Chapter 5: Knowledge, True Piety and the Soul and their Role in Living Well, Dying Well and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics
Following on from Chapter 1, I
think retaining the language of degrees in EVp38 deepens the meaning behind how
increasing our adequate knowledge helps combat evil and our negative affects.
As Elwes[i]
has brought out in his translation choices, one of the key ideas in EVp38 is
that possessing second and third varieties of knowledge proportionally reduces
how many evil, malicious, harmful affects we feel. Conversely, this implies
that the more inadequate ideas we have, the more likely we are to suffer from
harmful negative affects. I argue that this provides us with a useful
conceptual barometer to analyse evil and the relationship between knowledge and
piety in Spinoza’s ethics.
Earlier in the Ethics, Spinoza
delineates what good and evil are and describes them in relation to our nature.
That which agrees with our nature is good, if it is contrary to it then it is
evil and if something diverges from our nature then it is indifferent, in other
words, neither good nor evil (EIVp31d and s). In addition, we cannot have
certain knowledge of good or evil per se, but we can tell whether something
might be good or evil by looking at it in relation to knowledge. In EIVp27 and
its demonstration, Spinoza argues that if something enables and is compatible
with knowledge, then it is good and if something works as a knowledge-blocker
(eg EIVp73s “hatred,
anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions…”[ii]),
then it is evil. In this way, I think EVp38 builds on EIVp27 and p31 and so by
looking at these propositions together, it helps us appreciate how Spinoza
deepens his idea. Earlier in EIV, Spinoza states that good and evil relate to
our nature and are somewhat co-dependent with knowledge before adding in EVp38
that this co-dependency is so close that it increases and decreases in degrees.
Thus, I think it is helpful to see the relationship between true, adequate
knowledge and good and evil as being a matter of a fine, small tweaking of
degree rather than seeing it as general, sharply delineated categories.
Is Spinoza trying to convey the message that we should
focus our efforts on gaining true, adequate ideas and knowledge in order to
lead a good life and live well by showing that second and third varieties of
knowledge have more far reaching consequences than one might realise? Yes,
because knowledge is closely tied to our emotions, meaning that knowledge
indirectly impacts on us, our choices and our actions through the vehicle of
influencing our emotions. To analyse the concepts here more deeply, it is
perhaps useful to examine this in relation to EVp41s. Here, Spinoza argues
against the common misconception that:
“Pietatem
igitur et religionem et absolute omnia, quae ad animi fortitudinem referuntur,
onera esse credunt, quae post mortem deponere, et pretium servitutis, nempe
pietatis et religionis, accipere sperant.” (EVp41s[iii])
I provide the
Latin here because there are small but important differences between English
versions of this proposition. The most significant being the addition of the
word morality (Curley 1996 and Bennett 2017) which isn’t in the Latin and
calling animus, animi, mind, character or soul. Here are a selection of translations:
“In their
view, then, morality, religion, and absolutely everything related to strength
of character are burdens that they hope to put down after death, when they also
hope to be receive a reward for their bondage, that is, for their morality and
religion.” (Bennett 2017)[iv]
“Morality, then, and religion, and absolutely
everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which
they hope to put down after death, which they also hope to receive a reward for
their bondage, that is, for their morality and religion.” (Curley 1996)[v]
“They
therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable
to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside,
and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is for their piety and
religion;…” (Elwes 1901)[vi]
“Piety,
therefore, and religion, and absolutely all those things that are related to
greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens which they hope to be able to lay
aside after death; hoping to receive some reward for their bondage, that is to
say, for their piety and religion.” (White, Stirling 2001)[vii]
So I examined
the Latin words and found the White and Stirling version to be the most
representative. My literal translation of the options of the Latin text
meanings is:
Therefore/accordingly/consequently,
piety and religion and absolutely everything, which refers to a
courageous/strength of soul, they believe to be burdens/oppressive, which they
cast aside after death, and hope to receive [something] worthwhile for their servitude/bondage,
ie true piety and religion.
Although all
of the above translations chose reward, I decided to keep to the same usage of
pretium as Spinoza uses throughout the Ethics. He usually uses pretium to state
that he thinks something is worth his while to discuss or point out, for
instance in EIIp13s, EIIp49s, EIIIp50s. So its alternative meaning of reward,
although perfectly correct, would be a one-off exception in the context of
Spinoza’s Ethics. So, I suggest, Spinoza need not be arguing against people
expecting a reward after death. He may be merely pointing out that people
should not consider piety as a burden to be endured in their life, in the hope
it will be worthwhile in the end, after death. I think Spinoza’s objection here
is that to regard piety and religion as a burden turns it into a means to an
end rather than being of intrinsic value which is worthwhile for its own sake.
