In Spinoza’s Apology to his
synagogue that he wrote in response to his excommunication, Spinoza is believed
to have adamantly claimed that his ideas are, contrary to how he is perceived,
in line with Orthodox Judaism[i].
Scruton goes as far as to state that, in this Apology, it is believed that
Spinoza "defended his views as orthodox”[ii].
It seems that Spinoza’s own explanation for his excommunication is “merely”
that the rabbis over-reacted to the fact that he “had neglected ceremonial
observances”[iii].
Although “no copies” of this Apology are now available to analyse, Scruton[iv]
claims that “its contents were probably later included in the
Theologico-Political Treatise” (TTP), which is why, in this chapter, I wish to
take a closer look at this text.
Given this, I would like to
re-examine Spinoza in light of this claim of Spinoza’s that he remained an
orthodox Jew at heart with Orthodox Jewish views, even after his excommunication.
Although this is a statement coming from Spinoza himself, as far as I am aware,
philosophical scholarship and research has not yet examined to what extent one
can find orthodox Jewish thought at work throughout Spinoza’s texts, especially
since Nadler[v] states
that the relationship between Jewish thought and Spinoza “is too often
neglected in philosophical scholarship on Spinoza”. Nadler[vi]
further adds “there is still more work to be
done on the broader Jewish philosophical background of the TTP”. Moreover,
Nadler[vii]
specifies that, “in the post-Wolfson period, the more intricate philosophical
task of identifying Jewish elements in Spinoza’s thought, and doing so not
impressionistically but with solid comparative analyses and arguments” is
lacking. I agree with Nadler and wish to take on this approach, however, I
would like to press this connection further and more consistently than him.
This is partly because I disagree with Nadler’s[viii]
claim that Spinoza “seems not to have had any residual sense of Jewish identity.
In his writings, he goes out of his way to distance himself from Judaism, and
always refers to the Jews in the third person as “them”. Nor does he exhibit
any fundamental sympathy with Jewish history or culture; indeed, he seems to
harbor a degree of hostility to the Jewish people”. If I understand Nadler[ix]
correctly, he holds in tension that Judaism is vital to understanding Spinoza’s
thought processes yet, at the same time, wishing to claim that Spinoza “had
great contempt for Judaism”. I find this a contradictory approach which doesn’t
sit well and is possibly mistaken. Hence, one of the aspects of Spinoza I would
like to explore is the possibility of a fresh interpretation of Spinoza by
interpreting him as a religious Orthodox Jewish philosopher in light of the
Jewish Orthodoxy that was available to, and an influence on him, in his
lifetime. I also think it is informative to take account of Judaism when
examining Spinoza’s works, irrespective of one’s desired overall account.
Susan James[x]
states that she “aims to do something different” by claiming that “Works of
philosophy are best understood as contributions to ongoing conversations or
debates”. In this way, rather than situate her interpretative approach within
one of the pre-existing categories she lists, for instance a Cartesian or
Jewish interpretation, she carves out her own niche by creating a new branch of
interpretative approach which I call the Contextual-Argument-Analysis
interpretation. I agree with her that philosophical texts should be seen in the
context of the philosophical debates surrounding them. Further to this, I think
that this task need not be done separately from considering prior and ongoing
debates in Judaism. I suspect that one can also appreciate Spinoza’s premises
via Judaism since this approach renders Spinoza consistent within his own
premises and conclusions and consistent between his ideas and Judaism. However,
given that Susan James[xi]
specifically states she is not doing a Jewish interpretation, the fact that she
does not tend to address Jewish issues in her interpretation is neither
surprising nor does it negatively impact on her approach. Indeed, I wish to
build on her Contextual-Argument-Analysis and non-teleological approach and,
like her, try to do something different but within the Jewish interpretation by
providing an Orthodox Jewish insight into Spinoza and his works and by drawing
on the overall methodologies in analytic philosophy. This fulfils a research
need because Nadler[xii]
highlights that analytic philosophy tends to concentrate on Descartes’
influence on Spinoza rather than any Jewish influences on him. I acknowledge
there were many other influences on Spinoza apart from Judaism, such as
Descartes, Hobbes, Grotius, and friends he corresponded with and met as well as
the Dutch society he lived in[xiii].
Susan James[xiv]
has achieved such a thorough examination of the Dutch context and arguments
that Spinoza is responding to that I shall refer readers to her analysis of
this rather than attempt to cover this aspect in great depth myself.
Spinoza’s “formative” education
involved the study of Judaism and Jewish thought, including Maimonides,
Kabbalah and the Talmud[xv].
Indeed, he was steeped in Judaism from his childhood years at the “elementary school of the united Talmud Torah
congregation” through to and including possibly “adult studies in the Keter Torah yeshiva
run by the congregation’s chief rabbi, the Ashkenazic import Saul Levi Mortera”[xvi].
