Spinoza also argues for another,
more controversial necessary condition for having and maintaining a kingdom of
God as can be seen by the following quote:
“God has no special kingdom among
men except in so far as He reigns through temporal rulers”[i]
To see the necessary condition
within this statement, I shall re-state this quote as:
If God can rule through
Sovereigns of a state or states, then that state can be a kingdom of God.
This has the consequence that
some categories of worship fall under the jurisdiction of the sovereign.
Spinoza outlines two distinct categories of true worship, that of inward
worship and outward worship. The latter
can fall under the bounds of public right and so sovereign jurisdiction[ii].
The former falls within the bounds of a person’s private, inalienable right of
freedom of thought[iii].
These categories of worship, therefore, also refine my analysis of how Spinoza
might be defining and arguing for the beneficial role of true worship in his
TTP. Spinoza outlines the outward and inward worship thus:
“…the rights of religion and the
outward observances of piety should be in accordance with the public peace and
well-being, and should therefore be determined by the sovereign power alone. I
speak here only of the outward observances of piety and the external rites of
religion, not of piety itself, nor the inward worship of God, nor the means by
which the mind is inwardly led to do homage to God in singleness of heart.”[iv]
So, from this, outward worship
possibly defines as religious actions of observance. Since these are events
that can affect the political society in which they take place, Spinoza claims
that the sovereign should have jurisdiction over outward worship. This is to
ensure that such actions preserve the peace and welfare of the state so it
prospers and is stable and secure. Spinoza, I suspect, realises that this may
seem like a nanny-state to some readers which is why he is careful to point out
that the sovereign must, in return, respect people’s freedom of thought,
opinion, “communication”[v] and
judgement. By Spinoza imposing restrictions on a sovereign’s jurisdiction over
inward worship, he is balancing out the restrictions and areas of jurisdiction
and freedom, thus he avoids inadvertently advocating a paternalistic state.
Indeed, Jaspers[vi]
importantly highlights that “mere stability can be deceptive” if it is at the
expense of freedom. I think Spinoza is aware of this tension and so argues that
it is an abuse of sovereign power and a usurping of one’s rights if a sovereign
tries to prescribe what counts as true and false opinions about the worship of
God[vii].
Gorham[viii]
highlights another pertinent point raised by Spinoza in his TTP when he quotes
Spinoza as arguing that virtuous people will “resent the branding as criminal
of opinions which they believe to be true”[ix]
and will continue to press for “free expression”[x]
under all circumstances. This is echoed by Susan James[xi]
who adds that Spinoza also importantly maintains that the “upright” “do not
fear…death or …punishment” and their conscience is clear of having committed
any “disgraceful deed” and so are not full of “remorse”[xii]. I think Gorham[xiii]
rightly argues that Spinoza would see a lack of free speech and expression as
not beneficial to a sovereign because it would habituate people into becoming
deceitful by constantly expecting them to hold in tension a contradiction
between what they think and how they act which eventually would pervert the
functioning of the state. I think this fits well with Balibar’s[xiv]
informative interpretation of Spinoza’s thesis that “the sovereignty of the
State and individual freedom …are not in contradiction. The contradiction lies precisely in the attempt to set them up in
opposition to one another” (italics in original). Moreover, Balibar[xv]
reinforces this by maintaining that it is a law of nature that
“violent…constraints” on “individual freedom” and pressure to make people feel
“obliged to think like another” fosters
“a destructive force” aimed at the expense of the State which often succeeds in
bringing about its downfall (italics in original).
This, I think, goes some way
towards acknowledging the value of religious freedom alongside freedom of
thought, judgement and expression. Rather than falling into the trap of
outlining a nanny-state, I think Spinoza was aware of the aforementioned
dangers and was merely drawing attention to the historical fact that, as
Scruton[xvi]
highlights, “popular religion, which is the condition of peace among ignorant
people, is also the cause of war between them”. Interestingly, this gives one
an insight into how true worship and political stability are not one-sided.
