As I explore the topic of
teleology in Part 3, I remain consistent with the non-teleological
methodological approach to the history of philosophy that I have adopted, as
described by Susan James[i]. I
am not using any account or thinker with the aim or purpose of advocating a
particular thinker, theory or ideology. The comparisons I draw between
different accounts are for the purpose of better understanding each theory in its
own right, for its own sake, and then making a critical and informed decision
about which account best explains a range of phenomenon and why. So, at the
end, I put Spinoza’s account to the test by taking the example of the pizzly
bear to see how the account Spinoza (1632-77) suggests matches up with accounts
along the lines of Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BCE), Maimonides (twelfth to early
thirteenth century), Darwin (1809-82) and contemporary science of genomics. I conclude that Spinoza has the
most all-rounded theory of all of them and so there is much to be learnt and
appreciated about his perhaps under-valued system of thought. I believe this is
in line with a non-teleological methodological approach which tries to avoid a
type of historical arrogance whereby our times are seen as somehow superior to
all of those which came before so their only value is how they have helped us
arrive at our improved modern concepts. This is the teleological structure of
using the past as a means to our contemporary ends. So I attempt to be careful
not to inadvertently venerate and elevate our contemporary philosophical or
scientific theories above Spinoza’s seventeenth century ideas or to skew our
understanding of Spinoza, within the context of his own era, by making him a
vehicle for what contemporary theory expounds today. My aim is show that I
think theories, like societies, do not advance in an ever improving, linear
fashion so there is much to learn by examining and assessing an eclectic range
of strong theories, all of which contain some element of truth. I think we need
to draw on theories throughout the ages, rather than stay in a bubble of only
our present times, in order to enrich our understanding in general. As long as
this is not conducted in a manner whereby past philosophers and thinkers are
misconstrued for our own ulterior motives of proving our argument, then this is
methodologically acceptable.
Indeed, exploring theories up and
down the ages so they can be examined in context with each other is an approach
which I think Susan James uses in some of her works, such as her excellent
book, ‘Passion and Action: Emotions in the Seventeenth Century’[ii] and
her enlightening conference paper 'Religious Passions, Productive and
Destructive'[iii],
which place Hume within the context of Spinoza on these themes, although they
are a century apart. Both her approach and my approach attempt to strike a
balance between an overall historical perspective and context between eras
together with an appreciation of philosophers within their own era and for
their own sake. This is in order to reach an unbiased and benevolent reading of
philosophers’ works as well as enable us, to the best of our abilities,
critically assess their thought in an independent, rational way rather than
through the ideological biases of our era. Also, this non-teleological
methodology suits a philosophical analysis of Spinoza, given his
non-teleological approach to interpreting philosophy as well as scripture and
this is a philosophical consideration that I think motivates both my
interpretation and Susan James’s. Nevertheless, Susan James’s interpretation of
Spinoza is unique and distinct from mine. Similarities between our approaches
occur when, for my own independent reasons, I draw on her style of philosophy because
it resonates with me.
Furthermore, Susan James[iv]
cites Butterworth as a well-known example of a non-teleological methodology in
academia and I see that he too discusses different thinkers up and down the
ages within the same work, for instances in his ‘The Origins Of Modern Science
1300-1800’[v]. So,
I think it is obviously possible for me to also discuss the topic of final
causes and teleology from the pre-Socratics to Darwin and modern science,
without falling into a teleological methodology. This is because my aims and
motivations for doing so remain in line with the non-teleological
methodological framework and ideal of attempting to eliminate bias and
distortion in interpretation without necessarily restricting how many eras are
covered in the process. For philosophical and logical reasons, I agree with the
non-teleological methodological project of not merely selecting the aspects
useful to our argument or theory whilst leaving out other, inconvenient
aspects. I think to do this is setting up what is termed in logic as a strawman
fallacy. Committing such a logical fallacy is not only logically, analytically
and methodologically unsound in philosophy as well as in any academic
discipline. Nevertheless, I situate my interpretation and work firmly within
the discipline of philosophy and especially the field of the history of
philosophy within it and not within the history of ideas or philosophy of
history. In short, what I think is most important, is engaging in the pursuit
of pushing our intellectual understanding of human nature and the world around
us in as rigorous and unbiased manner as possible in order to make a solid
contribution to our body of knowledge.
How could Spinoza and Darwin
share any similarities despite being centuries apart from each other? Do these
apparent similarities arise from objective features in their texts or are they
superimposed by our contemporary outlook and projected onto their writings? I
maintain that there are objective reasons for exploring some similarities between
Spinoza and Darwin.
First, it is interesting and
informative for the philosophy of science to compare Darwin’s theories with
philosophical accounts of human nature and the world around us because,
apparently, Darwin thought along philosophical lines[vi].