If one feels only too pleased about the prospect of leaving it behind on death
then one’s heart is not in the right place and it possibly involves just going
through the motions of pious-looking behaviour during your lifetime. Spinoza
probably sees this as insincere and insincere piety and religion is not true
piety and religion. Again, if one’s main motivation for piety is a fear of
death and the punishment or divine retribution it entails, then one is not
doing good deeds and following divine commandments out of a love of God and
wanting to be a good person. Spinoza words this as “ex legis divinae
praescripto” literally meaning out of divine law precepts (EVp41s[viii]).
In Orthodox Judaism, both pious and ethical behaviour are often manifested in
doing what is called mitvot whose meaning is related to commandments of Jewish
Law. Doing a mitzvah can range from typical pious, religious behaviour such as
saying blessings to more general ethical behaviour such as helping someone,
which also displays kindness, a central feature of Orthodox Judaism called
chessed. So, is Spinoza arguing against people believing in reward after death?
I suggest not, because Spinoza may be claiming something more complex here. He
is perhaps attempting to bring out the importance of having the right attitude
towards piety and religion by seeing the intrinsic value in doing God’s
commandments and gaining knowledge of God. I do not think Spinoza is claiming
that piety and religion are not worthwhile, but rather that they are worthwhile
in themselves. I also suspect that Spinoza would not wish to dwell on
punishment after death given his excommunication which carried with it the
implication that he may not enjoy a world to come.
Another
interesting extra potential layer of meaning could be that pretium can also
mean prayer and accipere can also mean listen or hear. So I wonder whether
Spinoza chose these words over others because they carry the implicit meaning of
having your prayers heard. This would fit with his strong emphasis on piety and
religion throughout this proposition. Spinoza may consider praying with the
sole intention of trying to avoid punishment or gain something out of it as not
true piety, but rather, as using religion to get what you want. True piety and
religion is about becoming closer to God, loving and knowing God. Indeed,
Spinoza opens this proposition by arguing that piety and religion are the
foremost, best, principal reason / consideration even if we were unaware that
our mind (mentem) is eternal. He shows in EVp41s how preposterous a means-end
approach is when he shows the logical absurdity of dispensing with reason on
the false assumption or belief that “the mind is not eternal or immortal”[ix]
(mentes cum corpore interire[x],
literally, mind dies/perishes/ceases/ruined the body). Thus, I maintain that
his refutation of people thinking like this and logically showing it to be
absurd gives textual evidence that Spinoza must have held the reverse belief.
In other words, Spinoza must have believed in the eternal, immortality of the
mind and argued for enhancing our reasoning capacities because he saw this as
being a way of living which fitted with immortality. Although Spinoza here uses
the Latin word for mind, I think Spinoza did not just argue for the immortality
and eternity of mind but also of the soul. This is easy to overlook because
Spinoza uses various related phrases to refer to the immortality of the soul
rather than the phrase itself so the concept of the immortality of the soul in
his Ethics can be overlooked or dismissed and explained away.
A further
related problem is that the Latin words for mind and soul are not translated
consistently between translators and even within the same translation edition.
There are also differences between languages as can be seen in White’s footnote
to his translator’s preface when he discusses “a difficult passage” in
Spinoza’s Ethics[xi].
Here he gives the Latin sentence, which includes the word anima then highlights
Auerbach’s “as usual a perfectly literal translation” in which he translates
anima as “Seele”[xii]
(soul). He then provides Saisset’s
French translation, which chooses “l’ame” (soul) and states that he is “lucid”
and “perfectly understands the Latin”[xiii].
Despite both these accurate translations
preserving the meaning of the Latin word as soul, White opted for translating
it as mind even though he is happy to translate it as soul, at times, in the
Ethics, for instance in the last proposition in EV. He seems to wish to give
the same usage as the English translation example he gives in this footnote,
where Sir Fredrick Pollock uses “mind” instead of soul because he feels the
first usage of ipsius refers to an idea[xiv].
