Chapter 4: The Psychological Impact of Fear and Anxiety on Freedom, Living Wisely, Dying Well and Attaining Eternity in Spinoza’s Ethics
In this chapter, I shall explore
how EVp38 highlights the relationship between knowledge (cognitionis) and fear
of death (mortem … timet). Breaking the concepts down, we see that the phrase
fear of death in this proposition involves narrowing down negative emotions to
a verb that particularly specifies fear (timeo), while the noun death (mors)
incorporates the topics of corpses and, more generally, annihilation. Fear is a
negative, harmful affect so builds on the general problem of negative affects
raised earlier in the proposition EVp38. In his definitions of the affects in
EIII, Spinoza lists two different words, both of which can carry the meaning of
fear.
So what are the possible meanings
of these two words? The first definition, which involves fear, is the
thirteenth definition, “metus”[i]
which can mean fear, dread, apprehension, anxiety, and terror. It can also refer
to religious awe although this is usually in poetry. The second definition
which involves fear is “timor”, which appears in definition thirty nine[ii],
and comes from the verb timeo. The literal meaning of timor is mainly fear and
dread although this can include apprehension, alarm, anxiety. Timor can also
sometimes carry the meaning of timidity although this is a lesser-used
equivalent word in English. It can be used in personification and when
conveying that an object arouses fear, terror or anxiety, especially when used in
poetry. It can be used to convey an emotion for positive reasons too, namely awe,
reverence, veneration and is related to the word timoratus meaning that one is
full of reverence towards God, god-fearing, devout and reverent. As far as I
can gather, Spinoza does not use two other main words for fear which he could
have used, such as terror, terroris meaning terror/fear/alarm/panic and pavor,
pavoris meaning fear/panic.
Why does this matter? It gives us
a more complex, nuanced idea of what Spinoza may have meant by fearing death
and how it relates to attempting to live well and die well. I think it might
also impact generally on the way we read Spinoza and understand him, especially
since translations of Spinoza’s definitions of the affects in EIII varies.
White and Sterling[iii]
translate both metus in definition thirteen and timor in definition thirty nine
as fear. I think this is confusing and unhelpful because it gives the erroneous
impression that Spinoza repeats himself and conflates his terms by giving two different definitions of
the same word. Curley[iv]
and Elwes[v]
chose to give the two definitions separate senses, making metus mean fear and
timor mean timidity. This has the advantage of keeping the definitions separate
and showing that Spinoza uses two different words and does not conflate his
terms. Timidity is not a central meaning of timor but perhaps somewhat gives us
the flavour of Spinoza’s definition of it. Nevertheless, a drawback is that
using timidity could somewhat disassociate timor from its direct meaning of
fear. Thereby, making timor sound more like a personality trait rather than
something arising from a fear of an object external to you which is impacting
on your emotions and judgement in a way that you need to learn to control.
Timidity may be a by-product of this situation and reaction but, I claim, that
Spinoza’s definition of timor is more layered than the simple definition of
being too timid would suggest.
Hence, I shall now analyse: How
does Spinoza word his philosophical definitions of metus and timor and how does
it relate to the linguistic meanings and connotations of these words? What does
this tell us about Spinoza’s views on thinking about and fearing death?
Spinoza defines the word metus as
“tristitia”[vi]
whose main meaning is sadness, although tristitia is also used in Latin to mean
mournfulness, sorrow, grief, melancholy, gloom, dejection, moroseness and it
has similar connotations to its synonym severitas, so both can imply severity,
sternness and harshness. Spinoza himself generally defines tristitia in his
third definition of the affects in EIII as referring to people passing from a
greater, more powerful ideal or perfection to a lesser one[vii].
He specifies that one suffers from metus erratically, because he adds the
adjective inconstans meaning changeable, inconstant, inconsistent, capricious[viii].
Metus originates from ideas of the future or past whose outcome/fate/success we
doubt to some degree[ix].
In his definition[x], he
refers back to EIIIp18s2 so we are meant to expand his definition by relating
it to this scholium. EIIIp18s2[xi]
adds that metus springs from an image of a
doubtful/ dubious/ uncertain/ variable/ dangerous/ critical (dubiae) thing/event
(rei). If one were to remove the element of doubt then metus would become
despair[xii].
