Spinoza vol 3 ebook: Chapter 8: Feminist Interpretation of Spinoza On Oppression

Chapter 8: Feminist Interpretation of Spinoza On Oppression  

Following on from my previous chapter, I shall expand on the theme of oppression and rights. In chapter 7, I gave a textual analysis of chapter 1 section 5 (TP)[i] of Spinoza’s arguments in the original Latin. Here, I wish to take the same section but this time I shall attempt to illustrate how Spinoza’s political philosophy in his TP can inform feminism, feminist philosophy and jurisprudence because oppression is a key issue in these research areas. In so doing, I will also show the relevance of Spinoza’s philosophy to feminism today because, I maintain, Spinoza’s arguments can cross-apply to contemporary feminism and feminist jurisprudence, even in passages where he is not directly addressing women’s social situation. By testing Spinoza’s notions on feminist accounts, I will demonstrate the strength and truth of his arguments through suggesting ways Spinozianism can resolve logical tensions between them. Moreover, I hope to make evident the practical relevance and possible application of Spinoza’s concepts, thus establishing a further dimension to the analytic-feminist strand of my interpretation of Spinoza. I also suggest two claims: One, that Spinoza’s principle of defending rights for all in his TP gives philosophical underpinning and support to the aims of intersectional feminism. Two, that Spinoza’s philosophy can motivate the normative claim that intersectional feminism must strive to go further than simply being inclusive, it must embrace a broad definition of woman and treat all women as equals. Each intersectional feminist should, by definition, fight for and uphold all women’s rights as strongly as she does for the rights that are relevant to her life and identities.

Indeed, it is evident that, if women’s rights were fought for and upheld by everyone in society, rather than leaving it up to feminist movements to fight for, secure and maintain, as is often the case, then there would be more justice in society, be it ethical, social, political or legal. This Spinozian principle of upholding the rights of all, I maintain, highlights the need to encompass all of humanity into the concept of human rights, applying rights to both men and women without sex discrimination, as well as applying it to intersex and those who identify as non-binary and trans. It encompasses rights “irrespective of race, age, sexual orientation, ability or class”[ii] or marital status. I would also add religion (including women in religious institutions, for example, convents, cloistered or not, who are often forgotten, so can, as a result, be even more vulnerable). Rights for all also extends meaningfully into intersectional feminism and feminist philosophy of law and jurisprudence to avoid falling into “‘essentialism’ or ‘ethnocentricism’” in feminism whereby the female experience is sometimes erroneously reduced to one stereotype, often a white, cis, heterosexual female rather than reflecting all women[iii]. This was a criticism famously elaborated by Audrey Lorde, who, as a “black, lesbian feminist socialist writer”[iv], noticed that descriptions of the so-called female experience were failing to be inclusive enough of women of various identities. Nevertheless, Leslie Bender puts less emphasis on this concern, because she feels there is a great deal to be gained from examining “common experiences and patterns that emerge from shared tellings of life events”[v]. The potential value of this approach is: “What were experienced as personal hurts individually suffered reveal themselves as a collective experience of oppression”[vi]. Indeed, there is empirical evidence of patriarchal oppression being a sociological phenomenon which forms a global pattern. This pattern extends to trans women who, once they are perceived or identified as female, begin to suffer the same distinctive forms of female sexual harassment, abuse and violence, including fatalities. All this, I think, provides empirical grounds to argue that the existence of a diverse and completely inclusive sisterhood is not a myth, but is in fact a reality.

Both Bender and Lorde make important points but there remains a logical tension between their two approaches which needs resolving to reflect such empirical evidence of patterns of female oppression (very often involving various forms of economic oppression) across all continents, societies, cultures, traditions, religions, and identities. Should feminism examine women’s experiences through identity differences (a Lorde-like approach)? Or through finding a general umbrella of common ground between all women (a Bender-like approach)? Is it possible to balance the advantages of embracing all women’s identities explicitly (as opposed to making implicit assumptions) without losing a sense of the sisterhood? A concept Lorde questions as potentially being “a pretence of homogeneity of experience”[vii]. 

I wish to resolve this logical tension in a way which goes further than the answer of intersectional feminism by drawing on Spinoza’s political and ethical principle of actively defending and upholding others’ rights as one’s own throughout one’s lifetime. In this way, I attempt to show how Spinoza has the philosophical concepts to fill a possible theoretical gap in intersectional feminism.

