Spinoza vol 2 ebook: Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks on Volume 2

Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks on Volume 2

In this blog ebook, I have examined Spinoza’s philosophy of life, death and the immortality of the soul through two of his texts (Ethics and Short Treatise) and one letter (32). In this volume, I narrowed my focus within these primary sources to mainly EVp38 and EVp41s in the Ethics, two analogies in letter 32 and part 2 of his Short Treatise, namely his preface, chapter 23 and Appendix 2. The research topic of life and death in Spinoza has grown out of my 2015 abstract ‘Spinoza on how to live well and die well’ which was written with the time limit and word count restrictions of a presentation in mind and bears the kernel of my stance on this research topic. Although quite broad, I started my research on this topic with a focus on Spinoza’s two main texts, the Ethics and the TTP, which form the backbone of the abstract. This abstract then became the basis for the book outline for this blog ebook. As a book outline rather than a paper abstract, I then had the time and word count to develop my research in new and exciting ways as I discovered more textual material within and across Spinoza’s writings on life and death than I initially expected to find.

So, over the years, I have enjoyed both expanding the scope of my research to include lesser-researched Spinoza texts, as well as narrowing my focus, to flesh out very specific passages. In this way, I hope to further Spinoza scholarship. 

I have discovered that Spinoza’s early writings are far more mature and decisive than I anticipated because they are often depicted in Spinozian scholarship as lacking the maturity and conviction of his later writings. I maintain they are very similar to his later writings, indeed, I can hear the same voice and fundamental notions across all of Spinoza’s works so do not interpret him as prone to changing his mind or having distinct periods in his philosophy. Thus, I think the earlier works provide important insight into his main works and are a useful interpretative aid for understanding apparently obscure passages in Spinoza, be it in his later works or letters. I have the impression that Spinoza is perhaps assuming that his readers are somewhat familiar with many of the concepts and arguments in his earlier works before they read his latter works. Scholarship sometimes looks upon his Short Treatise as merely an abandoned draft which was rewritten as the Ethics. However, the Short Treatise feels like a very complete and well-thought out and organised, strongly argued treatise which is both valuable as a text in its own right as well as shedding light on his other texts.

In this volume, I have furthered my Analytic-Jewish interpretation of Spinoza. I have drawn on analytic and logic philosophical skills to show the underpinnings, structure and logical progression of ideas in Spinoza’s thought, untangling them from his continuous passages of writing and setting them out in logical form from premises to conclusion.

Additionally, I have discussed Spinoza’s scientifically and mathematically analytical, logical thinking. Previously, in part 3 of volume 1, I showed how science, including Darwin and contemporary genome theory, helps to uncover another layer of meaning to Spinoza’s conatus doctrine. I argue, in both volume 1 and 2, that scientific analysis suits Spinoza’s way of thinking about humans, the world and God. In part 1 of this volume, I explore the relevance of anatomical, biological and psychological theory for understanding Spinoza’s philosophy. In part 2 of this volume, I show how physics and maths have a bearing on interpreting key concepts in Spinoza’s philosophy. Being a scientist and philosopher was not as potentially problematic or contradictory for Jewish philosophers as it was for Christian philosophers and scientists, who faced religious restrictions on the content of their writings for fear that their science would disprove the existence and omnipotence of God. Apart from the famous example of Maimonides (12^th century) who had no problems being a philosopher as well as a doctor and astronomer, there were other Jewish philosophers who were also scientists, such as Abraham Bar Hiyya Ha-nasi (11^th – 12^th century) who was an astrologer, astronomer and mathematician as well as a philosopher and wrote both scientific and philosophical treatises. Likewise, Spinoza not only wrote philosophical works, but it is often forgotten that he also wrote two treatises on physics and maths, ‘Algebraic Calculation of the Rainbow’ and ‘Calculation of Chances’. Spinoza even admits in chapter 9 of his Short Treatise that the topic of motion “more properly belongs to a treatise on Natural Science rather than here”[i]. Although he consequently lays it to one side in this chapter, he goes on to expand on motion and rest when writing about the life, death and the immortality of the soul later in the Short Treatise. So despite being initially tentative about using scientific vocabulary and concepts, simplifying motion to just signifying an “Effect created immediately by God”[ii], he ends up making use of scientific and mathematical language (ratio and proportions of motion and rest) both in the Short Treatise and the Ethics, which even includes diagrams. Perhaps Spinoza did not wish to alienate non-scientific readers of his works so attempted to use natural science in an accessible way. However, I suggest that, by filling in the scientific definitions and concepts assumed by Spinoza in his works draws out a deeper understanding of his philosophical concepts, makes his abstract notions more accessible and helps his readers see consistencies in his thought. This is not an easy task, given that Spinoza is highly knowledgeable about a broad range of natural sciences. He took an interest in chemistry experiments, anatomy and biology (in his letters) and was also an expert in physics and maths, which included plans for telescopes so he must have had a profound understanding of astronomy.