However, when Spinoza defines
timor in EIIIdef39, he narrows his definition to an ambition/eagerness/
(carnal) desire to take the path of a lesser evil to avoid/evade a greater evil
(malum, which can also mean apple so perhaps has connotations of Adam and Eve
especially since Spinoza discussed the Garden of Eden in the Ethics) out of
fear (metuimus from metuo, related to metus). To gain further insight into the
meaning of timor, Spinoza refers us to EIIIp39s[xiii].
There we see a more detailed example of how timor impacts on judgement and
actions. Spinoza uses the verb form of timor, which is timeat from timeo and
not metus. He gives the example of someone who is filled with hate but after
considering/planning it, meditating/reflecting on it, s/he chooses not to
injure another for fear that they will suffer a greater evil themselves than
their intended target (EIIIp39s[xiv]).
This example makes me question
whether timidity is a good fit here for what Spinoza is describing with the
word timor. In this example in EIIIp39s, the person does not come across as
timid but rather seems to be under the influence of strongly negative passions
such as hate, and perhaps revenge, while being very self-centred, worrying more
about how it will impact on themselves rather than truly reflecting on the
right thing to do. The person may be timid, in the sense of lacking courage to
do a certain action (call it φ), but it is not very timid of them to
want to φ
purely out of hatred for another. Indeed, it’s probably best that they decide
against φing! Acting out of hatred for another cannot lead to ethical action or
justice. For instance, Spinoza argues that judges should make a ruling by
seeing the wider picture and considering and loving what is in the
“public well-being” and use their rational faculties to decide such matters,
rather than act out of “hatred or anger” (EIVp63c,d[xv]).
In this way, we can better avoid evil by aligning our desire with reason
(EIVp63c[xvi]).
Since Spinoza argues in EIVp64[xvii]
that knowledge of evil is always inadequate knowledge (especially, I maintain,
since evil does not give us knowledge of God because evil is not an attribute
of God), perhaps the problem Spinoza is exploring here is that thinking about φ
and choosing to φ or not to φ becomes fraught if one is in the grips of
negative affects such as hatred and anger and therefore working off inadequate
knowledge. Yet φing is a recurrent aspect of life and letting fear lead one into
inadequate knowledge and negative affects, which consequently muddles ones
cognition and judgement, makes one less intelligent and inhibits one’s ability
to live well, acquire true, adequate knowledge and act piously and ethically.
It also reduces our eternity by lowering the percentage of second and third
kinds of knowledge we possess so decreasing the eternity of our mind and soul.
So we not only live less well, we also die less well and are less eternal after
life.
Furthermore, a main difference
which strikes me between Spinoza’s two words for fear is that timor is more
related to cognition than metus. Interestingly, for the topic of free will, it
is describing choosing between two options (call them whether to φ or ψ) and
choices of action (φing or ψing). So Spinoza must be leaving room
for freedom of choice and action within his account of necessity. Metus is used
to help define timor hence timor is perhaps also different in the sense that,
although it is also a term of fear, in Spinoza’s definitions, it helps him
refer to the negative impact fear has on our cognitive capacities and hence our
life choices and decision-making of whether to φ or not. The question remains: Why
did he choose both metus as well as timor for his main definitions of the
affect, fear? I maintain that Spinoza uses the more all-encompassing word for
fear, metus, as a definition because he is giving an overall definition of fear
from which he extracts timor, giving it a narrower definition to show the
cognitive impact of the negative affect of fear and anxiety. Then he can expand
on both these aspects of fear more clearly to construct various arguments to
fit the context when discussing a topic. For instance, in EIVp67 and its
demonstration[xviii]
Spinoza could have used the noun timor, timoris meaning fear/dread (which would
be in keeping with its related verb timeo, timere, timui which he uses in
EVp38, see “timet”[xix])
when discussing a fear of death in relation to wise or free people, but
instead, he uses metus. However, in EVp38, he uses timeo when discussing a
fear/dread of death. By analysing Spinoza’s definitions, it becomes clearer
that timor, with its cognitive and epistemological implications of thinking and
knowing how to act, fits with the clash between true, adequate knowledge and
fear which Spinoza is highlighting in EVp38 and elsewhere in the Ethics. In his
works, there is often a close tie between knowledge and fear which works both
ways. True, adequate knowledge helps reduce fear while inadequate ideas
generate fear and superstition. Conversely, combatting fear and superstition
promotes true, adequate knowledge whereas a rise in fear and superstition, be
it in our individual life or collectively as a society, reduces our
intelligence and perpetuates false, inadequate ideas. Although Spinoza gives
examples of individuals, it is cross-applicable to the collective in wider
society. Spinoza is showing the damaging effects of fear on people,
irrespective of whether it arises from other negative affects such as hatred or
whether it is the climate of fear which triggers negative affects such as anger
and hatred alongside poor cognition. Moreover, Spinoza would rather one does
not act out of fear or try to evade evil, even if the result is that a person
is φing
by bringing about a good (EIVp63[xx]).