 I think intersectional feminism can successfully address the error of universalising one concept of ‘woman’ at the expense of including women of all identities and by acknowledging how their additional identities impact on their experience of being a woman. I think its long-term key to success is to be actively inclusive of all of the parallel identities women have (not prioritising some over others) as well as being fully inclusive of all gender identities (intersex who self-identify as female; transwomen (and possibly transmen and transboys); non-binary women, for example, agender women; gender fluid women (gender identity changes over time); multigender women. However, what I think intersectionality possibly struggles to address, is the accompanying concept and ethos of the sisterhood, defined as “a strong feeling of friendship and support among women who are involved in action to improve women's rights”[viii].

This would be akin to Spinoza’s principle of love thy neighbour which he thought all religions could adopt and relate to one another in accordance with it. Thus, it is a principle, if taken in Spinoza’s sense of it, which is inclusive of all religious beliefs. In Spinoza’s era, society was religion-based and non-belief or atheism was often outlawed. A present day application of this principle can be adapted to suit modern and global society which includes a greater variety of belief systems and none. Therefore, I think a contemporary application of his principle to a feminist concept of a sisterhood would run along the same lines.

However, it is one thing merely to aim at non-discrimination by ensuring feminism does not implicitly perpetuate forms of oppression itself by excluding and silencing sections of the female population. It is quite another to truly perceive and accept all women (especially those who are conscious of women’s oppression and act to improve women’s rights) as your equal and fight for their women’s rights just as you would your own. I think intersectional feminism is the best placed to attempt to resolve the former, that is, the internal discrimination/oppression problem. Their aim of inclusivity has addressed past issues of, for instance, the silencing and exclusion of lesbians and black feminists from attending or participating actively and socially within feminist groups. Such problems were highlighted by radical lesbian feminists who protested the exclusion of lesbians and lesbian issues from the Second Congress to Unite Women in the USA in 1970. Bell Hook famously raised awareness of how racial and class oppression intersects with women’s oppression and feminism in her seminal book ‘Ain't I a Woman?: Black women and feminism’[ix]. However, I maintain that it remains unclear to what extent intersectional feminism resolves the second tension, namely, how an intersectional sisterhood is created and maintained. Although it is beneficial to have both a variety of feminist schools of thought as well as feminist sub-groups where women who share the same identities as each other can share and address the additional patterns of oppression they suffer, this can sometimes result in a lack of cohesion and sense of sisterhood within the general umbrella of feminism.

Nevertheless, there are campaigns such as One Billion Rising, a global campaign against reproductive and sexual oppression, abuse and violence against all women, including “cisgender, transgender, and those who hold fluid identities that are subject to gender-based violence” and LGBTQIA+ communities[x]. Within this campaign, one can see Spinoza’s concepts in practice.

Firstly, that oppression and violence deprive one of independence:

 “each is so long independent, as he can guard against oppression by another”[xi]

(TP, chapter 2, section 15)

“everyone is … so far independent, as he is able to repel all violence”[xii]

(TP, chapter 2 section 9)

The links between oppression, violence and women’s levels of independence can be seen in the One Billion Rising campaign which seeks to empower women by freeing them to reach a greater level of independence through knowing their rights and powers, which help them overcome past, current and possibly even future oppression and violence. It is specifically aimed at the oppression of women and girls by men and tracking these patterns of women’s oppression across a wide range of “systemic violence in economic, political, socio-cultural, environmental and ideological spheres”[xiii]. This can be seen in their 2019 manifesto which focuses on ending: “Rape, Battery, Incest, Sexual Harassment, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), Sexual Slavery and Trafficking, Child Marriage, Femicide, Sexual, Gender and Reproductive Oppression, Violence Towards LGBTQIA+ Communities, Toxic Masculinity, Poverty/ Economic Injustice/ Labor Exploitation, Climate Destruction and Environmental Plunder, Racism, Hate and Discrimination, Religious Fundamentalism, State and Institutional Violence/ Militarization/ War, Forced Displacement/ Immigrant and Migrant Abuse.” [xiv] This list illustrates the extent of women’s oppression globally across every aspect and area of life within this patriarchal world we live in. The Youth section of the movement goes even further by including university campuses, slut shaming, bullying and sexism, misogyny, demanding women’s access to open spaces without fear, the right to education (throughout school and higher education to PhD), objectification and stereotyping of women and girls and domestic violence, and many more issues[xv].