Much as true worship leads to pro-social behaviour that benefits political
stability, so conversely, if a sovereign prescribes opinions about worship
thereby impacting on how one goes about true, inward worship, then this also
constitutes a threat to political stability. This time, however, it originates
from the sovereign’s actions rather than the citizen’s duties towards the
state. Nevertheless, if the sovereign correctly regulates outward worship then
this is not only of benefit to the welfare of the state, but also solidifies
the role of true religion and true worship within that state. This is because,
from his earlier necessary condition that claims if God can rule through
Sovereigns of a state or states, then that state can be a kingdom of God,
Spinoza concludes that religion needs a Sovereign to make “decrees” that give
religion “the force of a command”[xvii].
Furthermore, Spinoza argues that:
“…all the decrees of God involve eternal truth
and necessity, so that we cannot conceive God as a prince or legislator giving
laws to mankind. For this reason the Divine precepts…do not receive immediately
from God the force of a command, but only from those, or through the mediation
of those, who possess the right of ruling and legislating. It is only through
these latter means that God rules among men, and directs human affairs with
justice and equity”[xviii].
This seems to me to be a vital
connecting step in Spinoza’s argument because it links his prior arguments
about the concept of and the definition of outward and inward worship with
piety and with public peace, by making them achievable via a sovereign. By
making the role of the sovereign include being a proper interpreter of
religion, or at least, the true outward worship of it, then Spinoza
simultaneously accounts for and attempts to preserve religion and the state.
However, I’m not sure how Spinoza
would account for some rare occurrences whereby a legal decree of a state is
left so open to interpretation and unclear that what is legally enforced does
not match the decree. A contemporary example of this is the organisation ‘Women
of the Wall’ who fight for attaining gender equality in terms of having the
same religious rights as men to legally and peacefully conduct outward worship
in the public space of the Western Wall in Israel. Their actions, such as
wearing a tallit, bringing and reading the Torah in the women’s section and
singing prayers such as the Shema aloud, were treated as illegal by authorities
despite Women of the Wall citing that neither divine nor human law, in
Spinoza’s terms, prohibits or renders what they do illegal. The clause that was
cited in 2012 by authorities for the prohibition, categorized their actions as
the conduct of a religious ceremony that was not in accordance with “local
custom”[xix].
However, a year later in 2013, the Israeli courts ruled against the authorities
stating that Women of the Wall were “not violating law” or “local custom” and
that their outward worship, as Spinoza would term it, did not constitute
“provocation”[xx].
Since then, these events have led to a change in “the Law of the Holy Sites”
with the aim of increasing religious pluralism and toleration within Judaism by
creating a non-orthodox, egalitarian prayer section at the Western Wall and
including Women of the Wall as representatives in the governing committee for
that section[xxi].
Nevertheless, various tensions carried on after this law. Women of the Wall,
who comprised of all the different orthodox and non-orthodox Jewish
denominations, as a result split into two groups. The orthodox became known as
the ‘Original Women of the Wall’ to reflect their aims of advocating women’s rights
to worship outwardly at the Western Wall in a feminist orthodox way and for
what they see as orthodox Jewish reasons for doing so. So they disagreed with
the outcome that they would have to worship outwardly in a progressive Jewish
section despite identifying as orthodox, simply because they wish to, for
instance, wear a tallit, kippah, and read or chant torah[xxii].
This ruling has also meant that, strictly speaking, the orthodox feminists end
up with less rights than before to outwardly worship in the way they want to
within the orthodox section. This is because the new law means reserving the
orthodox section for those who wish to continue the status quo of men and women
worshipping differently from each other. This was not overtly stated
previously. They also did not agree with potentially reclassifying the Western
Wall as being akin to a synagogue which it never was before and carries with it
potentially more problematic restrictions[xxiii].
However, the progressive members of women of the wall were happy with the
result because having a progressive section fitted with their beliefs and
identity. However, both Women of the Wall groups carried on having trouble when
trying to make use of or question the workings of this new law and legal
wrangling continued.
