In this Chapter, I adopt the
“familiar analytic mode”[i] for
furthering a debate by critically engaging with existing literature and
outlining my stance by comparing and contrasting my approach and discussion of
Spinoza with others, namely Nadler, Susan James and Scruton, in the spirit of
an ideal held by analytic philosophy as described by Lamarque and Olsen:
“There is a sense of community
among contributors to these debates, however overtly critical analytic
philosophers can seem of each other’s work. Progress comes through criticism,
often in the form of unexpected counterexamples to general theses. Jenefer
Robinson’s paper on “Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music” (Part XI)
nicely illustrates how a debate advances. She enters into a dialogue with other
contributors and defines her own position in relation to theirs. This is the
familiar analytic mode. The cumulative effect of such debates is a sense of
concentrated effort on carefully circumscribed ground”[ii]
There are many strands of
analytic approaches so I shall highlight the basic features common to all
variants, such as analysing concepts and words in a systematic and rational way
including making use of logic, valuing the role of definitions and conditions,
creating hypotheses and testing them, being aware of counter-examples or
arguments and breaking down problems and questions into smaller, focused
debates and so on. My analytic approach builds on the following excellent
summary of what analytic philosophy is in ‘Aesthetics and the Philosophy of
Art’[iii].
It describes how ‘the idea of “analysis” is central to analytic philosophy’
although this takes many forms and varies in “the aims and methods of analysis”[iv].
They list the following general “distinctive” “Characteristics” “of the
analytic methodology” as[v]:
- “the prominent application of logic and conceptual analysis;
- the commitment to rational methods of argument;
- the emphasis on objectivity and truth;
- the predilection for spare, literal prose, eschewing overly rhetorical or figurative language;
- the felt need to define terms and offer explicit formulation of thesis;
- the quasi-scientific dialectical method of hypothesis/counter-example/modification;
- the tendency to tackle narrowly defined problems, often working within on-going debates.”[vi]
I agree with the above
methodological approach to philosophy. Examples of this in my interpretation of
Spinoza include Chapter 3 where I shall test my hypothesis by examining
possible textual support for my theory and analyse the word ‘image’. In Part 2,
‘On the Role of True Worship for True Religion and Political Stability’, I make
use of logic to present arguments Spinoza makes by setting it out as a
deduction, which I formulated myself, from premises to conclusion to clarify my
point and show the structure of his arguments. I also highlight when a claim
functions as a necessary condition in Spinoza’s TTP.
Nevertheless, I would add three
provisos to this. One, I don’t think that it is always correct to depreciate
arguments involving subjectivity, rhetorical or figurative language. This needs
to be taken on a case by case basis because some such arguments found over the
course of the history of philosophy can have a lot of merit and make good
points. Two, I agree with Susan James[vii]
that the apparently sharp analytic-continental divide in philosophy is not
always as neat or as helpful as it may seem. Three, I think the analytic
approach benefits from supplementing it with textual analysis skills which
helps answer the frequently asked question, nice theory but is it in the text
and where and is it stated explicitly or implicitly? I think textual analysis
skills especially fit together with the aspect of analytic philosophy which
concerns itself with questions about which properties exist and inhere in
something, be it an object, an artwork or a text, and if so, how, where and why?
This has particular value in the history of philosophy where individual
philosophers and their texts are examined rather than a general analysis of
philosophical questions, problems, topics or paradoxes, as is usually the case
in contemporary philosophy.
Furthermore, one of the
“theoretical presuppositions” of analytic philosophy which is “not universally
held”, according to Lamarque and Olsen[viii],
is “the belief that philosophical problems are in some sense timeless or
universal, at least not merely constructs of history and culture”. I think
there is an element of truth to this in the sense that Spinoza does address
timeless and universal philosophical topics and questions, such as the eternal
mind, substance, how to live well. A clear example of this is in the Ethics[ix] where
Spinoza provides a geometric style logical argument for his ideas and
conclusions. In this way, Spinoza is asking us to assent to his views through
engaging our intellectual faculties to reason logically through his arguments
and system of thought rather than only relying on him providing historical or
cultural reasons to support them. Hence, irrespective of the era of Spinoza’s
readers, we can all work through his ahistorical and non-cultural reasons and
arguments whilst judging the soundness, validity and plausibility of those
arguments for ourselves. Although Spinoza is responding to and drawing
inspiration from debates around him as well as down the ages, I think he still
attempts to make use of these debates to help him construct rational reasons
and arguments which enable us to glean eternal truths about God, human nature
and the universe. These now so-called analytic characteristics and
presuppositions, which are nevertheless already inherent in Spinoza’s writings,
mean that, I think, making use of the fundamental philosophical analytic
methodology and argumentation helps to interpret him by uncovering the content,
structure, reasoning and nature of his thoughts in a way that is faithful to
his texts.
However, I do not share the
subsequent “widespread skepticism about the value of historically
contextualized study of earlier philosophers” held by some contemporary
analytic philosophers[x]. I
think there can be times when “the historical development of problems”[xi] can
be helpful as long as it is analysed philosophically. I make use of this
historical development approach in Part 3,
‘Was Spinoza a ‘Forerunner’ to Darwin?’, when analysing the topic of
teleology by tracing debates from the pre-Socratics through to current,
contemporary scientific discoveries. Here, my analytical approach is more in
line with Kendall Walton in his paper 'Categories of Art’[xii]
because I find his arguments more compelling than those in favour of an
ahistorical approach. The salient points Walton makes about historical context,
including the artist’s intentions, which I agree with are:
“It cannot be correct, I suggest, to perceive a work in categories
which are totally foreign to the artist and his society…”[xiii]
“It should be emphasized that the
relevant historical facts are not merely useful aids to aesthetic judgement;
they do not simply provide hints concerning what might be found in the work.