Secondly, One Billion Rising provides empirical support for the possibility of and necessity for a diverse and inclusive sisterhood within which all women fight alongside each other for women’s rights for all women. (Men can support the cause by joining the Men Rising campaign which supports ending oppression of all women and girls[xvi].) The main aim of a sisterhood is to redress the gender injustice in patriarchal society. In this way, it fulfils Spinoza’s requirement of love thy neighbour, which in practice means justice for all[xvii]. Transposed into present day feminism, this requirement specifies that there should be justice for people of all sex and gender identities, rather than a bias in favour of the archetypal “reasonable man”[xviii] who is modelled on the (cis white heterosexual) male sex, while claiming to represent all.  

A more detailed description of Spinoza’s argument is perhaps that people should align their (positive) passions with the double-meaning principle of love thy neighbour/defend and uphold their rights as your own[xix]. The rationale of this principle should also prevail over the (negative) passions. If this principle were applied to the law courts, as Spinoza suggests[xx], then I think that discrimination on the basis of sex (biological sex or sex identity) would be eradicated. It would potentially bring about true rights for all because men would not lose any rights, but, unlike the current global situation, women’s rights would be recognised and upheld to the same level as men’s rights. As the principle states for all, this would hold true, regardless of the person’s gender identity as well as other identities, such as racial and sexual orientation. Given Spinoza’s arguments for religious toleration in his TTP, this would also guard against discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. This, I maintain, provides a theoretical and practical framework which can both strengthen the current legal ideal of non-discrimination and gender neutrality but actively address the shortcomings of the legal system of upholding its ideal. Spinoza’s principle of upholding and defending rights for all just as (passionately) as you do your own, if applied consistently, addresses the concerns of all three main contemporary feminist movements:

First wave feminism sees the social and legal gender problem as being caused by a “male monopoly of law” which introduces “inequalities” into an otherwise objective, fair system[xxi].

“For second phase feminists, of differing political persuasions, the root problem with law lies in its pretended impartiality, objectivity and rationality.”[xxii]

Third wave feminism puts legal gender inequality down to hidden gender biases meaning that although the “law is gendered”, this is compounded by inconsistencies in application which make it difficult to track gender discrimination[xxiii].

Spinoza, I suggest, gives us a way of transcending all three explanations, because, no matter which account of the root cause holds true, in all three explanations, it holds true that women’s rights are not upheld and defended to the same degree and to the same extent as men’s rights, across all other identities, such as race, class, age. Thus, regardless of different identities between women, they share a common form of oppression, namely, gender oppression. I refer to it as gender oppression rather than sex oppression because it not only relates to being biologically female, but also extends into gender identity, such as transwomen. Transwomen suffer an alarmingly high rate of violence, often fatal, once they identify as, or are perceived as female by men.

Hence, Spinoza resolves the logical tension between Lorde and Bender’s statements[xxiv] by homing in on two approaches to the problem. One, by arguing that the principle of justice for all must be consistently applied in society throughout people’s lifetime, by individuals and justice systems, not just as an ideal but in practice. The (negative) passions must not be allowed to introduce bias and injustice, whether it be on a personal, legal or political level. Two, by explicitly writing about oppression, Spinoza is fulfilling the general political criteria that: “..in order to advance any political movement, there exists the need to raise the consciousness of those being oppressed.”[xxv] Furthermore, Spinoza’s philosophy answers the feminist call for raising awareness and increasing knowledge of oppression: “By identifying sites of…oppression, feminist scholars….demonstrated further the supremacy which men have traditionally assumed and maintained in society”[xxvi] and still do. As I discussed in chapter 6, Spinoza shows awareness of gender oppression in the private sphere, when he argues against the role of the patriarchal, head of the household who treats his family as his property. This is an impressive argument for a man living in the 17^th century, given that feminists today are still having to refute gender biased notions of a woman’s appropriate role in the home that are often based on the same Aristotelian-style idea of gendered, binary biological limitations that Spinoza, back then, rejected. Moreover, Spinoza’s philosophy also maintains that everyone has the same nature, thus he is not suggesting a binary or gendered concept of women and men’s nature. He also has a positive concept of nature and God’s relation to it.