This suggests to me that the Talmud (writings on Jewish oral law and rabbinic
commentaries on it) and Torah (containing the first five books of Moses often
with rabbinic commentaries) must have made a hugely lasting impression on
Spinoza. Indeed, this is further supported by the fact that Spinoza was writing
a Hebrew grammar book alongside writing his Ethics and Political Treatise[xvii]
which would indicate to me that Spinoza continued both his sense of Jewish
identity and his interest in Jewish language, thought, the Jewish community and
religious beliefs because Hebrew is seen as a holy language for Jews. Not only
is it the language of Jewish prayer but Hebrew letters and words also have many
layers of meaning and possible interpretations. This perhaps can be seen when
Spinoza expresses his strong views in his TTP about how to read, translate and
interpret scripture linguistically and how to deal with linguistically obscure
passages in order to stay theologically accurate and rigorous. This forms part
of his argument for keeping theology and philosophy distinct and is his main
objection to Maimonides’s methodology of using philosophy to fill in the gaps
in our scriptural understanding[xviii].
Although both theology and philosophy can grasp true religion, their
methodology must be separate and so remain only within the scope and methods
and language of each discipline[xix].
By demarcating philosophy and theology as distinct disciplines which have and
give their own style of reasons, arguments and justifications, which are of
equal value in themselves, Spinoza also attempts to solve the common problem of
philosophers and theologians clashing with each other and it causing social and
religious tensions[xx]. In
this way, Spinoza is also arguing against what Susan James[xxi]
calls the teleological approach in that one must not superimpose something
alien to one thing onto another. In the TTP, this amounts to not superimposing
philosophy onto theology and vice versa, as well as not superimposing the
properties, ideologies, bias or a different era, thinker or culture onto a
text. In this way, Spinoza advocates the methodology of focusing on the
properties inherent in the text and discipline to thereby fulfil the aim of
staying accurate and faithful to the text. Hence, I think that the Orthodox
Jewish views expressed in Spinoza’s premises have been somewhat under-researched
and so my focus will be on that aspect, in the hope that this gives one a
clearer understanding of Spinoza’s philosophical arguments.
I suggest an interpretation of
Spinoza that simultaneously holds two things in tension. On the one hand,
Spinoza was an unique, philosophical genius that could “ab initio” deduce
truths from premises that are “unpolluted by received ideas”[xxii].
This is important because “Spinoza would have condemned the practice (known
nowadays as the ‘history of ideas’) whereby a study of the ancestry of ideas
takes precedence over an enquiry into their truth and meaning”[xxiii].
Yet, on the other hand, Spinoza utilized the unusual education he received in
mainstream and Jewish philosophy as well as in Judaism to enhance and deepen
his ideas and arguments. I think one should bear in mind that part of this
unusual education was Spinoza’s “early teachers” which included the “orthodox
senior rabbi of Amsterdam, Rabbi Saul Morteira, and the liberal Rabbi Manasseh
ben Israel, a man of wide learning and secular interests, friend of Vossius,
Grotius, and Rembrandt”[xxiv].
In this way, Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel could have been a possible role model
for Spinoza because Manasseh could hold in tension being an orthodox Jew, a
rabbi, and yet, at the same time, having liberal attitudes and secular
interests. Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel wrote books in Latin which were also aimed
at non-Jewish readers even though they contained Jewish thought, he had
connections with a range of scholars including Christians such as Anna Maria de
Schurman, and was familiar enough with Christian, Ancient Greek and Latin works
to include them in his own writings[xxv].
So, I think it would be natural for Spinoza to think he could do likewise and
gain the same wider readership that Rabbi Manasseh enjoyed without compromising
his Orthodox Judaism or being excommunicated. Hence, I would argue that, just
because Spinoza has apparently progressive ideas in his writings, he may not
have seen this as being in opposition to Orthodox Judaism or a sign that he had
rejected Judaism or become an atheist. Spinoza may have, at times, disagreed
with some rabbinic approaches but one must also remember that Spinoza does not
disagree with every rabbi, as can be seen when he agrees with and cites Rabbi
Abraham Ibn Ezra on Mosaic authorship[xxvi].
Although Ibn Ezra was a somewhat controversial figure, he is nevertheless seen
as a key thinker and one who is very knowledgeable about Judaism, a deeply
spiritual man who even engaged in discussions with the grandson of Rashi[xxvii].
Ironically, this now deeply revered rabbi, Abraham Ibn Ezra, was also
excommunicated which just goes to show that excommunication from a synagogue
means nothing. It happens to the best of them. Spinoza is in good company.
Interestingly, it was while Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel was in London, England
(which was under Oliver Cromwell at the time) to work for the readmission of
the Jews into England, that Spinoza was excommunicated following a tribunal
headed by Rabbi Morteira in 1656. Was there rivalry between the two rabbis? Was
it a rivalry between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews?