Rather they help to determine what
aesthetic properties a work has; they, together with the work’s non-aesthetic
features, make it coherent, serene,
or whatever. If the origin of a work….had been different in crucial respects,
the work would not have had these qualities; we would not merely have lacked a
means for discovering them.”[xiv]
I think this approach is also key
to understanding philosophical texts and treatises in the history of
philosophy. So, cross-applying Walton’s observations[xv]
to Spinoza’s writings, I argue that relevant background context shines a light
on the inherent qualities and features noticeable in his texts while also
acknowledging that who Spinoza was, his life experiences and his era influenced
his writings and that knowing this background information aids us in detecting
key features of his thought. I think his texts should also be read and interpreted
within the context of his life, any known intentions he may have had and the
society he lived in (both the Dutch and Jewish community). Nevertheless, I
attempt to be careful not to superimpose any notions onto Spinoza which would
be alien to him. For example, I do not argue in Part 3 ‘Was Spinoza a
‘Forerunner’ to Darwin?’ that Spinoza was a Darwinian because this is not
possible as Darwin’s theories did not exist until two centuries later! However,
this does not preclude the usefulness of comparing and contrasting Spinoza and
Darwin’s ideas, arguments and theories in order to analyse the topic of
teleology, assessing the philosophical strengths and weaknesses accordingly.
Although it is impossible for Spinoza to have been influenced by Darwin or
espouse Darwinian theories, it is an open question whether the reverse is true,
especially since we know that Darwin took an interest in philosophy and the
topics he is dealing with can be found in philosophy as far back as the
Pre-Socratic, Empedocles. Nevertheless, Darwin also had other,
non-philosophical influences so his conclusions will reflect his own
independent thinking, his empirical research as well as a variety of thinkers.
However, despite raising these possibilities in my arguments, I do not conclude
that Darwin based his theories on Spinoza because this carries the risk of
potentially superimposing notions and intentions on Darwin which he may not
have had. There are other possibilities, for instance, both Spinoza and Darwin
may have drawn inspiration from Empedocles and others down the ages and,
therefore, there may be some similar features in their works. The purpose of
comparing, contrasting and paralleling thinkers is in order to examine the
properties inherent in their texts whilst, at the same time, gaining a broader
perspective of how these theories are situated within the history of philosophy
and the philosophy of science. In this way, each thinker is interpreted in a
way which is faithful to their era and texts but not so narrowly that we lose sight
of the historical context of the debates about teleology.
This is in accordance with Susan
James’s[xvi] methodology
for the history of philosophy, especially where she rejects a teleological
approach which results in qualities being superimposed onto a text that have
been transported from another thinker or era or some other source alien to the
philosopher and then ascribed to their writings. I also find Susan James’s[xvii] Contextual-Argument-Analysis
interpretation (as I call it) coheres with Walton’s recommendations for good
aesthetic judgement and for an historically informed analytic approach in his
'Categories of Art’[xviii] because
she values and examines the origins, context and background to Spinoza’s
arguments in his TTP and the society he lived in whilst also engaging in
argument analysis and staying true to the properties his treatise contains.
Hence, her Contextual-Argument-Analysis interpretation also gels with my
Analytic-Jewish interpretation because both are in line with a Walton-style
approach to philosophy and run alongside each other by drawing on different
aspects of the background to Spinoza to inform philosophical analysis of his
writings. Hence, I think Walton, amongst others especially in aesthetics,
provides a template for analytic philosophers to remain analytic and attempt to
avoid imposing bias and ideology, whether past or present, but without having
to display a lack of “interest in the social, political, or ideological
underpinnings” of the works they are analysing[xix].
[i] Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen,
eds., “General Introduction,” in “Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The
Analytic Tradition: An Anthology,” Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies
(Wiley-Blackwell, Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 5.
[ii] Lamarque and Olsen, 5.
[iii] Lamarque and Olsen, “General
Introduction.”
[iv] Lamarque and Olsen, 1.
[v] Lamarque and Olsen, 2.
[vi] Lamarque and Olsen, 2.
[vii] Susan James, “Why Should We Read
Spinoza?” (Royal Institute of Philosophy, London Lecture Series 2014-15: The
History of Philosophy, London, UK, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5cAxJCz1Xk.
[viii]
Lamarque and Olsen, “General
Introduction,” 2.
[ix] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics,
trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature
(Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001).
[x] Lamarque and Olsen, “General
Introduction,” 2.
[xi] Lamarque and Olsen, 2.
[xii] Kendall Walton, “Categories of Art,” in Aesthetics
and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology, ed. Peter
Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies
(Wiley-Blackwell, Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 142–57.
[xiii]
Walton, 154; 155.
[xiv] Walton, 145.
[xv] Walton, 142–57.
[xvi] James, “Why Should We Read Spinoza?”
[xvii]
Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise (Oxford
University Press, 2014).
[xviii]
Walton, “Categories of Art,” 142–57.
[xix] Lamarque and Olsen, “General
Introduction,” 2.
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