In this way, when applying
Spinoza’s political philosophy to complex contemporary situations, one needs to
bear in mind that even in a democracy, with a democratic sovereign, there can
be genuine problems concerning religious freedom when authorities are given
strong powers concerning outward worship in public spaces. I would suggest that
this may be why Spinoza wants to argue that, as Lemmens[xxiv]
summarizes it, “it is perfectly conceivable to live a pious – ie. truly
religious - life without exercising any outward rites of religion”. This, I
think, follows on from the consideration Lemmens[xxv]
raises earlier that “if piety as such would be intrinsically related to
ceremonial observances, then true virtue and happiness would depend on a
contingent cultural tradition”. This is problematic in many practical
situations, ranging from demarcating different ways in which the sexes should
go about outward worship in public, through to examples that Spinoza raises
such as the banning of a particular religion and forced conversions that took
place in Spain and Portugal regarding Judaism and in Japan regarding the
banning of Christianity[xxvi].
Given Spinoza equates true piety with true virtue, too much emphasis on true
outward worship being necessary for true piety could lead to unfortunate
conclusions that when a state supresses or bans a religion or certain outward
forms of worship, then their followers would end up less virtuous simply
because their outward worship, and with it their piety, are being outlawed.
This, I think, is an implication Spinoza would want to avoid, especially given
his family’s background of religious exile and his excommunication.
In terms of the outcome of the
Western Wall issue, I think one can see Spinoza’s views at work here in that
the sovereign, rather than a religious faction, should have the last word on
resolving tensions concerning outward worship and that a democratic sovereign’s
solution should aim at creating public peace, toleration and pluralism. Spinoza
does not see this system of attuning outward pious worship with political
welfare and peace, as new-fangled, even for the seventeenth century. He sees it
as a fact that came to light from his empirical observation that “religion has
always been made to conform to the public welfare”[xxvii].
This leads Spinoza to claim that this attuning of the two constitutes a true,
necessary condition for the preservation of both religion and the state alike[xxviii].
Moreover, Spinoza anticipates an “increase in piety”, public welfare and the
“security of states” in which this system is followed[xxix].
I suggest this textual evidence shows Spinoza arguing for and encouraging an
increase in an already existing, and therefore somewhat traditional,
understanding of piety and points to an argument for religious pluralism rather
than secularism or assimilation or a type of new religion. As I understand
Spinoza, the idea behind his seemingly secular politics is to avoid one
religion being the dominant, state religion while relegating the others to
subsidiary status, rather than to create a secular society in general. In this
way, by making room for a religion-neutral space at the top of a political
society, all religions can attempt to have equal, non-hierarchical status in
relation to each other, thereby reducing the power struggles and exile problems
between those who identify as belonging to different religions and
denominations. As Smith[xxx]
points out, people’s main identity in the seventeenth century revolved around
the religion they belonged to, which also meant that people didn’t leave a
religion in that era because they would feel bereft of an identity. However,
unlike Smith[xxxi],
I think these identity considerations mean that, for Spinoza, resolving
religious tension in that era would be uppermost in his mind, not
secularisation or suggesting some new type or approach to being religious. I
suggest it would seem unrealistic to Spinoza to create a political theory that
would ask people to reject or relinquish their religious ways of life and
identity, if such a notion would even occur to him in his era in the first
place. Secularisation and adopting a variety of identities, religious and
non-religious is perhaps something we see as an option in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries but is methodologically teleological to superimpose onto
Spinoza’s arguments.
On Spinoza’s account, piety seems
to lie at an interesting cross-roads because he notes the categorical
difference between piety in an intrinsic sense and pious observances. Intrinsic
piety falls under the category of inward worship that a sovereign doesn’t
attempt to control or determine, whilst pious observances categorize under
outward worship that a sovereign does determine in order to preserve the state.
Spinoza claims to have successfully demonstrated by the end of chapter 7 of his
TTP that inward worship of God and intrinsic piety, including “the means by
which the mind is inwardly led to do homage to God in singleness of heart”, all
categorize as private inalienable rights that a sovereign must not infringe[xxxii].