I have also furthered the Jewish aspect of my Analytic-Jewish interpretation by situating Spinoza’s account of the immortality of the soul within Jewish philosophy and finding that his philosophy fits in very well alongside theirs. In his commentary, Wolf briefly mentions some fascinating parallels where Spinoza is in agreement with Maimonides and Crescas[iii]. However, I have aimed to add to this by showing how Spinoza’s philosophical accounts of life, death, the soul and immortality are embedded in Jewish thought and Orthodox Judaism. I expanded on this to illustrate how I interpret Spinoza as accounting for both personal and collective immortality.  In life, we hold in tension being an unique individual as well as being part of a collective society, so Spinoza continues this combination of the individual and the collective into his philosophy of death and immortality.  

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), 57, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

[ii] Spinoza, 57.

[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Commentary’, in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910), 165–240, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

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———. Ethics. Translated by W.H. White and A.K. Stirling. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature. Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001.

———. Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Edited by Jonathan Bennett. Pdf ebook. Canada: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com, 2017. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1665part5.pdf.

———. ‘“Korte verhandeling van God, de mensch en desselvs welstand”’. Translated by J. Jelles and J. Monnikhoff. Netherlands, circa 17th/18th century. https://www.kb.nl/en/resources-research-guides/kb-collections/collections-by-theme/benedictus-de-spinoza-collection. https://galerij.kb.nl/kb.html#/nl/spinoza/page/7/zoom/2/lat/-77.87881372624744/lng/-42.1875.

———. Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE. Edited by C.H. Bruder. EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (Google e-Book). Vol. II. III vols. Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844. https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.

———. Opera, Renati des cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata metaphysica  Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Edited by C.H. Bruder. EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-Book). Vol. I. III vols. Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843. https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.

———. Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing. Edited and translated by Abraham Wolf. London: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

———. THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. REVISED EDITION. London, UK. Vol. II. II vols. BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901. http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

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White, W.H. ‘Translator’s Preface’. In Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, xviii–lxxxviii. translated by W.H. White and A.K. Stirling. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature. Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001.

Wolf, Abraham. ‘Commentary’. In Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being, 165–240. London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

———. ‘Introduction: I. The Life of Spinoza, II. History of the Short Treatise’. In Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being, ix–cxxvii. London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910. https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook: Chapter 9: Spinoza’s Appendix 2 in his Short Treatise : ‘On the Human Soul’

Chapter 9: Spinoza’s Appendix 2 in his Short Treatise : ‘On the Human Soul’ 

In Appendix 2, Spinoza aims to rationally discover and explain the essence of (nature of) the human soul[i]. Appendix 2 reiterates many of the concepts he’s previously explored in chapter 23 and his preface to part 2, which I have discussed in my part 2 of this volume. So I shall focus on definitions and arguments which give a deeper layer of meaning or another angle of perspective to analyse what Appendix 2 adds and how it makes use of some key concepts and other definitions stated earlier in the Short Treatise.

