In Part 1, I have questioned
whether Spinoza really did rebel against traditional, Orthodox Judaism at all.
Was he merely coming to very philosophically logical conclusions from highly
orthodox principles that led him to seemingly unorthodox conclusions? Do these
misunderstood, seemingly unorthodox conclusions make Spinoza appear more
odd-ball and eccentric than he was? Is Spinoza more of a misfit, more unusual
in the context of Western philosophy, and hence perceived as hard to comprehend
and misunderstood, precisely because he stayed true to his orthodox roots
rather than because he rejected his Jewish heritage?
This may particularly be the case
since it is easy to imagine that the Amsterdam Sephardic synagogue community
were all more strictly minded than they were. Spinoza knew, and was perhaps
influenced by, liberally minded rabbis, such as Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel[i],
within his synagogue community. As a result, I think when Spinoza brought his
mixture of traditional yet liberal minded Judaism to a wider forum, he ended up
being ahead of his time and more controversial, especially since Rabbinical Law
was the only official voice of Judaism during Spinoza’s era. Also, when he
apparently states in his Apology that he may have been excommunicated for not being
religiously observant enough[ii],
this, in part, I think may be due to his desire to connect with Judaism in his
own personal way according to his own beliefs and informed choices and a need
to express them unconstrained by others. It is also important to bear in mind
that Spinoza was possibly experiencing problems at his synagogue prior to his
excommunication, such as bribery attempts and maybe even an attempted knife
attack on him just outside his synagogue[iii].
I think it is plausible that this might have impacted on his attendance, so
there could have been extenuating circumstances why he appeared less observant.
After his excommunication, Spinoza would have found leading a Jewish life with
all the obligations a Jewish man has very difficult because many observances
and religious obligations required him to attend synagogue with other men. In
the seventeenth century, Spinoza would have needed the cooperation of the
Jewish community, from which he had been cut off from, to buy the most basic
produce and items because everything had to be kosher (foods and items which
are made in accordance with Jewish laws) and, therefore, he would have been
limited to Jewish shops which sold these goods[iv].
Hence, Spinoza may not be breaking away from Judaism or his Jewish identity as
Nadler suggests[v].
It is perhaps helpful to bear in
mind two points:
One, that Jewish identity is not
solely dependent on religious affiliation. Spinoza is automatically Jewish in
virtue of his mother being Jewish because Jewish identity in the seventeenth
century was matrilineal and still remains so today for the orthodox Jewish
world. Strictly speaking, nothing Spinoza or his synagogue says or does can
change this aspect of his identity and Spinoza would know this. So I think
Spinoza would not even think of himself as being capable of losing his Jewish
identity. His excommunication imposed on him was a type of alienation from
Judaism and the Jewish community. However, the Talmud (Sanhedrin 44a) states
“Even though [the people] have sinned, they are still [called] ‘Israel’.”[vi]
Thus, even if one took the extreme view that Spinoza had lapsed (inadvertently
or otherwise) according to the Jewish community, it would not mean that he
suddenly ceased to be a Jew nor that he would think of himself as no longer
being one. Spinoza, as I have shown, was well versed in Jewish oral law with
its rabbinic commentaries, and this sentence in the Talmud comes only one
chapter before the chapter on worship so it is unlikely that Spinoza would not
be aware of this passage on Jewish identity. Furthermore, this sentence on
Jewish identity is in the chapter in the Talmud called Sanhedrin[vii]
which is the name of the main rabbinic court in ancient Israel which remained
influential after the Temple period. So the contents of this chapter and its
views on Jewish identity are crucial and, therefore, would be common knowledge.
As can be seen by the Spanish Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, no matter how
strong the external pressures and circumstances, such as forced conversions and
persecution, many Jews still felt a sense of Jewish identity and carried on
having a personal attachment to Judaism and, despite the dangers of doing so,
even continued Jewish religious observances in private as far as was possible
under the difficult circumstances. Given that this is in Spinoza’s family
background, and that his family chose to leave for another country where they
hoped they would not have to hide their Judaism and identity, I think Spinoza
is unlikely to disown his heritage through either personal or external factors,
given all that his family went through to preserve their Jewishness. To
consider Jewishness as relying on external factors (such as belonging to and
attending synagogue or publically displaying one’s Judaism and so on) would implicitly
involve considering those who were unable to do so due to persecution as
potentially ceasing to be Jewish, no matter how they themselves felt or what
they did. So, I doubt Spinoza would have agreed with making Jewish identity and
Judaism so contingent on external circumstances and indeed may have had an
aversion to such thinking because this would have affected his own family’s
identity down the ages through no fault of their own. So Spinoza may have
carried on feeling a sense of Jewish identity and even privately carried on
living a Jewish life, as far as was practically possible for him, after his
excommunication and, because this would leave less historical evidence behind,
it may seem to us, centuries later, as though he had ceased to live a Jewish
life merely through lack of historical evidence to the contrary.