In contrast, Oldenburg introduced the notion of a “Masculine Philosophy” as an “explicit goal” of the Royal Society[xxvii]. Many male natural philosophers/scientists, such as Boyle, Bacon and Descartes, reinforced the misogyny behind this new approach to natural and scientific research with their gendered language[xxviii]. Science and philosophy (since there was less distinction between the two fields in that era) were to go from being “passive and weak” “female” disciplines to being “active” male disciplines [xxix]. They looked upon women as being analogous to the natural world and thought both should be effectively tamed and oppressed by men. Nature was referred to using feminine pronouns and Bacon encouraged men to “capture” and “hound her”, “bind her to [mans] service and make her [man’s] slave”[xxx]. Descartes advocated mastering and possessing nature while Boyle went so far as to claim that men should “bring nature to be serviceable to [men’s] particular ends, whether of health, or riches, or sensual delight”[xxxi].

The result of such attitudes in the Royal Society and among male scientists (who were also becoming reviewers once Oldenburg began the peer review system) in that era lead to a rise in sexism against women scientists which still lingers on today[xxxii].

One aspect of this sexism in STEM is turning so-called “norms of masculine behavior” into “norms of scientific behavior” and “method”[xxxiii]. These norms, which are claimed to be contradictory to “norms of feminine behavior” include learning to be “objective, impartial, logical, unemotional, disinterested, and independent”[xxxiv]. However, as one sees in Spinoza’s arguments for independence, this is part of living a good human life, free from various forms of oppression. Consequently, by labelling independence a male trait, I argue that patriarchy is fundamentally oppressing women and restricting their capacity to be free and reach their full potential. Moreover, I think this constitutes good grounds for encouraging women to be independent researchers in their chosen discipline, to free them from biased patriarchal systems and institutions as well as to show that women are not, by nature, unsuited to independent thinking, researching or living. Otherwise, the sexist stereotype persists that women are only suited to being dependent, such as seeking help from others or collaborating with others, which simply is not the case.

Furthermore, as can be seen with women philosophers such as Lady Mary Shepherd (18^th-19^th century), women are perfectly capable and well-suited to excelling in “objective, impartial, logical”[xxxv] thought, amongst other things, so this gender bias about their cognitive abilities must not be used to make women lack confidence in subjects which require these attributes. I would not advocate removing these qualities from being valued in research, on the basis that they are male qualities, because I reject the notion that they are inherently male qualities, they are merely qualities that can be learnt by all, whether the person identifies as male, female or non-binary. The focus for progress in science, philosophy and other disciplines should, instead, be on removing gendered language, notions (including what constitutes male and female traits so both these and gender neutral traits can be valued), stereotypes and bias so everyone can reach their full potential.

Behavioural stereotypes also mean that “Western scientists are expected to be aggressive and competitive, and jeopardize their careers when they do not exhibit these traits”[xxxvi], which puts women scientists and women philosophers (and women in other careers where these traits are needed to progress) at a disadvantage. By penalising women for displaying (or criticising them for allegedly possessing or displaying) aggression or competitiveness, women are substantially held back in their careers from this attitude alone. Such disadvantages are also in addition to other biases they suffer, such as not being perceived as specialists or knowledgeable, experiencing gendered harassment, unjustifiable pay gaps and so on. Meanwhile, the same behaviour is normalised or rewarded when exhibited by men, giving them a head start and psychological advantages, such as, being labelled and perceived as more independent, intelligent, impartial, expert and logical.

A second aspect of sexism in STEM, philosophy and academia in general, is that barriers faced by women are far more extensive than just the original patriarchal ideology of oppressing women and nature expressed by Oldenburg, Boyle, Bacon and others. (Although not so by Spinoza.) It became a pattern of oppression of women which impacted on their “access to universities” (including appallingly “restrictive admissions”), and then only offering them “menial research roles”, “less financial assistance” on top of “exclusion” from, for instance, “meetings and collaborations and information networks”[xxxvii]. All of which reinforced and compounded the limiting, gendered behavioural norms aforementioned.