Spinoza starts by highlighting that, amongst other things, humans are a “created finite thing” before going on to deduce what logically “necessarily follows from that”[ii]. What does the concept of being created and finite mean and what assumptions does it carry? As I mentioned in my chapter 7, one can read finite here as meaning that humans have not existed for eternity. For current purposes, I shall take eternity to simply signify, as Wolf put it in his accompanying commentary to the Short Treatise, “reality independently of time or beyond it”[iii]. This coheres with Wolf’s quotation of Spinoza’s Metaphysical Thoughts later in his commentary[iv] where Spinoza seems to conceptualise eternity as being non-sequential and unchanging. So, one cannot pick out a time slice, say, afterwards at time X, because eternity does not function like this. Given, as I mentioned in chapter 7, humans came into existence after other things, their existence is not eternal but sequential (ie in relation to when other things existed, unlike, for instance God who is eternal). How should one understand Spinoza’s concept that humans are created? Spinoza defines creation (no longer occurring in Nature) early in the Short Treatise as referring to both a thing’s essence, its nature, as well as existence[v]. Maybe, I suggest, Spinoza does not discuss creation ex nihilo in the way philosophers expect him to because he does not use the term create to refer to creation from nothing but rather from something pre-existing[vi]. What one thinks of as constant creation, Spinoza terms generation (which only refers to its existence and he thinks still occurs in Nature)[vii]. Not only does Spinoza assume these concepts later but, in Appendix 2, Spinoza also refers readers back to his chapter 9, part 1, where he depicts an idea as being something God created and objectively has the formal essence of everything in it[viii]. All created things’ essences are contained in God[ix]. Putting this together, it makes sense that, given an idea has essence, it is created because creation denotes a thing’s essence and existence.

Breaking down the terminology further, one can relate Spinoza writing that an idea objectively has formal essence to how he goes on to define formal essence and objective essence. Formal essence combines the attribute of thought with the object and objective essence which denotes the real existence of idea[x]. However, the terms objective and subjective now mean the opposite of what they meant in the Early Modern period[xi], so it is easy for the contemporary reader to misunderstand them. In Spinoza’s day, objective meant an object of thought, unlike contemporary usage where things relating to thought are termed subjective[xii]. This helps to make sense of Spinoza’s statement that objective essence is understood through the idea[xiii], since ideas are thoughts of a mind. Whereas the term subjective, for Early Modern philosophers, took its meaning from the prefix sub, suggesting something beneath. Hence it was used to describe the reality underpinning the properties of a thing or subject[xiv]. Thus, when we predicate[xv] something as being true of someone, eg person A is a Y (Y is predicated of person A) we are saying something about the reality underpinning the property Y that person A possesses so we learn something real about that person. Reality is a pivotal concept in the term essence. Here, I shall be working with the concise definition of this complex term provided by Wolf in his commentary on the text, namely, “that the essence of a thing is its share of, or participation in, ultimate reality”[xvi]. Since God is the Supreme, Ultimate Being, it follows that ultimate reality refers to God. In this way, our essence partakes in God and is enjoined to God. This explains why Spinoza claims in his Metaphysical Thoughts that we understand objects created by God through God’s attributes[xvii] (the attributes of thought and extension because these are the only attributes of God accessible to the human mind). According to Spinoza, the attribute of thought gives rise to the mode thought/soul (pertaining to their essence), the attribute of extension gives rise to the mode of body. [xviii] In this way, if the mode of thought dies, the soul dies with it, although the attribute of thought, belonging to God, never dies, just as God exists eternally[xix]. The same is true of the body’s relation to extension. Although the body dies, God’s attribute of extension does not die[xx].

This asymmetry between objects and their modes impacts on how Spinoza thinks about what can unite with what. Therefore, objects who, like us, undergo change and death, do not unite with attributes which do not change or die, like God[xxi].  Ideas do change and die so are united with objects because ideas derive their existence from the object[xxii].  On the opening page of Appendix 2, Spinoza admits that he sees the mind/body union as being due to the soul changing with the body[xxiii]. This, I maintain, is consistent with what Spinoza claims about how the soul survives bodily death. During life, the main union is between the soul/idea and the body. On death, the soul avoids dying with the body by uniting with God, who exists eternally. God’s attribute of thought is perfect, so gaining true, adequate ideas during our lifetime helps boost the immortal part of soul, so helping us unite with God and achieve immortality.