Two, religiously, Spinoza was an
orthodox Jew by default because, in the seventeenth century, this was the only
official branch of Judaism since rabbinic law was the official voice of Judaism
until the eighteenth century. It was not until the nineteenth century that
Reform Judaism was established. So all Jews in Spinoza’s era, irrespective of
their outlook, strictly speaking classify as orthodox Jews.
Hence, on this picture, I
consider Spinoza an open-minded, independent thinking orthodox Jew. This then
keeps Spinoza firmly within the context of his era and avoids imposing more
contemporary movements and views, which developed subsequent to his lifetime,
onto Spinoza and his works. The question of whether Spinoza would have chosen
to be a progressive Jew (for instance, be part of an independent, unaffiliated
synagogue or community or be a Liberal, Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative
or Masorti Jew) had he lived in a later era is merely a speculative one because
we shall never really know. It could be argued that, had Spinoza lived in the
nineteenth century onwards when progressive Jewish communities existed, then
his approach may have seemed less controversial. However, I have come to the
conclusion that this would not have to be the case. Even these days, there are
many different branches and sects to choose from within Orthodox Judaism,
ranging from the Ultra-Orthodox eg Haredi; Chassidism; Chabad through to Modern
Orthodoxy and Open Orthodoxy with or without a feminist twist to any of these
options. For instance, Haredi women have recently started a feminist movement
within their branch of Judaism[viii].
Irrespective of this further speculative question of which type of orthodoxy
would have appealed to Spinoza the most, the latest controversy over Rabbi
Dweck[ix]
shows how, even today, you can be accused of heresy by those in authority if
they perceive your views as contradicting theirs and being more liberal-minded
than they wish to permit. For instance, Rabbi Dweck was accused of heresy
despite being a congregational Rabbi, a Beit Din Rabbi and the Sephardi Senior
Rabbi and thus leader of Sephardi Jews in London, UK.
Furthermore, accusations of
heresy are still very complex issues and somewhat confusingly applied to
individuals. I find it interesting that Spinoza and Rabbi Dweck are both
Sephardi Jews who seem to run into trouble with Ashkenazi Rabbis, despite
living in different centuries. This raises the question of whether the tensions
that arise and sometimes lead to claims of heresy result from clashes and
misunderstandings between the different overall approaches that the Ashkenazi
and Sephardi have towards Judaism rather than it being a question of how
liberally-minded any one particular person is. For instance, Rabbi Dr Lopes
Cardozo[x]
highlights, in relation to the Dweck case, that Sephardi Judaism has a
different style of rhetoric from other sections of the Jewish world. In
addition, Lopes Cardozo points out “Portuguese-Spanish masoret (halachic
tradition) ….is quite different from the Ashkenazic one” and is even different
from other types of Sephardic ones[xi]. So
problems can arise if Rabbi Dweck supports his views with this style of
Portuguese Sephardi tradition while many of his opponents are Ashkenazi using
their own traditions and approaches[xii].
Although Lopes Cardozo[xiii]
does not cross-apply these points to Spinoza, I think these points are relevant
to Spinoza because he too was from a Portuguese Sephardi Jewish background
while his synagogue was in the Ashkenazi tradition. So Spinoza may also have
had a very different style of rhetoric and argumentation, together with a
knowledge and respect for a dissimilar interpretation and tradition of Jewish
Law than the Ashkenazi Rabbis in his synagogue would acknowledge. So they may
have harshly judged Spinoza’s approach to Judaism as un-Jewish simply because
it did not cohere and agree with their Ashkenazi approach which they often
favoured in their synagogue education system.
So, Spinoza’s approach to Judaism
may have merely been in line with a Portuguese Sephardi approach that was
ingrained in him from his family and native background (perhaps as well as
Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel who was born in Portugal) which was equally as valid
as any other Jewish approach, be it other types of Sephardi and Ashkenazi
rhetoric or interpretations of Jewish Law. But, maybe as with Rabbi Dweck,
rather than conceding that it is merely a difference of judgement and
tradition, it was condemned as heresy. So, it seems to me that heresy is
obviously applied to views which need not even be that new or experimental.
Unlike Rabbi Dr Lopes Cardozo[xiv], I
think this may be relevant to Spinoza’s take on Judaism and the controversy
surrounding his Jewishness and excommunication.
Furthermore, Rabbi Lopes Cardozo[xv]
suggests that a constructive, open-minded private discussion with Rabbi Dweck
would have been more appropriate, than the destructive course of action taken,
and I have to agree with him. Rabbi Lopes Cardozo also points out that it is
“an accepted practice” to attempt to understand the other’s perspective
regardless of whether you agree with it or not and you don’t have to change
your views or decisions, just try to appreciate where others are coming from[xvi].