Spinoza, however, in chapter 1, section 5 of his TP, I think, is showing awareness of widespread oppression in the public sphere, including the legal world of the law courts. Given that Spinoza saw how gendered the law is through his legal battle with his sister over their inheritance and yet, rather than use his male privilege against her, he gave her more than she was legally entitled to receive, I suggest Spinoza’s discussion of oppression in the public and legal sphere in section 5, implicitly includes women’s oppression. Likewise, Spinoza’s natural philosophy and metaphysics (amongst other branches of philosophy he engages in) are not imbued with elements of the 17^th century Royal Society’s sexism. As I have argued in this volume, Spinoza’s politics is not advocating misogyny and to claim otherwise, I have suggested, is a misreading of his original Latin texts. Additionally, I do not agree with Barbone and Rice’s claim that Spinoza’s political philosophy possibly forgets about rights for social groups (“such as ‘women’s rights’, ‘gay rights’, etc.”) by referring to individuals in his “conception of right”[xxxviii]. I think there is textual evidence to the contrary. It is apparent that Spinoza accounts for different religious groups and people of various cultural identities and norms living alongside each other, especially in his TTP.

Hence, as I have argued, Spinoza’s philosophy is well-suited to the development of feminist concepts and arguments, such as the ones I have offered in this chapter. When Spinoza does address sexist systems or concepts in society, he does not argue for creating masculine societal norms, as Bacon and Boyle advocated. Spinoza’s arguments, I think, can help resolve the tensions within the concept of a sisterhood. Both conceptually and in practice, the same principle of rights for all must still apply between all members of the sisterhood who identify as women (including transwomen and intersex who identify as women). Each member of the sisterhood must, therefore, defend and uphold the rights of all women, of all identities and cultures, across the world, including indigenous women. As a result, by creating a sisterhood based on diversity of experience, we both retain intersectionality while gaining an understanding of the distinctively female “collective experience of oppression” that Bender suggests[xxxix], but in all its various forms, giving a richer picture of the female condition. In this way, Spinoza’s philosophy of justice, (amongst other features of his philosophy) I think, is not only relevant to political, social and moral philosophy, but can also be a source of inspiration for feminist philosophy.

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, ed. J. van Vloten and JPN Land, Editio Altera, Tomus Primus (Netherlands: Hagae comitum, M. Nijhoff, 1895), 270–71, https://archive.org/details/Spinoza1895Opera2VlotenLand2ed/page/n7.

[ii] Hilaire Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 1st edition (London: Cavendish Publ, 1998), 20.

[iii] Barnett, 20.

[iv] Barnett, 20.

[v] Barnett, 20.

[vi] Barnett, 20.

[vii] Barnett, 20.

[viii] N/A, ‘Sisterhood’, in Cambridge Dictionary (UK: Cambridge University Press, N/A), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sisterhood.

[ix] bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, Nachdr., Pluto Classics (London: Pluto Press, 2001).

[x] N/A, ‘The 2019 Campaign  RISING: FROM A CAMPAIGN, TO A WAY OF LIFE’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/about/campaign/.

[xi] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. I, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1891), 296, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/1321.01_Bk.pdf.

[xii] Spinoza, I:295.

[xiii] N/A, ‘The 2019 Campaign  RISING: FROM A CAMPAIGN, TO A WAY OF LIFE’.

[xiv] N/A.

[xv] N/A, ‘Youth Rising’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/resources/youth-rising/.

[xvi] N/A, ‘Men Rising’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/resources/men-rising/.

[xvii] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xviii] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 6.

[xix] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.

[xx] Spinoza, 270–71.

[xxi] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 5.

[xxii] Barnett, 6.

[xxiii] Barnett, 7.

[xxiv] Barnett, 20.

[xxv] Barnett, 12.

[xxvi] Barnett, 4.

[xxvii] Janet A. Kourany, ‘Philosophy of Science: A New Program for Philosophy of Science, in Many Voices’, in Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions, ed. Janet A. Kourany (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998), 231.

[xxviii] Kourany, 231–32.

[xxix] Kourany, 231.

[xxx] Kourany, 231.

[xxxi] Kourany, 231–32.

[xxxii] Kourany, 232.

[xxxiii] Kourany, 232.

[xxxiv] Kourany, 232.

[xxxv] Kourany, 232.

[xxxvi] Kourany, 232.

[xxxvii] Kourany, 232–33.

[xxxviii] Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Introduction’, in Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 18, footnote 61.

[xxxix] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 20.