How does all the above help us to understand Spinoza’s concept of the essence of the soul, which he claims is his main point in Appendix 2? Spinoza draws the conclusion that the definition of the essence of the human soul is:

“Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or “objective” essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, &c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension.”[xxiv]

The core of this definition is that the essence of the human soul involves an existing idea or the objective essence which flows from God’s attribute of thought. Shortly after this passage in the B version of the manuscript, Spinoza rolls the soul/idea/objective essence all together when he writes that “the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises…”[xxv]. As I showed earlier in this chapter, objective essence, thought, idea, and the soul are interconnecting concepts. Objective essence is understood through an idea and denotes the real existence of an idea. In this way, they are interrelated and combine into what the soul constitutes. Spinoza maintains in this above definition of the essence of the soul that the soul is interlinked with the essence of an object, essence being what partakes in and enjoins to God. I suggest these arguments help formulate Spinoza’s theory that increasing one's amount of adequate ideas boosts the part of one's soul which lives on after bodily death (by having a closer union to God than with the dying body).

When Spinoza expands on what he means by “in fact exists in Nature”, he briefly explains that he wants to “include” all the modes of all the attributes of God, not just the two we know about, namely, thought and extension[xxvi]. Thus, I gather that Spinoza contends that all of God’s attributes have modes, and each have souls[xxvii]. Hence, although Spinoza spends most of the time arguing for what could be described as an intellectual soul, it seems to me that, in this brief statement,  he may leave explanatory room for bodies (the modes of the attribute of extension) to also have a soul. How many souls does an object have, for Spinoza? One for every mode which flows from an attribute of God? If both the mode of extension and the mode of thought have a soul each, then this, I suggest, may be one way of continuing Spinoza’s mind/body parallelism after death. Indeed, Spinoza goes on to further analyse the concept of modes of extension, especially because it is already relatively well understood and we have no knowledge of the other attributes of God so one can only somewhat glean these through the attributes of God we do know (thought, extension)[xxviii]. Spinoza runs the following brief argument which makes deductions from what we know about extension to what we are less familiar with about the essence of the human body’s soul.

1. Assume (from Spinoza’s aforementioned arguments in the Short Treatise) that:

extension has two modes: motion and rest

2. Every particular material thing’s existence depends on a proportion of both motion and rest

(not one or the other)[xxix]

3. Motion and rest have an “actual ratio”[xxx]

4. Actual ratio has an objective essence (in God’s attribute of thought) which is the soul of the body[xxxi]

Hence, the soul/idea of the body changes with the changes of ratio between motion and rest.[xxxii]

Spinoza also maintains that these fluctuations in bodily motion and rest trigger biological and psychological feelings we experience during our lifetime[xxxiii]. He provides examples of physical feelings such as pain, cold, heat and also accounts for the apparent contractions we experience when different parts of the body undergo different proportions of motion and rest[xxxiv]. For instance, Spinoza illustrates this by explaining how one part of the body, eg the eyes, may be more sensitive to pain and more easily injured than another part, eg the hands[xxxv]. Spinoza also factors in external materials and forces impacting on the body (such as the material differences between wood and iron and how they produce different levels of pain in the human body) when calculating differences in motion and rest on the human body[xxxvi]. He also specifies emotional feelings such as happiness we feel when doing something we enjoy or when resting when the balance of proportion between motion and rest are regained[xxxvii]. By understanding feelings, Spinoza argues, one understands oneself better, including one’s life experiences and one’s faculty of reasoning[xxxviii].

In this way, to conclude Appendix 2, Spinoza ties together both life and death[xxxix]. By analysing feelings which arise from motion and rest, we understand the soul’s role in how we think and feel during our lifetime and how this relates to gaining knowledge of ourselves, our thoughts and experiences in life. After death, through his theory of the soul’s immortality (especially in his preface to part 2, his chapter 23 and Appendix 2) his readers understand how the soul becomes immortal by uniting closely with the immanent presence of God after bodily death. I suggested previously, this includes both collective immortality and personal immortality. This, I suggest, may have further textual support in Appendix 2 when Spinoza explains particularity. First he clarifies that attributes are all equal, as are the essences of modes[xl]. Then he maintains that when modes acquire existence, they are no longer equal with attributes because they now exist through the attribute so their essence becomes subject to that attribute[xli].  So when modes exist, they adopt their own particular essence, thereby becoming a particular rather than being an idea which does not have particularity, making it in line with Nature, as “there is none in Nature” [xlii]. Perhaps, I suggest, Spinoza’s explanation of particular modes here in his Appendix 2 of his Short Treatise could shed light on how souls, while they exist during life and death, can be unique, particular souls which carry through their personal identity.