This is mostly because Spinoza sees this as being part of a broader category
containing general inalienable rights such as freedom of judgement and thought
which encompasses Spinoza’s view that “every man’s understanding is his own”[xxxiii].
Much as this independence of understanding has often been seen as a threat to
religion, Spinoza disagrees, claiming instead that this freedom of thought and
judgement actually benefits true religion. This is because if one feels free to
think about religion in a manner that best suits that person, then Spinoza
maintains that this brings about the right conditions for true worship of God
and a dedicated approach to religion. I do not think this amounts to a
rejection of traditional religion or worship, just perhaps a more personal and
rational approach to it. One must not assume that tradition leaves no room for
independent thought or that a personal approach means anything goes.
Traditional Judaism, including rabbinic commentary, Talmudic debate as well as
examples in the Torah of disagreement and dispute leading to social changes,
such as inheritance rights[xxxiv],
means that Spinoza need not see his rational argumentative approach as
untraditional or as opposing tradition. Indeed, he is very fussy about not
distorting true religion and scriptural interpretation thereby preserving the
word of God and true religion[xxxv].
In this way, contrary to general opinion, both traditional religion and the
political state benefit from freedom of thought and judgement and from
worshipping wisely/truly or in other words, worshipping in accordance with
one’s “conscience”[xxxvi].
Nevertheless,
Spinoza does, I would argue, have safety-nets in place so that this freedom of
conscience doesn’t descend into false religion and false worship. For instance,
the way in which Spinoza carefully sets out a methodology of scriptural
interpretation, he tries to ensure that, if followed diligently, a person could
exercise their freedom of thought, judgement and intellect about religion
without introducing false, blasphemous or anti-social opinions into their
reading of scripture. Spinoza approves of one aspect of Rabbi Jehuda Alpakhar’s
approach to the Hebrew Bible, that of interpreting “Scripture by Scripture” and
argues vehemently against any approach that twists the text for a particular
end goal, whether it be well-meaning or not[xxxvii].
This, I think, is another way in which Spinoza discusses how to preserve and
maintain true worship since the methods of scriptural interpretation again, as
I discussed earlier in Part 2, seem to fall under Spinoza’s broader definition
of true worship. In other words, part of worshipping truly is to take care not
to “twist” what scripture teaches by, for instance, over-rationalizing
scripture until its meaning is incorrectly changed, which is something he criticises
Maimonides of doing[xxxviii].
It could be argued that when Spinoza cites Rabbis Alpakhar and Maimonides when
discussing biblical interpretation, he is merely using their names to refer to
Christian contemporaries of his whom he didn’t wish to mention by name[xxxix].
However, I wish to put forward the possibility that Spinoza was not hinting at
anyone. I think it could be argued that he was engaging with the past and
on-going debates in Judaism about biblical exegesis. I suggest the fact that he
chose to compare Rabbi Alpakhar, a lesser-known contemporary of Maimonides and
a critic of his, with Maimonides shows he is trying to contribute to Jewish
debates on scriptural interpretation, not specifically or exclusively Christian
theology, especially since Spinoza expressed his unfamiliarity with and lack of
grasp of Christianity, so didn’t like to pass detailed comment and criticism of
it. So, I think, if one wishes to attempt to cross-apply Spinoza’s thoughts to
Christianity, this must be done very carefully and selectively, in order to
avoid misreading Spinoza’s texts and theories by going too far beyond Spinoza’s
general knowledge about world religions and thereby his comfort-zone within
which he and his arguments remained. Medieval rabbis would sometimes need to take
account of Christian theology in their arguments. So, is Spinoza showing some
awareness of the questions his Christian readers might have about the topics in
his TTP, and where they fit in to his political and religious theories? This
would be quite normal and not symptomatic of Spinoza making Christian arguments
himself or trying to blend in with Christianity in the Netherlands. As I argued
earlier, I think Spinoza perhaps looked upon it as merely a vehicle for
improving understanding and tolerance between Christians and Jews and as a way
of addressing how his political theories apply to everyone in Dutch society.