So, leaving aside the aspect of hatred in EIIIp39s for a moment, one can see
how timor and metus could cloud anyone’s intellect through negativity and poor
coping strategies in the face of stress, fear and, I suggest, anxiety. Both
metus and timor can refer to anxiety but, given his definitions, I suggest my
above examination helps us to distinguish between feeling anxious or fearful
(metus) and acting out of fear and anxiety (timor), revealing the practical
application of Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion on living and dying well.
Thus: Is Spinoza somewhat
philosophising about the psychology of stress and anxiety and how to alleviate
it yourself, by managing your negative affects, including reducing the effect
fear has on your cognition and judgement, in order to live well and die well? I
contend that Spinoza has captured a common but lesser-known aspect of human
nature and psychology with his analysis of fear and its impact on mental
cognition and knowledge. I think this is impressive and insightful of Spinoza,
especially since it is still an on-going debate in psychology today. I suggest
that findings in recent studies perhaps support Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion
and psychology which I have outlined above.
Scientific research has shown
that fear and stress has a detrimental impact on cognition and memory. The
fight or flight reaction is designed to help us act rather than reason, especially
when it involves using our reasoning faculties to take in, understand and
remember new knowledge[xxi].
Spinoza specifically discusses the now well-known psychological phenomenon of
fight or flight. In EIVp69c, Spinoza maintains:
“The free man is as courageous in
timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.”[xxii]
Such presence of mind is an
ability which is just as relevant today as it was in Spinoza’s era and is a
very important survival skill. In this way, Spinoza picks up on something
fundamental in psychology when developing his account of the free man, living
well and wisely despite conflict or any dangerous situations which may arise.
Psychology research has discovered that fear can make people “suffer cognitive
paralysis, resulting in complete inaction.”[xxiii]
A familiar example of this in daily life is when a fire alarm goes off in a
building and people stop what they are doing but, instead of evacuating the
building, slump into inaction and
negativity. Even if it later turns out to be a false alarm, your overall
survival strategy should be to go through standard evacuation procedures calmly
and efficiently. Although you may encounter several false alarms and may not want
to look silly constantly evacuating unnecessarily, it only takes one correct
alert to be fatal and you will not find out which one that is until it is too
late. Therefore, people are advised to leave their office when the alarm goes
off, whether they feel like doing so or not[xxiv].
However, extrapolating from the aforementioned scientific research, I deduce
that actively beginning an evacuation is more likely to be the response of
stress-hardy people who, unlike the majority of people, are less prone to freezing
during dangerous, stressful, fear-inducing situations. Furthermore, I maintain
that Spinoza would advise that one should not just think of oneself when the
alarm goes off but help those slower to respond so “they escape from the
dangers”[xxv].
Perhaps another cause of misresponding
to pressure situations could be related to Morgan’s discovery in a study
carried out in 2006[xxvi].
He found that the side-effect of fear on cognitive ability and information
retention meant participants struggled to see the wider picture and tended to
only remember and focus on small specifics which changed the way they would,
for instance, reproduce a drawing from memory[xxvii].
This concurs with other studies carried out which show the impact fear and
anxiety has on memory and cognitive performance[xxviii].
Some suggested approaches for alleviating anxiety and depression and reducing
the negative impact it has on the intellect is, I claim, in line with Spinoza.
I argue that Spinoza’s appreciation of the complexity of fear, anxiety and
depression being a combination of emotional, behavioural and cognitive factors
is supported by a number of studies and experiments carried out in modern
psychology. This field is still a work in progress and there is much still to be
done. However, some studies have shown that making changes to your cognitive
approach is often particularly effective and important for both physical and
mental health, regardless of whether someone is clinically or non-clinically
depressed or anxious[xxix].
Even mild, non-clinical depression or anxiety can adversely impact on
intellectual performance, for instance in exams, so examination bodies and
institutions are advised to do everything they can to help reduce potential
stressors so it does not lower students’ academic performance[xxx].
In terms of therapeutic approaches and what individuals can do to help
themselves, some experiment results indicate the importance of dealing with
doubt and negativity while reshuffling one’s cognitive functioning, alongside
dealing with emotional factors[xxxi].