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), 161, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

[ii] Spinoza, 157.

[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Commentary’, in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910), 167, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

[iv] Wolf, 195.

[v] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 23.

[vi] Spinoza, 24.

[vii] Spinoza, 23.

[viii] Spinoza, 159–60.

[ix] Spinoza, 157.

[x] Spinoza, 158.

[xi] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short Treatise’, 168.

[xii] Wolf, 168–69.

[xiii] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 160.

[xiv] Wolf, ‘Wolf’s Commentary to Short Treatise’, 168.

[xv] Wolf, 168–69.

[xvi] Wolf, 167.

[xvii] Wolf, 167.

[xviii] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 157.

[xix] Spinoza, 157.

[xx] Spinoza, 157.

[xxi] Spinoza, 159.

[xxii] Spinoza, 158.

[xxiii] Spinoza, 157.

[xxiv] Spinoza, 159.

[xxv] Spinoza, 160.

[xxvi] Spinoza, 159.

[xxvii] Spinoza, 159.

[xxviii] Spinoza, 161.

[xxix] Spinoza, 161.

[xxx] Spinoza, 161.

[xxxi] Spinoza, 161.

[xxxii] Spinoza, 161.

[xxxiii] Spinoza, 161–62.

[xxxiv] Spinoza, 161–62.

[xxxv] Spinoza, 161–62.

[xxxvi] Spinoza, 161–62.

[xxxvii] Spinoza, 162.

[xxxviii] Spinoza, 162.

[xxxix] Spinoza, 162.

[xl] Spinoza, 160.

[xli] Spinoza, 160.

[xlii] Spinoza, 160.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook: Chapter 8: How Can We Evaluate Spinoza on Immortality and the Soul from his Preface to Part 2 of his Short Treatise?

Chapter 8: How Can We Evaluate Spinoza on Immortality and the Soul from his Preface to Part 2 of his Short Treatise?

In this chapter, I shall evaluate Spinoza’s detailed discussion of the human soul in his preface to part 2[i]. I think it is a valuable section in itself because it gives two types of arguments, the more verbose but concise main text and the logical argument in the subtext, both of which provide further insight into Spinoza’s views of the soul, life, death and immortality. This preface also acts as an interesting link between chapter 23 and appendix 2 of the Short Treatise[ii].

Spinoza’s use of the terms motion and rest in the Short Treatise (and other works, including the Ethics) are reminiscent of the science of physics. Simply put, what Spinoza may have meant by motion is something which is moving at a given speed in a certain direction (whose velocity can be mathematically calculated) which makes it change its location. By rest, Spinoza may have expected us to think of something which has no velocity so is stationary unless something impacts on it, known in physics as being acted upon, a phrase Spinoza uses a great deal in his metaphysics and ethical theories. Physics, including mathematical calculations, is a subject Spinoza was steeped in as a maker of instruments and lenses. Spinoza researched and designed microscopes and telescopes together with complex mathematical calculations for them. These were appreciated by scientists of the day who wanted to work with him on ambitious scientific projects in this field, such as how to construct the largest telescope in Europe. So, Spinoza was not just some lowly lens grinder as he is so often portrayed these days. Indeed, back in Spinoza’s time, lens grinding was the in-thing![iii] He was a well-respected scientist! Therefore, I think it’s important to read Spinoza’s physics, mathematical and scientific vocabulary across his works in light of scientific theory, whether he is directly discussing science or not. For instance, his chapter ‘On Our Happiness’ in his Short Treatise where he sets out biological statements such as “all the activities of the body must proceed from motion and rest” before he claims that motion and rest also impact on whether we consider an object to be good or bad[iv]. In short, Spinoza argues in his chapter concerning happiness that, the more harmonious the proportion, the more favourably we view it[v]. Conversely, the more inharmonious the proportion of motion and rest is, the more we dislike the object[vi]. This has an impact on how we feel about things around us and our mood. The soul is aware of these states and, moreover, “the intelligent soul uses the body as a tool, and, consequently, as the soul is more active in this case, so is the feeling more perfect.”[vii] These notions and applications of motion and rest are reflected earlier in his preface to part 2 of the Short Treatise when he claims that motion and rest vary in proportion to one another and that this produces differences in the particular, which impacts on what we can say about that particular[viii].