Textual support for this is when Spinoza cites Paul in the New Testament, in
between his examination of King Solomon’s proverbs, in order to argue that
everyone is capable of assenting to his claims:
“These words
clearly show that everyone can by the light of nature clearly understand the
goodness and the eternal divinity of God, and can thence know and deduce what
they should seek for and what avoid;…”[xl]
Moreover, I
think Spinoza puts forward his understanding of the most rigorous ways for
interpreting scripture in a manner which helps him to situate his arguments
within the on-going Jewish examination of scriptural interpretation. This can
be seen by his overt inclusion of the Maimonidean controversy while showing the
advantages and disadvantages of various approaches, including approaches to
obscure scriptural passages. Spinoza pairs the contrasting views of Maimonides
with Rabbi Alpakhar (who strongly objected to Maimonides’s approach as being
heretical, which contributed to the famous Maimonidean controversy and banning
of Maimonides’s books in his lifetime[xli]).
This pairing of these two Rabbis I think, is better understood if we take
Spinoza to be referring to the Rabbis themselves, not using them as a
representative of another thinker. So I think we should proceed with caution in
order not to make the teleological methodological error of assuming it is very
un-Jewish of Spinoza in the seventeenth century to point out any potential flaw
in Maimonides’s writings. This is
because Spinoza would have been well aware that aspects of Maimonides’s
arguments had been rejected as heretical and controversial, particularly among
the Ashkenazi, whose approach was the dominant one at his synagogue. We need
not assume that Spinoza would have the same level of admiration for Maimonides
as some Jews do in the twenty-first century. Besides, Jewish biblical criticism
is an activity which Jews, and now more commonly non-Jews as well, have done
throughout history up to and including present day exegesis and is mostly
carried out by arguing for and against other positions, methodologies and
traditions. So I see Spinoza as merely participating in this on-going Jewish biblical
interpretation debate, not as rejecting or refuting Judaism or tradition any
more or less than those who came before or after him.
Furthermore, by arguing against biblical commentators having too much creative license with scripture, Spinoza
hopes to preserve and understand the true doctrines of faith therein[xlii].
This, for Spinoza, as I argued earlier, also entails not worshipping the words
on the page or the scripture itself but rather taking the core, clear and
distinct messages to heart and living by them[xliii].
A further safety-net Spinoza puts in place to guard against false religion and
false worship is that he recommends keeping ministerial roles and political
roles distinctly separate at all times since they require incompatible things
and so are not roles which combine successfully in one person. Moreover,
political stability is best maintained when ministers stick to mainstream
religious doctrines and do not occupy roles in which they wield any political
power, but rather leave space for the sovereign to guide the political
stability and outward worship in society:
“How hurtful it is to religion
and the state is the concession to ministers of religion of any power of
issuing decrees or transacting the business of government: how, on the
contrary, far greater stability is afforded, if the ministers are only allowed
to give answers to questions duly put to them, and are, as a rule, obliged to
preach and practise the received and accepted doctrines”[xliv]
I interpret this passage in
accordance with Bogers’[xlv]
insight that when “authoritative religious figures…do not adhere to” core
mainstream doctrines such as loving one’s neighbour as one loves oneself, and
compound this with a manipulation of subjects through religion, which sets up a
clash between themselves and the sovereign as to who subjects are expected to
obey and how they consequently act, then they are, in effect, destabilizing the
state by usurping and dissipating the sovereign’s power. This reading of
Spinoza is, according to Gorham,[xlvi]
in accordance with Locke’s view that “intolerant doctrines and preaching from
within” religious places of worship, “aided by superstitious congregations and
corrupt politicians, constitutes the major threat to civil peace”. Indeed,
Locke would go further than Spinoza on this point, and recommend that religions
that “explicitly usurp...civic authority” should be banned and that religions
should be subject to the “toleration imperative”, namely that all religions
must ““internalize” (own and teach) toleration with respect to any other
religion””[xlvii].