So such comparisons help us both assess philosophical accounts in light of
scientific observations as well as think about the underappreciated
philosophical underpinnings and inspiration behind scientific discovery.
Secondly, the pre-Socratic Empedocles is thought to be “a forerunner” to Darwin[vii] so
likewise we can ask the same forerunner question about Spinoza. Hence, I think
it is plausible that Spinoza may have been aware, just as other thinkers have
been, of early evolutionary theories in ancient Greek philosophy. This not only
applies to Darwin but also to, for instance, Aristotle. As can be seen by
Bostock’s examination of Aristotle’s Physics Aristotle’s discussions of
teleology and Empedocles’s theory of evolution importantly show that “Aristotle
is aware, then, of the first attempt at an evolutionary explanation of why the
parts of animals, and their instinctive behaviour, are so well adapted to their
environment. But he does not see how it could be made to work.” [viii]
Conversely, even if Spinoza was unaware of pre-Socratic evolution theory, I
suggest he is not implausibly ahead of his time. It is not impossible in the
seventeenth century to conceive of striving in a way that is compatible with
relatively modern evolutionary theory. Well before the seventeenth century, in
ancient pre-Socratic times, philosophers such as Empedocles were not only
conceiving of but also famously expounding a version of the evolutionary theory[ix]. So
there have always been the philosophical methodologies which provide the tools
of thought within debate and rational argumentation to conceive of such ideas,
independently of previous influences. (Besides, many great thinkers put forward
theories and ideas that are seen as being far ahead of their time because great
minds are capable of transcending time and place through their intellectual
efforts, inspiration and insights.)
So which methodologies have been
utilised as tools to enhance rational argumentation and debate? It is
interesting to note some of the methodological choices made by Spinoza and
Aristotle many centuries earlier.
Aristotle’s four causes account[x]
offers a logical explanation of why things are as they are. He used this
account to analyse the natural world and intentional human behaviour. This
gives rise to a system of thought that can be used as a tool for understanding
ourselves, other people and the world around us by deducing conclusions from
axioms. Spinoza also developed an axiom-based philosophical system of analysis,
especially in his Ethics[xi],
which also contains many deductions about humans and nature. However, when it comes to the Euclidian
geometrical methodology, Aristotle rejects this style of argumentation and
demonstration on the basis that it isn’t suited to the variety of disciplines
he wishes to analyse[xii].
Barnes describes this methodology thus:
“…Euclid’s geometry is an
axiomatized deductive system: he selects a few simple principles, or axioms,
which he posits as the primary truths of his subject; and from those axioms he
derives, by a series of logically compelling deductions, all the other truths
of geometry. Geometry thus consists of derived truths, or theorems, and primary
truths, or axioms. Each theorem follows logically – though often by way of a
long and complex chain of reasoning – from one or more of the axioms.”[xiii]
However, unlike Aristotle,
Spinoza embraces Euclidian methodology in his Ethics by making use of “a
Euclidian apparatus of Definitions, Axioms, Propositions, Demonstrations, and
Corollaries”[xiv]. A
Euclidian-style argumentation would be a sensible choice for Spinoza because,
in the seventeenth century, this was generally considered the most rigorous and
clear way to present your arguments and demonstrate that they are plausible and
true. Euclid’s geometry was considered a core part of education and was the
main credible way of presenting ideas for many centuries, up until an
alternative method was put forward in the nineteenth century[xv].
So, I think this would be the most convincing argument structure for Spinoza to
use to convince the readers of his era. Indeed, Spinoza seems to hold this view
of maths in E. I. app[xvi] as
a way of providing a standard /pattern (“normam”) of truth (“veritatis”) by
writing how it makes clear/reveals/points out essence and properties without
involving final causes. In this way[xvii],
maths, amongst other things, means that instead of paying attention to /
judging (“animadverterent”) in accordance with these common
prejudices/prejudgements (“communia haec praeiudicia”), they are led
(“ducerentur”) to true/well-founded/proper (“veram”) knowledge (“cognitionem”
and so perhaps a sense of proper examination/ inquiry/ investigation/
acquisition of knowledge/ recognition of true ideas/ notions).
Aristotle, however, gives his
explanations in the format of his doctrine of the four causes which functions
in the following way: to locate the cause, you ask why something is so and to
provide the explanation, you state “in a simple subject-predicate sentence:
So-and-so is such-and-such” or, in other words, the logical framework Aristotle
uses is “X because Y”[xviii].
Aristotle’s method of questioning and then providing a reason, I think,
somewhat resembles the methodology of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR),
in so far as the PSR also uses the framework of questioning why and then providing
a reason to explain and understand a fact. In its most unlimited usage, the PSR
holds that all facts can be explained by giving a “sufficient reason”, even the
most idiosyncratic ones[xix].