Another direct application of motion and rest to the topic of life and death in his Short Treatise is when Spinoza clarifies in note 11 that the knowledge he is discussing picks out “not any body you please….but just such a body having this proportion of motion and rest, and no other: for as the body is, so is the Soul, Idea, Knowledge, &c.”[ix] In this note 11 passage[x], Spinoza is clearly showing that it is possible to track a specific individual human’s personal identity through time, because substantial knowledge picks out that individual’s body and soul from all the others. It could be argued against this reading of Spinoza (as it has been argued contra Gersonides’ account of personal immortality[xi]) that Spinoza seems to base the uniqueness of that individual’s personal identity on the knowledge they possess. Therefore, such contras argue[xii], one cannot pick out an unique individual because it is possible for both person A and B to possess the same knowledge, call it X, as each other. However, I struggle with this type of refutation of Spinoza’s views on immortality and personal identity. It does not address why Spinoza would specify in note 11 “not any body you please, but just such a body ….and no other…”[xiii]. Given Spinoza is also grouping the body, soul and knowledge together as all matching up with each other and the identity of a specific person, it follows that the human soul must be as unique as the body and its personal identity must be trackable across different life stages, or else it would not amount to perfect, infinite, substantial knowledge. In this passage, Spinoza is not merely relying on the knowledge the individual acquires over their lifetime as a marker of their personal identity, but here is referring to substantial knowledge containing the relevant information about the unique individual[xiv]. Since substantial knowledge is perfect, infinite knowledge and is an attribute of God, who is omniscient, I suggest it is unlikely that this type of knowledge is unable to pick out an individual’s personal identity. Hence, even if we were unable to identify an unique individual after death, surely God would be able to do so? Thus, I think perhaps God’s omniscience and attribute of perfect, infinite, substantial knowledge ensures our individual, personal immortality continues after death. My proposed resolution of this tension is supported by Spinoza’s note 15, which reiterates that the soul unites with the one, thinking substance, God[xv]. So, I maintain, surely it follows from this that substantial knowledge, as an attribute of God, should be able to distinguish one soul from another uniting with it, even if we could struggle to do so because we do not possess only perfect knowledge. If, as Spinoza states in note 15[xvi], the soul can know and love extension as well as the one substance, God, then I’m inclined to think that perhaps one cannot rule out the possibility of the soul continuing to know its unique extended body in some way. If this were left open as a possibility, I think, this would make room for a soul’s knowledge being distinct from other souls’, meaning an individual soul would continue to be unique (at least as unique as our bodies are). This, I argue, would provide one way of continuing Spinoza’s mind/body parallelism after death because the body would immediately live on as an idea in the soul.