I think Spinoza advocating that “ministers” of religions should stick to
“received and accepted doctrines”[xlviii]
also lends textual support to my reading that Spinoza was not rejecting or
deviating from traditional religion.
[i] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XIX,
245.
[ii] Spinoza, VII, 118, XVII, 241.
[iii] Spinoza, VII, 118, XVIII, 241.
[iv] Spinoza, XIX, 245.
[v] Scruton, Spinoza, 102.
[vi] Jaspers, Spinoza, II:72.
[vii] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XIX;
XX, 257.
[viii]
Geoffrey A. Gorham, “Spinoza, Locke, and
the Limits of Dutch Toleration,” Macalester International 27, no. 1
(2011): 111.
[ix]
See also Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XX,
262.
[x] Spinoza, 262.
[xi] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise, 310.
[xii]
See also Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XX,
263.
[xiii]
Gorham, “Spinoza, Locke, and the Limits
of Dutch Toleration,” 111.
[xiv] Etienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics,
trans. Peter Snowdon, Radical Thinkers Series (London; New York: Verso, 2008),
27.
[xv] Balibar, 28.
[xvi] Scruton, Spinoza, 94–95.
[xvii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XIX,
248.
[xviii]
Spinoza, 248.
[xix] J. Maltz and Y. Ettinger, “Major Victory
for Women of the Wall Jerusalem Court: Women Not Violating Law by Wearing
Prayer Shawls at Western Wall,” Haaretz, April 25, 2013,
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/jerusalem-court-women-not-violating-law-by-wearing-prayer-shawls-at-western-wall.premium-1.517577.
[xx] Maltz and Ettinger.
[xxi] The Jerusalem Post (staff), “Reform
Movement Holds First Official Prayer Service at Western Wall,” The Jerusalem
Post, February 25, 2016,
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Reform-Movement-holds-first-official-prayer-service-at-Western-Wall-446050.
[xxii]
J. Sharon, “Original Women of Wall Reject
Compromise at Site,” The Jerusalem Post, January 29, 2016,
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Original-Women-of-Wall-reject-compromise-at-site-443215.
[xxiii]
For the latest details see: “Original Women of the Wall Facebook
Page,” social media, facebook, n.d., https://www.facebook.com/OriginalWomenoftheWall.
[xxiv]
Lemmens, “Spinoza on Ceremonial
Observances and the Moral Function of Religion,” 57.
[xxv] Lemmens, 52.
[xxvi]
Lemmens, 57.
[xxvii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XIX,
250.
[xxviii]
Spinoza, 252.
[xxix]
Spinoza, 254.
[xxx] Steven B. Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism,
and the Question of Jewish Identity, Hardback (USA: Yale University Press,
1997), chap. 8.
[xxxi]
Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the
Question of Jewish Identity.
[xxxii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, VII,
119.
[xxxiii]
Spinoza, XX, 257.
[xxxiv]
Jill Berkson Zimmerman, “Real Change in
the Torah,” educational, myjewishlearning.com, n.d.,
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/real-change-in-the-torah/.
[xxxv]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes.
[xxxvi]
Spinoza, 6.
[xxxvii]
Spinoza, XV, 191.
[xxxviii]
Spinoza, VII, 115.
[xxxix]
Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the
Question of Jewish Identity.
[xl] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, 68.
[xli] Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question
of Jewish Identity.
[xlii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, chap.
VII; XV.
[xliii]
Spinoza, XII, 166.
[xliv]
Spinoza, XVIII, 241.
[xlv] Thijs Bogers, “Spinoza and Toleration,” Opticon1826,
no. 11 (Autumn 2011): 2.
[xlvi]
Gorham, “Spinoza, Locke, and the Limits
of Dutch Toleration,” 112.
[xlvii]
Gorham, 112.
[xlviii]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XVIII,
241.
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