosophical concepts which may be attempting to transcend such linguistic habits or restrictions of common usage. Thus, as part of the analytic-feminist strand of my interpretation of Spinoza, I prefer Elwes’s translation[ix] of omnes as simply meaning all people, irrespective of gender. 

Nevertheless, when it comes to the word contentiones three words later (line 1), there are some merits to both translation choices. Shirley’s choice of “quarrelling”[x] provides consistency with Spinoza’s TP chapter 6 where he also uses the word contentiones, as I discussed in my previous chapter[xi]. However, Elwes is perhaps attempting to bring out the Latin sense of competitive and combative “strife”[xii] which is an additional meaning of contentiones[xiii]. This would be in line with Cicero’s usage of the word to depict conflict in the context of war or people competing against each other[xiv]. I think this gives an added layer to the possible meanings and implications of the word contentiones. As we saw in my previous chapter, Spinoza uses contentiones when referring to personal conflicts such as quarrels between parents and children but uses discordiis to refer to political dissent. Spinoza is not discussing political dissent in the passage above so one would expect him to choose contentiones over discordiis. If one looks ahead to see the context of this sentence in chapter 1, section 5 of the TP, one finds that Spinoza, perhaps, has both the individual and the collective in mind. This time, these personal quarrels also take place in the broader context of law courts, palaces and places of worship which should uphold what is right and just in society.

At the individual level, Spinoza is showing how people’s passions should be aligned with upholding justice and rights for everyone, not just for themselves, through their religious belief in loving one’s neighbour as one would oneself. However, Spinoza observes that this is often not the case in life, possibly because people allow their more ferocious passions to override such ethical, social, legal and religious principles, until it is too late and they are weakened by sickness and imminent death. Thus, I suggest, this passage contains pivotal notions within Spinoza’s philosophy of life and death as well as his philosophy of justice. As I discussed in my volume 1 on Spinoza, chapter 6, justice and charity are closely interlinked in Judaism and are a prerequisite for making “the world a better place”[xv], to hasten the coming of the Moshiach, when God will uncover the spiritual dimension of the material world. Indeed, the Hebrew word for charity, tzedakah, means justice, showing how the two concepts are interwoven. It obliges a Jew to act justly towards others as part of leading an ethical, religiously Jewish life. Judaism places a great emphasis on doing good deeds in this life, in this world, to correct injustices committed now. Justice and charity are:

·         an ethical end in themselves in this world

·         a way of leading a life which loves and obeys God who loves justice and charity

·         a preparation for the world to come

Thus, Spinoza argues for making the effort to be a righteous person during life, not leaving it until the eleventh hour to repent in time for death to secure a better afterlife for oneself[xvi]. It therefore follows, amongst other reasons, such as the ones I raised in my previous chapter[xvii], that Spinoza would not have a Hobbesian might is right stance, because it goes against the Jewish principle of justice. So, in this passage, Spinoza emphasises the importance of seeing the value of upholding justice throughout life, both as an individual and as a collective, including justice systems such as law courts and royal courts[xviii]. Perhaps the ethical message here is to remind people to live justly now, not wait until they have a crisis of conscience on their deathbed, when it is too late to have much impact on the quality of people’s lives as well as society as a whole.

In this way, one can see how the principle of upholding others’ rights leads into and informs the topic of the problem of oppression, making section 5[xix] a very cohesive and informative passage. However, a striking difference between these two translations is that Elwes[xx] has explicitly highlighted the topic of oppression by translating opprimere (line 2 above) as oppress, unlike Shirley[xxi], who depicts the competitive situation of trying to better one another.

Such translation variations gives non-Latin readers of the TP a very different sense of Spinoza’s philosophy and how much importance he places on the topic of oppression, whereas, for the Latin reader, the word opprimere in this section 5 remains the same across the main published editions of Spinoza’s TP in Latin, such as Bruder (1844)[xxii], Vloten and Land (1895)[xxiii] and Gebhardt (1925)[xxiv]. The nuances, however, between these Latin texts, I find, lie in analysing differences in punctuation which can give a fresh perspective on where emphases and subclauses may have been placed. As I shall discuss later in this chapter, there are additional, informative footnotes at the bottom of the page between Latin editions which provide vital background information or remind the reader of similar passages in Spinoza’s other works. This enables the reader to fully appreciate the textual evidence of Spinoza’s consistency of argument and thought across all his works and body of philosophy. Although, on the rare occasion there is a different spelling between the Latin editions, so far, I have not found this an interpretative obstacle. For instance, Bruder[xxv] contains the word quum whereas Vloten and Land[xxvi] as well as Gebhardt[xxvii] give the word cum. However, they both effectively mean the same thing and are akin to variant spellings so it does not impact on our understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy.