I suggest all this may have important implications for Spinoza on personal identity not only during a person’s lifetime but also after their death. Nadler, unlike some Spinoza scholars (eg. Donagan, Wolfson), argues that Spinoza’s claims about immortality do not leave room for a specific, unique individual and their unique soul surviving death[xvii]. In this way, he maintains that Spinoza does not have a theory of personal immortality and even rejects the notion of the immortality of the soul altogether[xviii]. However, I question this. Firstly, if we were to grant Nadler the claim that Spinoza denied personal identity, this, I argue, would not be a problem for Spinoza, nor would it count as a grave error in his metaphysics. Why? I suggest that, by looking at Spinoza’s philosophy within the historical context of Jewish thought and Judaism down the ages as Nadler does[xix], one can nevertheless draw very different conclusions about Spinoza’s notion of the soul and how it unites with God without a strong emphasis on personal immortality, namely, that Spinoza coheres very well with it, especially given the era he lived in. Most medieval Jewish philosophy did not advocate personal immortality of the soul[xx]. During this period, it was commonly argued that the intellect, “which bears no trace of individuality”, remained after death and Maimonides (1135-1204) argued more specifically for the immortality of the intellect rather than the soul[xxi]. Some, such as Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410), disagreed with an intellectual account of immortality, replacing it with an ethical account and arguments concerning love of God[xxii]. I suggest that Spinoza’s views on immortality across his writings contain a balanced combination of all these aspects, as he interweaves his accounts of the intellect, ethical behaviour and a love of God. Indeed, medieval Jewish philosophers who advocated the vital role of the intellect in immortality also gave ethical conduct, in this life, a central role in their philosophy[xxiii], so Spinoza’s combination of ethics and intellect for achieving immortality is typical of Jewish philosophy. Moreover, like Spinoza, medieval Jewish philosophy maintained that immortality could not be assumed, but rather seen as something to be earned in this life through increasing our intellectual and ethical capacities[xxiv]. It has been suggested that Spinoza, like Crescas but unlike Leibniz, emphasizes virtue in his book, Ethics, especially when discussing the immortality of the soul[xxv]. Indeed, Spinoza’s account of the human soul uniting with God to survive bodily death and achieve immortality, I argue, is remarkably similar to Crescas’s account of what happens to the souls of the righteous[xxvi]. Crescas maintains, as does Spinoza, that after the body dies, souls can “attach themselves to God to an extent which was denied them while they were in the body, and their union with God is constantly being strengthened.”[xxvii] Similarly, for both Spinoza and Crescas, if this union does not take place, the soul suffers and is annihilated[xxviii]. This is in line with the medieval Jewish idea that, because God brings everything into existence, God has the power to make it also go out of existence[xxix]. So I suggest interpreting Spinoza’s descriptions of blessedness and joy in loving and understanding God to be akin to Crescas’s view that, “The souls of the righteous after death enjoy the splendor of the *Shekhinah” when their souls cleave to and unite with God[xxx].

The Shekhinah is a feminine Hebrew noun for the immanent presence of God and I maintain that Spinoza may well have believed in the Shekhinah because in Letter 58 (54), dated 21^st September 1674, Spinoza answers Boxel’s questions about the possible existence of ghosts. Spinoza rejects Boxel’s habit of assuming ghosts are always male as merely “a fancy” and suspects Boxel’s preconceived ideas of gender come from “the common imagination that God is masculine, not feminine”[xxxi]. Here, I argue, is a strong feminist statement by Spinoza on gender assumptions. He refuses to subscribe to the narrow prevailing view (which still persists to this day), that God is male and never female! He also does not fall into implicit gender bias of ascribing and assuming maleness of ghosts, despite not even believing in them. I argue that the way Spinoza answers Boxel shows how the faculty of imagination can create a fictional image based on unexamined notions, causing a flight of fancy rather than a conclusion based on rationality drawn from logically examined true, adequate ideas. This, I suggest, could inform contemporary feminist theory and feminist interpretation of Spinoza concerning the topic of how gender bias functions and generates false beliefs. To situate my feminist interpretation of Spinoza within current strands of feminist philosophy, Spinoza’s letter to Boxel would, I argue, provide textual evidence which challenges feminist interpretations of Spinoza’s ideas as inherently sexist and committing implicit bias.

Returning to the topic of immortality in Jewish philosophy, personal immortality was not emphasised until a century after Spinoza’s lifetime, beginning with Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) arguing for the continuance of everyone’s soul after death[xxxii].  Nevertheless, Jewish philosophers in the 19^th and 20^th continued to prefer collective immortality over personal immortality[xxxiii].  Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) refuted personal immortality as being too selfishly focused on the individual when the emphasis should be on the collective and creating an ethical society[xxxiv].  Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) understood Judaism to advocate “the soul's immortality as applying to the people as a whole rather than to the individual”[xxxv]. Personal immortality is only relevant to the extent to which it comes from an individual’s personal moral improvement but the focus should still be on the Jewish collective history living on eternally and promoting truth and morality in society[xxxvi].