So I think it begs the question why this Jewish practice is not applied to
Spinoza and Rabbi Dweck. Today, as always, it is part of a traditional approach
in Orthodox Judaism that diversity of approach to Judaism should be tolerated
and appreciated in its own right, not condemned. Rabbi Lopes Cardozo puts it
beautifully when he writes:
“What seems to be totally forgotten is that
Rabbi Dweck’s methodology in studying, understanding, and applying Halacha is
very different from yours (and perhaps mine), but absolutely authentic and
legitimate.”[xvii]
There also seems to be a much
more astringent approach to Rabbi Dweck and Spinoza than is applied to their
contemporaries. Others were excommunicated in Spinoza’s era but were taken back
by their synagogue. Rabbi Dweck has also received unequal treatment regarding
his debacle compared to others. Therefore, I suspect, we cannot take seriously
the fact that Spinoza was excommunicated more harshly than others as indicative
of him expressing any great heresy. Especially given that Rabbi Dweck has also
suffered from this greater astringency despite trying to spread positivity
towards groups in society who suffer from discrimination, which, one would
think, is a good thing and something to be praised! What I think we can learn
from the real-life examples of Spinoza and Rabbi Dweck is within the conclusion
of Rabbi Lopes Cardozo’s ending to his letter “real Judaism is far removed from
these types of misguided attacks” and they should not be left to fester in
communities and society[xviii].
We should not participate or fuel attacks on others which can be “motivated by
power struggles and jealousy”[xix].
This is a sentiment that I find is echoed in Spinoza’s TTP. Thus, I do not
interpret Spinoza as rejecting or losing his Judaism or his Jewish identity. Rather,
I think Spinoza was drawing on a combination of his education, knowledge and
practice of Judaism together with his independent thinking and study to engage
in current and past debates and then reaching the truth for himself. The
Sephardi Jewish community in the Netherlands in Spinoza’s era were particularly
sensitive about religious observance mainly as a reaction against the
oppression of Judaism in Spain at the time[xx].
I think it is a common phenomenon for there to be a peak of focus on Jewish
religious practices being strictly observed in order to prevent the eradication
of Judaism as a result of oppression. In this way, the tensions Spinoza had in
his day between retaining traditional Judaism, assimilation into society as a
whole and questions over progressiveness within Judaism are a perennial debate
in every era, which perhaps adds to the ever contemporary relevance of his
writings.
[i] Scruton, Spinoza, 6.
[ii] Scruton, 9.
[iii] W.H. White, “Translator’s Preface,” in Ethics,
by Benedict de Spinoza, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth
Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), xxi.
[iv] I
discuss this further in Liba Kaucky, My Spinoza Research Diary
(blog), n.d., http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.co.uk/.
[v] Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza,” 492.
[vi] “Talmud, Sanhedrin,”
http://halakhah.com/, n.d., http://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Sanhedrin.pdf.
[vii] “Talmud, Sanhedrin.”
[viii]
Although some Haredi women eschew the label Haredi feminist, others embrace it.
For an example of someone who does, see an article on Ruth Colian: J. Maltz, “Meet the Haredi Feminist
Fighting for a Political Voice,” Haaretz, October 20, 2013,
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.553479.
[ix] I
discuss this further in my blog: Kaucky; Liba Kaucky, “Heresy? Spinoza and
Rabbi Dweck,” My Spinoza Research Diary (blog), June 29, 2017,
http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.co.uk/2017/06/heresy-spinoza-and-rabbi-dweck.html;
Liba Kaucky, “Freedom of Thought, Speech and Teaching in Spinoza,” My
Spinoza Research Diary (blog), September 18, 2017,
http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.co.uk/2017/09/freedom-of-thought-speech-and-teaching.html.
[x] Nathan Lopes Cardozo, “In Defense of
Rabbi Dweck and Orthodox Judaism,” Blogs for the newspaper The Times of Israel,
The Times of Israel: The Blogs (blog), July 5, 2017,
http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/in-defense-of-rabbi-dweck-and-orthodox-judaism/. Rabbi Dr Lopes Cardozo makes
some excellent point concerning the issue over Rabbi Dweck, including how
clashes and misunderstandings can arise between the Sephardi and Ashkenazi
approaches although I disagree with his stance on Spinoza’s excommunication.
[xi] Lopes Cardozo.
[xii] Lopes Cardozo.
[xiii]
Lopes Cardozo.
[xiv] Lopes Cardozo.
[xv] Lopes Cardozo.
[xvi] Lopes Cardozo.
[xvii]
Lopes Cardozo. Halacha contains Jewish law based on the written
and oral Torah and influences Jewish life in every way, including thoughts,
beliefs and conduct.
[xviii]
Lopes Cardozo.
[xix] Lopes Cardozo.
[xx] Scruton, Spinoza.
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