However, I think the problem with this is that it results in giving the overall
impression that Spinoza has mentioned the soul explicitly less often than he in
fact did. So I suggest that, to give a full account of Spinoza on the soul, one
needs to map the account onto where and when Spinoza actually used which words
and why, otherwise it is impossible to accurately assess Spinoza’s description
of what the soul is like. This in itself is a complex but informative task
because there are two different words for soul in Latin. One is anima, animae
meaning soul/spirit/vital principle/life/breathing/wind. This is similar to the
Jewish concept of ruach meaning soul, wind, breath of life. Spinoza uses this
word but more sparingly and often when he wrote about Descartes’s views rather
than his own. The other word for soul is animus, animi meaning soul/ mind/ intellect/
feelings/ heart/ spirit/ courage/ character/ air. This too suits the Jewish notion
of an intellectual soul, that the heart is the seat of the intellect and that
you pray to God with all your heart and soul/mind. Courage and spirit may be
connotations Spinoza would wish to imply given that he uses the related word
animositatem (meaning boldness/courage/spirit) in this proposition (EVp41) as being
vital to living well, alongside piety, religion and generositatem[xv]
(excellence/generosity).
Although
character is an optional meaning for animi, I agree with White and Stirling
that soul suits EVp41s[xvi],
especially given that here Spinoza is emphasizing piety and religion, as well
as in the Ethics in general, which ends on discussions about the soul in the
White and Stirling translation[xvii].
I claim that, if Spinoza had wanted to convey the word character without
religious connotations and without evoking the soul, and more in the sense of
Ancient Greek philosophy of virtue and character, he would have used a
different word. There are many Latin words to choose from, ranging from virtus,
virtutis (strength, power, courage, bravery, worth, manliness, virtue,
character, excellence); ingenium, ingeni(i) (nature, innate quality, natural disposition or capacity, character,
talent); persona, personae (character,
personality); natura, naturae (nature, birth, character); mos, moris (custom,
habit, manner, character, behaviour, morals); ars, artis (skill, craft, art,
science, knowledge, method, way, character). Indeed, Spinoza does make use of
these words in other places so he knew these words but didn’t choose to use
them in this context. Animus also relates to courage (and he highlights this
aspect of animus by paring it with fortitudinem, meaning
firmness/strength/courage/valour). Additionally, it carries the meaning of
spirit and air, making it akin to the word ruach in Hebrew.
I argue that
soul is the most plausible translation of animus because Spinoza uses this word
when giving a demonstration for the eternity of the soul in the Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect, a short text written earlier and seen as a
precursor to the Ethics. So, I suggest there is a continuation between
Spinoza’s views on the soul there and in the Ethics and that the Ethics may be
assuming some arguments in the Emendation. Perhaps character has a role to play
in understanding animus, but in a different way from our usual understanding of
phrases such as strength of character. I maintain that it is the Orthodox
Jewish combination of ethical and religious conduct going hand in hand as being
aspects of God’s commandments, rather than as separate notions.
In this sense,
animus is a well-chosen word for Spinoza because he can simultaneously imply
pious, ethical and intellectual elements of the soul. Thus animus, I maintain,
is best translated and understood as the rational soul. The significance of this
is that Spinoza uses the notion of “animi acquiescentia” (which I shall call
repose of the intellectual soul) when concluding his Ethics and uses it to
distinguish between an ignorant person and a wise person who lives well and
never ceases to exist[xviii].
[i] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS
of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK,
vol. II, II vols, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york
street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade
road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901),
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.
[ii] Spinoza, II:236.
[iii] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera, Renati des
cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata
metaphysica Ethica ordine geometrico
demonstrata, ed. C.H. Bruder, EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT
EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-book), vol. I (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS
BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843), 414,
https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.
[iv] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics
Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, ed. Jonathan Bennett, pdf ebook (Canada:
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com, 2017),
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1665part5.pdf.
[v] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed.
and trans. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books (England, UK: Penguin
Books, 1996), 180.
[vi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:269.
[vii] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics,
trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature
(Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), 255.
[viii]
Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414.
[ix] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, II:269.
[x] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414–15.
[xi] W.H. White, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Ethics,
by Benedict de Spinoza, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth
Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), XLIII.
[xii] White, XLIII.
[xiii]
White, XLIII.
[xiv] White, XLIII.
[xv] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414.
[xvi] Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White,
Stirling), 255.
[xvii]
Spinoza, 256.
[xviii]
Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:415–16.
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