Hence, irrespective of whether Spinoza believed in immortality for individual humans where their unique personal identity continues clearly after death, I argue that Spinoza’s account of the immortality of the human soul is generally very much in line with various strands of Jewish philosophical accounts down the ages. I claim that Spinoza did believe in a type of personal immortality in that it is the individual soul which attaches itself to God. The soul is a mode of the one substance, God, so it is always linked to God, just to a closer extent after death. In the Jewish prayer, Modeh Ani, a person thanks God for returning their (divine) soul to them in the morning, after it has been with God during the time they were asleep. If God did not return their soul but kept it, the person would have died. The concepts in this prayer are derived from the Sages (especially the Psalms and Lamentations) therefore these very personal concepts about the soul’s relationship with God would be familiar to Spinoza. This would support my hypothesis that the soul can remain distinctly personal and individual post-uniting with God, given that it would be un-returnable by God if it was not identifiable and unique to a specific individual. Or, it would run the risk of waking up a different person if the identical soul were not returned! Furthermore, this process which takes place every night until morning is paralleled with the resurrection of the dead when the soul reunites with its body in the messianic age. So these concepts about the soul are directly relevant to both life, death and immortality in Spinoza. In this way, Spinoza accounts for both individual and collective immortality. Thus the notion of personal immortality is not missing but only de-emphasised and I do not think this reduced focus in Spinoza on individual, personal immortality constitutes a weakness in his philosophy. Indeed, one may look upon it from the Jewish philosophical perspective that an emphasis on a collective immortality and social ethics constitutes a strength in an account because it highlights the importance of moral, sociable behaviour in society during our lifetime, rather than emphasising a self-focused, personal immortality after death. 

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Wellbeing, ed. and trans. Abraham Wolf (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

[ii] Spinoza.

[iii] Abraham Wolf, ‘Introduction: I. The Life of Spinoza, II. History of the Short Treatise’, in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man & His Well-Being (London, UK: A. & C. Black, 1910), lxix, https://archive.org/details/spinozasshorttre00spinuoft/page/n7.

[iv] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 123.

[v] Spinoza, 123–24.

[vi] Spinoza, 123–24.

[vii] Spinoza, 124.

[viii] Spinoza, 63–66.

[ix] Spinoza, 64.

[x] Spinoza, 64.

[xi] Martin Lin, ‘Nadler Steven Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Book Review by Lin)’, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, N/A, N/A, no. N/A (4 December 2002): N/A.

[xii] Lin.

[xiii] Spinoza, Short Treatise, 64.

[xiv] Spinoza, 64.

[xv] Spinoza, 65.

[xvi] Spinoza, 65.

[xvii] Lin, ‘Nadler Steven Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Book Review by Lin)’.

[xviii] Lin.

[xix] Lin.

[xx] Gale Thomson, ‘Soul, Immortality of’, Encyclopaedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com (Encyclopaedia Judaica. Encyclopedia.com, 19 December 2018), https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/soul-immortality.

[xxi] Thomson.

[xxii] Thomson.

[xxiii] Allan Arkush, ‘Immortality: Belief in a Bodiless Existence: Everlasting Life Was Not Always Guaranteed to the Jewish Soul.’, educational, myjewishlearning.com, Unavailable, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/immortality-belief-in-a-bodiless-existence/.

[xxiv] Arkush.

[xxv] Kohler Kaufmann, ‘IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL (Late Hebrew, “hasharat Ha-Nefesh”; "ḥayye “Olam")”’, Jewish Encyclopedia (JewishEncyclopedia.com, Web publication date unavailable. Ffom   printed edition 1906), http://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8092-immortality-of-the-soul.

[xxvi] Thomson, ‘Soul, Immortality of’.

[xxvii] Thomson.

[xxviii] Thomson.

[xxix] Arkush, ‘Immortality: Belief in a Bodiless Existence: Everlasting Life Was Not Always Guaranteed to the Jewish Soul.’

[xxx] Kaufmann, ‘IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL (Late Hebrew, “hasharat Ha-Nefesh”; "ḥayye “Olam")”’.

[xxxi] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 380, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[xxxii] Arkush, ‘Immortality: Belief in a Bodiless Existence: Everlasting Life Was Not Always Guaranteed to the Jewish Soul.’

[xxxiii] Thomson, ‘Soul, Immortality of’.

[xxxiv] Thomson.

[xxxv] Thomson.

[xxxvi] Thomson.