The question remains: Did Spinoza wish to explicitly raise the topic of oppression in this passage or not? I would argue that Spinoza is explicitly discussing the problem of oppression here because oppression, indeed a very strong type of oppression, is a literal meaning of opprimere (opprimo-ere-pressi-pressum). Opprimere has two main meanings, but I think in the context of Spinoza’s sentence here, one can discount the second meaning of surprise/catch by surprise. This leaves only one other option, that of oppression in its various manifestations. The generic meaning is “to press upon, press down; often with destructive force, to crush.”[xxviii] Other equivalent meanings can include to overthrow or overwhelm. Cicero used the verb opprimere to depict extinguishing (a candle) in his De Senectute, as well as more literally elsewhere, to mean “to weigh down, burden, crush, suppress”[xxix]. Thus, Elwes retains the literal meaning of the Latin when he translates it as “mutually to oppress one another”[xxx] whereas in Shirley’s version[xxxi], there is more translator’s licence. The phrase to best one another is not in keeping with the equivalent English words for opprimere and is an awkward, lesser-used phrase which does not help the flow and readability of Spinoza’s passage. The phrase besting each other also ignores the element of, and Spinoza’s possible awareness of, the destructive behaviour involved in suppression and oppression revealed through Spinoza’s choice of words[xxxii].

Now the question remains: Who does Spinoza think behaves more destructively in conflict? The victorious one who has and can continue to oppress and harm the vanquished? Or the one who escapes the victor in the interest of preventing further harm, prejudice and oppression? Many people would consider escaping/retreating a cowardly option. Nevertheless, fleeing or retreating would do damage limitation in cases of war where the victors go on to oppress, harm and be prejudiced against the conquered. How is Spinoza criticising the destructive behaviour of conquerors? By describing observations of how some have treated the vanquished badly? Or by praising the wisdom of the ones who escape the victor rather than battling on or surrendering, which could cause further harm?

I suggest the clause “et qui victor evadit, magis glorietur, quod alteri obfuit, quam quod sibi profuit”[xxxiii] (lines 2-3 above) is more complex to understand than it seems at first glance. My interpretation keeps an open mind whether there is only one way to read Spinoza’s sub-argument here. I suggest there are two main ways to possibly read these words, both of which bring their own set of advantages and disadvantages.

One way to understand this conqueror/conquered argument (which I shall refer to as Reading A) is to stay with a meaning which is along the same lines as the two above translations by Elwes and Shirley. On this account, Spinoza would be arguing that victorious people take more pride and happiness in harming and hindering people they win against, than in gaining an advantage or good for themselves. Although this attitude flies in the face of the religious, ethical principle of love thy neighbour as yourself, which also equates to defending and upholding their rights as you would your own, the passions often override this principle during their lifetime until they are on their deathbed[xxxiv]. So the subject of the clause (et qui…profuit) is the victorious one (victor) and the clause is read as comparing two things using the structure magis…quam (more…than) to express how the conqueror/winner is more proud/happy because of one thing than because of another (magis…quod…quam quod…)[xxxv]. On this view, magis is an adverb meaning more, to a greater extent. Glorietur is taken to come from glorior which means to pride oneself (as Elwes[xxxvi] has used it) but can also mean to glory or boast/brag. Glorior does not equate to being happy or elated so to achieve a more literal understanding of Spinoza’s precise meaning, I suggest Reading A should opt for the victor taking pride and glory in what they have done to their opponent, and perhaps boasting about it rather than implying they were merely feeling “elated”[xxxvii] (Shirley’s choice of word). What is the victor taking pride in? This leads us to the word obfuit, from obsum, meaning to be in the way of someone; be prejudicial to; be against; to tell against; be a nuisance to; to hurt (if with the dative). Here, Elwes[xxxviii] is perhaps taking alteri to be an adjective in the dative singular, given that he translates it as harm because if it were a noun, it would not be in the dative, so could not mean harm. Obfuit is contrasted with profuit, meaning advantageous (as Shirley translates it[xxxix]), beneficial, useful, profitable or to do good (as Elwes translates it[xl]). To whom has the victor done good or given an advantage? Sibi can be plural or singular and can be translated as oneself rather than specifying masculine or feminine. Thus, I suggest, translating sibi as himself, as both Elwes and Shirley have done, does not reflect the possible broader scope that sibi represents. Oneself would be more representative because it is gender neutral and does not restrict the meaning by implying the victor prioritizes himself, seeking his own self-interest, making him an ethical egoist. Simply put, in philosophy, an ethical egoist refers to a person who bases their moral code on what benefits them the most, sparing very little thought for others.