Hence, I think Spinoza was right to combat depression, anxiety and factors
impeding cognitive and intellectual development by taking the same three
factors as modern psychology does into account, namely, emotional, cognitive
and behavioural. These three factors, I maintain, are not only reflected in his
double definition of fear and related responses (metus, timor), but also in his
descriptions of various emotional, behavioural as well as cognitive thought
processes which he argues need addressing in order to live well.
When it comes to more extreme,
dangerous fight or flight situations, studies have found that it is useful for
people to learn how to cope during extreme fear-inducing situations, as, for
instance, soldiers do, because you are significantly less likely to make
potentially fatal errors and you generally increase your survival chances,
although differences remain even between skilled soldiers[xxxii].
Reactions to fear-inducing scenarios vary more markedly among untrained people,
in relation to their prior cognitive abilities and personality traits[xxxiii].
There is, however, disagreement
about how anxious people fare.
Robinson finds that anxious
people perform worse because their cognition and memory is too preoccupied with
thinking about their fear of dying[xxxiv].
In this way, Robinson’s plausible account of the anxious experiencing a
decrease in their cognitive abilities through a fear of death, I think, lends
support to Spinoza’s claim in EIVp67 that a free, wise person would not dwell
on thinking about death or be overtaken by negative affects, including worrying
about and fearing death.
However, Derakhshan adds that
anxious people have one extra skill over non-anxious people. Derakhshan argues
that people who suffer from anxiety have the “advantage” of being better at
detecting something hostile and acting swiftly[xxxv].
Nevertheless, I’m not convinced that anxious people always accurately perceive
who and what is and is not hostile and react appropriately. Surely they may
either be prone to panicking or be made to panic. Or simply assume the worst
due to their negative brain pattern or based on bad experiences in the past,
rather than inferring it accurately from the people and situation presented to
them. However, I agree that they need not be passive victims who require others
to deal with potential situations for them, given that anxious people possibly
retain the ability to detect and act on a problem, in other words, think and
act for themselves under pressure. Indeed, throughout the Ethics, Spinoza
encourages the wisdom of pursuing an independent, rational, measured approach
over irrational, hysterical reactions, brought-on by fear and negative affects,
which impair wisdom and knowledge and directly or indirectly generate evil.
This is a central message of EVp38 which highlights the connection between
knowledge and negative affects, encompassing anxiety, dread and fear, including
a fear of death.
[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera, Renati des
cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata
metaphysica Ethica ordine geometrico
demonstrata, ed. C.H. Bruder, EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT
EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-book), vol. I (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS
BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843), 320, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.
[ii] Spinoza, I:325.
[iii] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics,
trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature
(Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), 149, 155.
[iv] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed.
and trans. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books (England, UK: Penguin
Books, 1996), 106, 111.
[v] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS
of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK,
vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street,
covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road
cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 167, 182,
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.
[vi] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:320.
[vii] Spinoza, I:317.
[viii]
Spinoza, I:320.
[ix] Spinoza, I:320.
[x] Spinoza, I:320.
[xi] Spinoza, I:286.
[xii] Spinoza, I:286.
[xiii]
Spinoza, I:299–300.
[xiv] Spinoza, I:299–300.
[xv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:231.
[xvi] Spinoza, II:230.
[xvii]
Spinoza, II:231.
[xviii]
Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White, Stirling),
212.
[xix] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:411.
[xx] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:230.
[xxi] Michael Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’, New
Scientist, 13 May 2017.
[xxii]
Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:233.
[xxiii]
Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’, 33.
[xxiv]
Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.
[xxv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:210.
[xxvi]
Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.
[xxvii]
Bond.
[xxviii]
Esther F. Akinsola and Augustina D.
Nwajei, ‘Test Anxiety, Depression and Academic Performance: Assessment and
Management Using Relaxation and Cognitive Restructuring Techniques’, Psychology
4, no. 6A1 (2013): 18–24,
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.46A1003.
[xxix]
Akinsola and Nwajei, 23.
[xxx] Akinsola and Nwajei, 23.
[xxxi]
Akinsola and Nwajei, ‘Test Anxiety,
Depression and Academic Performance: Assessment and Management Using Relaxation
and Cognitive Restructuring Techniques’.
[xxxii]
Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.
[xxxiii]
Bond.
[xxxiv]
Bond.
[xxxv]
Bond, 35.
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