Moreover, debating is par for the
course in Judaism where differing rabbinic opinions are argued about and even
disagreed with since no-one can agree with every rabbinic thought uttered
because there is so much of it and it expresses very diverse opinions and
approaches. As Rabbi Susan Grossman describes it:
“The Talmud is full of such
debates: different opinions are tried, compared and tested. Often a successful
conclusion means finding how the opinions of two or more rabbis can be
internally consistent (and therefore legitimate) even if they represent
diametrically opposite opinions. The model of Talmudic study has not only honed
our ability to think clearly but has also created a Jewish culture open to the
difference of opinions.”[xxviii]
Rabbi Dr. Weinreb similarly
points out:
“We all nod our heads in
agreement when we hear the phrase, “Two Jews, three opinions.””[xxix]
So I think this style of
Spinoza’s is not symptomatic of a dismissal of Judaism either but is actually
characteristic of the Jewish approach to thinking independently, open-mindedly
and being able to hold two or more divergent opinions in tension and not being
over-concerned with tradition. As Rabbi Weinreb continues:
“….it is apparent that our sages
do not categorically oppose dispute, debate, and argument. Rather, everything
depends upon the motive. …………
They particularly appreciated
disputes which were motivated by the search for truth. Hence, hardly a page in
the thousands of pages of the Talmud does not record strong differences of
opinion between the rabbis. …………
Students of Torah must not only
study the content of these ancient disputes. They must also learn to re-create
the atmosphere which prevailed among the disputants, an atmosphere of civility
and mutual respect and a willingness to concede one’s original position in
order to achieve the truth.”[xxx]
On this picture given by Rabbis
Susan Grossman and Tzvi Weinreb, Spinoza fits in well with Jewish culture
throughout the ages, always questioning and thinking for himself in his search
for truth. Therefore, I find Spinoza’s claim that he remained Orthodox in his
views all the more compelling given that he was a principled man who seems to
have never wished to state anything contrary to his genuine beliefs or
compromise his philosophical stances throughout his life but rather favoured
stating the truth, even if just on principle. For instance, he declined the
University post offered to him by Heidelberg University to avoid any pressure to
compromise his philosophical principles[xxxi].
So, I think that one can
plausibly believe Spinoza that he really did feel he remained Orthodox in his
outlook even after his excommunication and would not have simply claimed to be
so just for personal gain or to placate the synagogue authorities.
[i] Scruton, Spinoza, 9.
[ii] Scruton, 9.
[iii] Scruton, 9.
[iv] Scruton, 9.
[v] Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality
and the Jewish Mind, xi.
[vi] Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza,” 502.
[vii] Nadler, 496.
[viii]
Nadler, 492.
[ix] Nadler, 492.
[x] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise, 3–4.
[xi] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise.
[xii] Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza,” 496.
[xiii]
Scruton, Spinoza, 20.; Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality
and the Jewish Mind.; James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise.
[xiv] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise.
[xv] Scruton, Spinoza, 20.
[xvi] Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza,” 491–92.
[xvii]
Scruton, Spinoza, 12.
[xviii]
Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political
Treatise and A Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, Dover
Philosophical Classics (Mineola, New York, USA: Dover Publications Inc, 2004),
VII, 115.
[xix] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes.
[xx] Spinoza.
[xxi] James, “Why Should We Read Spinoza?”
[xxii]
Scruton, Spinoza, 19–20.
[xxiii]
Scruton, 21.
[xxiv]
Scruton, 6.
[xxv] Joseph Jacobs, “Manasseh Ben Israel,” Jewish
Encyclopedia, n.d., http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/10345-manasseh-ben-israel.
[xxvi]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, X, 146.
[xxvii]
Anon.,
“Abraham Ibn Ezra,” Jewish Virtual Library, n.d., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/abraham-ibn-ezra. Rashi was a great, seminal commentator on the Talmud and the
Tanach (the Hebrew Bible, also known as the Old Testament) whom everyone
studies at every level of Jewish education.
[xxviii]
Rabbi Susan Grossman, “Two Jews Three
Opinions,” beliefnet.com, accessed October 30, 2017,
http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/virtualtalmud/2007/05/two-jews-three-opinions.html.
[xxix]
Rabbi Dr. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, “Rabbi
Weinreb’s Parsha Column, Korach: ‘Two Jews Three Opinions,’” ou.org (Orthodox
Union), accessed October 30, 2017, https://www.ou.org/torah/parsha/rabbi-weinreb-on-parsha/rabbi-weinrebs-parsha-column-korach-two-jews-three-opinions/.
[xxx] Weinreb.
[xxxi]
Scruton, Spinoza, 13–14.
orcid.org/0000-0003-1598-0833