Nevertheless, I suggest a second possible, plausible way to understand this sub-argument (which I shall refer to as Reading B) because Reading A leaves some questions unanswered. The main problem I think is: Why does Spinoza use the word evadit? Reading A must translate this as comes out or emerges as victorious/the conqueror but this is not the meaning of evadit. Its main meaning is to escape and when it is translated as emerge, I find it is used to describe emerging from a location, not emerging as something. For instance, in Virgil’s Aeneid II, line 531, we find evadere in its perfect tense, evasit: “ut tandem ante oculos evasit et ora parentum…”[xli] where evasit is taken to mean “‘he emerged’, i.e. out of the colonnades and halls of the palace.”[xlii] Hence, surely, if someone were to emerge in Spinoza’s sentence, it would be from a location, such as a battle field, rather than emerging as something, such as a conqueror. At best, supporters of Reading A could argue that evado-ere can also mean to result in or to end up. An example of this is in Cicero’s Pro Murena (paragraph 29) when writing that those who did not end up orators, turned to studying law (“sic nos videmus, qui oratores evadere non potuerint, eos ad iuris studium devenire”)[xliii].

However, I’m not sure how this fits well with Spinoza’s sentence because, although one could settle on someone ending up the victor, this is not consistent with Spinoza’s use of evadere elsewhere in a similar context. In chapter 18 of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), he writes “in quo iterum Israëlitae victores evadunt”[xliv] which Elwes translates as “beaten by the Israelites”[xlv]. So there is an inconsistency in translation here. In the TTP, evadere is taken to mean being beaten, not emerging as the winner, which is the opposite of what we see here in the TP. On the basis of the passage in the TP, evadunt would be referring to the Israelites who emerged/came out victorious, not the people of Judah who were beaten by the Israelites. But it does not. So which is more accurate? The TTP is very difficult to read otherwise because the context surrounding the sentence shows clearly who won and lost, and it is referring to an historical, biblical event so we can cross-refer. Whereas, in the TP, this is not the case.

The only cross-reference we have is in the Vloten and Land edition, which provides us with the footnote sign Ɨ after the word obfuit, to direct us to Spinoza’s Ethics, EIVp58s, in which the most similar section is:

1)“ex quo, quandoquidem de summo, quod restimatur, bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem 

2)quocumque modo opprimendi, et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis, quod alteri obfuit, quam 

3)quod sibi profuit. Est igitur haec Gloria seu acquiescentia revera Vana, quia nulla est.”[xlvi]

(line numbering mine)

Elwes translates this as:

“The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing.”[xlvii]

Curley translates this as:

“And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible. The one who at last emerges as victor exults more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself. This love of esteem, or self-esteem, then, is really empty, because it is nothing.”[xlviii]

Not only does Curley’s version use rather melodramatic language, such as monstrous lust, I question whether one should give the impression that one can use both esteem and self-esteem in this passage, as well as give the impression that they are interchangeable. There is no reference to a love of anything in the Latin, so I suggest it cannot be assumed that Spinoza was trying to discuss a love of self-esteem. Neither gloria nor acquiescentia (see line 3 above, passage quoted from the Ethics) strictly translate as esteem or self-esteem, and other Latin words are more commonly used for esteem. If Spinoza had meant self-esteem, as in having pride in oneself, he perhaps would have used the verb, glorior,(-ari, -atis), meaning to boast or pride oneself, but he did not. Had Spinoza intended to specify being self-centered, he would have used the adjective gloriosus, which he clearly does not. Spinoza also does not use the reflexive ipse or in se ipso to specify self- in this sentence, so Curley’s “self-esteem”[xlix] is not an obvious translation choice. Indeed, Elwes opted for honour[l] rather than esteem of any kind.