In this way, there are no such things as, what some philosophers call, brute
facts (facts for which there is no rational explanation)[xx].
In logic, the PSR would be expressed as:
“For every x, there is a y such
that y is the sufficient reason for X (formally: ∀x∃yRyx∀x∃yRyx [where “RxyRxy” denotes the binary relation of
providing a sufficient reason]).”[xxi]
Melamed expands on the above
sentence, which he refers to as (2), thus:
“The PSR is, in fact, a family of
principles which are generated by various restrictions of (2), and by
ascriptions of different degrees of modal strength to (2). To begin with,
variants of the PSR may differ according to how they restrict the kinds of
things that require a reason (the explananda).”[xxii]
This similarity of question and
answer style between Aristotle and Spinoza is not especially surprising, given
that the PSR was already used by some pre-Socratics, so pre-dates both of them[xxiii].
The pre-Socratics were very keen on science so the similarity between
themselves, Aristotle and Spinoza in how they structure explanations could also
be due to their common interest in science and explaining human nature and the
world around them. Nevertheless, the PSR generally fell out of favour during
the Medieval era and didn’t come back into use by philosophers until the Early
Modern period, including Spinoza[xxiv].
So, despite Spinoza and Aristotle being centuries apart and the PSR falling
into disuse between their eras, in terms of the question and answer structure
of argumentation, Spinoza and Aristotle provide a similar methodology and both
seek to define their concepts clearly. The PSR also holds not just that
everything has a reason but that everything has a cause and therefore nothing
happens by sheer chance. Pure flukes cannot be properly explained so appear to
happen by chance through our inability to provide reasons and explanations. As
we shall see in the next chapter, whether one accepts the claim that things can
happen by sheer chance importantly impacts on arguments and explanatory
accounts about teleology and final causes.
[i] James, “Why Should We Read Spinoza?”
[ii] Susan James, Passion and Action. The
Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, paperback (Great Britain:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
[iii] Susan James, “‘Religious Passions,
Productive and Destructive’” (Hume After 300 Years. The 38th Annual Hume Society
Conference, The Old College, Edinburgh University, UK, 2011),
http://www.humesociety.org/conferences/RecentConferences/Edinburgh2011/PROGRAMME-PLUS-ABSTRACTS-FINAL.pdf.
[iv] James, “Why Should We Read Spinoza?”
[v] H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern
Science 1300-1800, Third Printing 1959 (pdf e-book) (New York, USA: The
Macmillan Company. G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1959),
https://ia902300.us.archive.org/27/items/originsofmoderns007291mbp/originsofmoderns007291mbp.pdf.
[vi] Geoffrey A. Gorham, “Philosophy of
Science” A Beginner’s Guide, paperback, Beginner’s Guides (England, UK:
Oneworld Publications, 2009), ix.
[vii] Gordon Campbell, “Empedocles (C. 492—432
B.C.E.),” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP, n.d.),
http://www.iep.utm.edu/empedocl/.
[viii]
David Bostock, “Introduction and
Explanatory Notes,” in Physics, by Aristotle, paperback, Oxford World
Classics (Great Britain and USA: Oxford University Press, 2008), xxvii–iii.
[ix] Campbell, “Empedocles (C. 492—432
B.C.E.).”
[x] Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and
trans. J. Warrington, Everyman’s Library 1000 (Great Britain: Dent and Sons
Ltd., 1966); Aristotle, Physics, ed. David Bostock, trans. Robin
Waterfield, paperback, Oxford World Classics (Great Britain and USA: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
[xi] Benedict de Spinoza and Henri Krop, Spinoza
Ethica, 8th edition (Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam : Prometheus, Bert Bakker,
2015).
[xii] Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle” A Very
Short Introduction, paperback, Very Short Introductions (New York, USA:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 39.
[xiii]
Barnes, 39.
[xiv] Don Garrett, “Introduction,” in Ethics,
by Benedict de Spinoza, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth
Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), ix.
[xv] David Berlinski, The King of Infinite
Space. Euclid and His Elements (New York, USA: Basic Books, Perseus Books
Group, 2013), 7–8.
[xvi] Spinoza and Krop, Spinoza Ethica,
118; Benedict de Spinoza, Opera, Renati des cartes principia philosophiae
more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata metaphysica Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, ed.
C.H. Bruder, EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google
e-book), vol. I (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN.,
1843), 218,
https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.
[xvii]
Spinoza and Krop, Spinoza Ethica,
118; Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:218.
[xviii]
Barnes, “Aristotle” A Very Short
Introduction, 84.
[xix] Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Martin Lin,
“Principle of Sufficient Reason,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, September 7, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/sufficient-reason/.
[xx] Melamed and Lin.
[xxi] Melamed and Lin.
[xxii]
Melamed and Lin.
[xxiii]
Melamed and Lin.
[xxiv]
Melamed and Lin.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.