However, Elwes’s translation provides a different set of challenges. Here in this passage in the Ethics, unlike in the TP passage referred to at the beginning of this chapter[li], Elwes has skimmed over the sense of oppression by translating opprimendi as “to put down”[lii] rather than to oppress. A further textual problem here is that the words seu acquiescentia seem to me to be missing altogether in the English version by Elwes[liii]. Given that igitur (meaning therefore) signals the logical conclusion to this paragraph, I maintain it is important to formulate this sentence correctly in order to understand the whole paragraph and possibly the whole proposition and its scholium. Seu means or, which I think may be structurally setting up the disjunct x or y. This means that, when we ask the textual analysis question what is empty/being nothing, the answer could be the disjunct itself, not just honour per se. The concept contrasted with gloria (glory, fame, renown, ambition, boast) in this disjunct is acquiescentia, meaning to rest, relax or repose in death or to acquiesce, submit, assent. To acquiesce/submit would contrast with the glory of being victorious. On this picture, the disjunct would read as being between two different things (1. the glory of being the victor or 2. submitting by escaping the victor), unlike in Curley’s version which refers to two different types of the same thing, namely, esteem and self-esteem[liv].

If we keep to the typical meaning of evadere as escape, then when Spinoza writes evadit here in the TP, who is escaping whom?[lv] If the focus is on the one coming out victorious, then is this implying that the victor is escaping? If one compares this with classical Latin texts, the verb evadere usually refers to the beaten one escaping from the victor. Thus, if one re-reads Spinoza’s Ethics and TP in light of this, who exactly is Spinoza referring to when he writes evadit? The victor who escaped or the one who escaped from the victorious one? Reading A amounts to the claim: He who at last escapes as the triumphant one. However, this seems an awkward, opaque way of merely referring to the victor. Hence, for the alternative reading, Reading B, I would suggest that Spinoza is referring to the one who escapes the triumphant one, in other words, the one who is beaten by the victor, just as in the TTP, Spinoza is referring to the People of Judah who lost to the Israelites. The triumphant one fits the sentence better than the victor. This is because triumphant is an adjective which may be in the accusative, whereas if it is the Latin noun ‘victor’, then it is in the nominative. On Reading B, the Latin word ‘victor’ is read as being in the accusative to give the sense of escaping from the triumphant. This is in contrast to Reading A which would prefer to read ‘victor’ as being a nominative noun to make the person the word ‘victor’ is referring to the subject of the sentence. That way, it is easier to give the sense of the victor/conqueror being the active one in the sentence and the main person to whom Spinoza is referring.

This gives the literal translation - he who escapes the triumphant (one) - which, I suggest, fits thematically with a passage in Spinoza’s Ethics (EIVP69c) which I highlighted in my volume 2 of this series on Spinoza, chapter 4[lvi], where I discuss Spinoza’s argument:

“The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.”[lvii]

Thus, one can link the two together by seeing the one who escapes the triumphant person as effectively electing to retreat from battle. The knock-on effect of changing the focus from the victor to the beaten one who escapes, is that the person feeling pride changes with it. However, I suggest this is not a problem for Reading B because again it could be read in conjunction with EIVP69c. The one retreating from battle (by escaping from the triumphant one) can feel a sense of pride. This is because Spinoza’s philosophy acknowledges that free people can be just as courageous in choosing a timely retreat rather than battling on and elongating a war. This also impacts on how to interpret the comparison between doing harm or good. Reading B raises the question: Is it wiser for the beaten one to flee rather than cause further harm by fighting on, which does not do any good, benefit/advantage anyone? This coheres with EIVP69c where the free, wise man’s choice is between fighting on or retreating. If one wishes to extrapolate Reading B’s version of Spinoza’s philosophy, one could argue that such arguments in Spinoza’s texts may amount to an anti-war message, alongside his criticism of oppression.

A further advantage of Reading B is that it is in a good position to refute the stance, expressed in secondary literature, that Spinoza’s philosophy contains the flaw of equating power with right. This stance can result in claims, such as the one Barbone and Rice attribute to Matheron, that Spinoza’s philosophy sees nothing wrong with a powerful emperor conquering a small territory by force and oppressing its subjects through fear[lviii]. On this view, the sense of right to oppress would be due to the physical power to do so, not through any sense of ethical right or power. According to Barbone and Rice, this, amongst other things, leads interpreters of Spinoza’s philosophy, such as Curley, to argue that Spinoza’s concepts of power and right are deficient[lix]. However, on this point, I agree with Barbone and Rice that such a stance stems from a “misreading” of Spinoza and happens when “one is not careful enough to understand what Spinoza means (and does not mean) by the term ‘power’”[lx]. Barbone and Rice rightly highlight that nuances in the Latin text may be lost on the “non-Latin reader” because the two different senses of power in Latin (potentia and potestas) are conflated when they are both indiscriminately translated into English as the power of an individual or collective, including the “abstract” notion of sovereignty[lxi]. They outline three main senses of power from Spinoza’s Latin:

1.       Potentia: the “innate ability”[lxii] to, for instance, eat strawberries

2. Potestas: having “permission, authorization”[lxiii] to, for instance, eat the strawberries you bought at the supermarket

In this way, you may have the potentia to eat the strawberries in the supermarket before you buy them, but you do not have the potestas to do so.

3. Summa potestas/summae potestates: this phrase gives rise to the concept of sovereign power, be it an individual (president; monarch) or a collective (“a committee or the entire state”[lxiv])

An important difference between potentia and potestas is that the former is an “essential” property, whereas the latter is an “accidental” property[lxv]. This means that people can gain, lose or transfer the potestas type of power, but not their potentia type of power. Thus, I cannot lose my innate physical capability of eating strawberries, nor can I transfer my power to do so to you (potentia). But I can choose to grant you permission to eat my strawberries (potestas). Similarly, on the level of political power, individuals can grant their political state permission to, for instance, represent them in parliament, which is reflected in Spinoza’s Latin arguments in which citizens transfer their potestas, but they can never transfer their potentia[lxvi]. This is also seen in the wording of sovereign power relating to summa potestas not summa potentia. Hence, it is a mistake to interpret Spinoza as supporting the idea that an emperor could use “crushing forces” to gain the right to “occupy” and “oppress”[lxvii] because this would have been expressed as the emperor having summa potentia, which is not a position Spinoza argued for in his philosophy. There is nothing inherently autocratic about granting potestas. Indeed, it prevents people stealing strawberries and eating them just because they physically can (potentia). However, they do not have the potestas to do so, thus it counts as theft.

Nevertheless, the TTP shows an important aspect to the powers and rights of the state. According to Barbone and Rice: Spinoza argues that “the state has no authority (potestas) to limit freedom of thought”[lxviii]. They show how this informs Spinoza’s views on obedience. If I am only “obliged to obey” that which has more potentia than I do[lxix], then this only applies on a macro-level (the universe) such as the laws of nature. So, in accordance with Barbone and Rice’s example of gravity[lxx], Spinoza is merely arguing that I do not have the power (potentia) to change the laws of gravity in order to stop the strawberry from falling off the table.

In contrast, on a micro-level (this world), according to Barbone and Rice, I am “not obliged, however, to obey that which has authority (potestas) over” me[lxxi]. For example, on a political level, citizens, individually or collectively, can have the power to resist an autocratic emperor because, although the emperor may be capable of destruction (potentia), the emperor would not have the “authority or control, and so citizens may disobey him”[lxxii]. Thus, the autocratic emperor does not possess an automatic right to be autocratic in any meaningful way.

On an individual level, a modern example of this may well be that of lecturers and students within their university setting. It may appear that there is an imbalance of power between them but, if analysed in terms of potentia and potestas, this is not the case. Both are humans, subject to the same laws of nature, so they both have the same potentia type of innate power, which neither can take away from the other. In terms of potestas, either can grant the other this potestas, which is a perfectly acceptable form of transferring power to grant permission. Furthermore, on Barbone and Rice’s picture[lxxiii], the student is not obliged to be obedient to the lecturer just because the latter is in a position of authority. The student cannot gain or lose their rights because their right is rooted in their innate potentia, so it does not fluctuate according to the lecturer’s so-called position of power/authority (potestas). This Spinozistic perspective is empowering: The student is not some powerless, as the expression goes, puppet on a string, feeling obliged to obey some all-powerful, authoritative lecturer. They are equal in power (potentia) and are free to confer, accept or reject the other’s power (potestas). So, on a Spinozistic picture, to think otherwise is a mistake.

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[i] Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Introduction’, in Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 1–30.

[ii] Benedict de Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, ed. J. van Vloten and JPN Land, Editio Altera, Tomus Primus (Netherlands: Hagae comitum, M. Nijhoff, 1895), 270–71, https://archive.org/details/Spinoza1895Opera2VlotenLand2ed/page/n7.

[iii] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. I, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1891), 289, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/1321.01_Bk.pdf.

[iv] Benedictus de Spinoza et al., Political Treatise (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 35–36.

[v] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[vi] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 35–36.

[vii] D. P Simpson, Cassell’s Latin-English, English-Latin Dictionary (London: Cassell, 1987), 473.

[viii] Simpson, 412.

[ix] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[x] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 289.

[xi] Liba Kaucky, ‘Chapter 6: Spinoza on the Personal and the Political (in the TP)’, in Research Thoughts On...  Spinoza - Volume 3: A Feminist Approach to Spinoza’s Political Treatise, ed. Liba Kaucky, 1st edition, vol. III, Research Thoughts On…1 (London, UK: blogger.com, 2019), N/A, http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2019/06/spinoza-ebook-vol-3-chapter-6-spinoza.html.

[xii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xiii] Simpson, Cassell’s Latin-English, English-Latin Dictionary, 146.

[xiv] Simpson, 146.

[xv] Liba Kaucky, ‘Chapter 6: Spinoza on the Personal and the Political (in the TP)’, in Research Thoughts On...  Spinoza - Volume 3: A Feminist Approach to Spinoza’s Political Treatise, ed. Liba Kaucky, 1st edition, vol. III, Research Thoughts On…1 (London, UK: blogger.com, 2019), N/A, http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2019/06/spinoza-ebook-vol-3-chapter-6-spinoza.html.

[xvi] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xvii] Kaucky, ‘Chapter 6: Spinoza on the Personal and the Political (in the TP)’.

[xviii] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xix] Spinoza, 270–71.

[xx] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xxi] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 35–36.

[xxii] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., ed. C.H. Bruder, EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol. II, III vols (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844), https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.

[xxiii] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xxiv] Benedictus de Spinoza and Carl Gebhardt, Opera, vol. 3, 4 vols (Heidelberg, Germany: C. Winter, 1925), http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/primo-explore/fulldisplay?vid=SOLO&docid=oxfaleph012466133&context=L.

[xxv] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE.

[xxvi] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt.

[xxvii] Spinoza and Gebhardt, Opera.

[xxviii] Simpson, Cassell’s Latin-English, English-Latin Dictionary, 414.

[xxix] Simpson, 414.

[xxx] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xxxi] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 270–71.

[xxxii] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xxxiii] Spinoza, 270–71.

[xxxiv] Spinoza, 270–71.

[xxxv] Spinoza, 270–71.

[xxxvi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xxxvii] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 35–36.

[xxxviii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xxxix] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise, 35–36.

[xl] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[xli] R. H. Jordan and Publius Vergilius Maro, Virgil, Aeneid II (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1999), 18.

[xlii] Jordan and Vergilius Maro, 61.

[xliii] M. T. Cicero, ‘M. TVLLI CICERONIS PRO MVRENA ORATIO’, Educational, http://thelatinlibrary.com/, No website date given, http://thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/murena.shtml.

[xliv] Spinoza and Gebhardt, Opera, 3:224; 210.

[xlv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:240.

[xlvi] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 220.

[xlvii] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 226, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[xlviii] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books (England, UK: Penguin Books, 1996), 146.

[xlix] Spinoza, 146.

[l] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1901, II:226.

[li] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:289.

[lii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1901, II:226.

[liii] Spinoza, II:226.

[liv] Spinoza, Ethics, Transl. Curley, 146.

[lv] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[lvi] Liba Kaucky, ‘Chapter 4: The Psychological Impact of Fear and Anxiety on Freedom, Living Wisely, Dying Well and Attaining Eternity in Spinoza’s Ethics’, in Research Thoughts On...  Spinoza - Volume 2: Life, Death, Immortality and the Soul, 1st Edition, vol. II, Research Thoughts On... 1 (London, UK: blogger.com, 2018), http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-4.html.

[lvii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, 1901, II:233.

[lviii] Spinoza, ‘Introduction’, 15.

[lix] Spinoza, 15–16.

[lx] Spinoza, 16.

[lxi] Spinoza, 16.

[lxii] Spinoza, 17.

[lxiii] Spinoza, 17.

[lxiv] Spinoza, 16.

[lxv] Spinoza, 17.

[lxvi] Spinoza, 17.

[lxvii] Spinoza, 15.

[lxviii] Spinoza, 19.

[lxix] Spinoza, 19.

[lxx] Spinoza, 19.

[lxxi] Spinoza, 19.

[lxxii] Spinoza, 19.

[lxxiii] Spinoza, ‘Introduction’.