I think the relationship between
knowledge of God and good conduct within a state informs why Spinoza agrees
with Solomon that it is important that one “cultivates his natural
understanding”[i].
This is partly because Spinoza highlights a distinction between internal and
external guidance from God. He equates “God’s internal aid” with “inward
personal virtue” which is present in people who develop their natural
understanding[ii].
Since knowledge and understanding are God-given, Spinoza may be claiming here
that the wisdom that God gives people establishes their personal virtue which
functions internally within people like a moral and social compass which, in a
sense, God directs simply because God necessarily is the cause of everything.
Nevertheless, people do need to actively maintain their personal virtue through
“vigilance, right action and thought”[iii].
In this way, I think Spinoza’s
view accounts for things in the world flowing necessarily and somewhat
deterministically from God as well as the active, on-going moral and political
responsibility of people to work on and maintain their ethical and social
principles and behaviour.
As I mentioned earlier, I
understand Spinoza as seeing this as being just as achievable for the multitude
as for philosophers. Scruton[iv], I
think, captures how this is possible as he defines “true philosophy” as being
“identical” to “true religion” which neatly captures how philosophy can be a
means to, rather than a hindrance to true religion, despite Spinoza’s sharp
distinction between philosophy and theology. The multitude, nevertheless, can
comprehend a sufficiently “adequate idea of God”, “eternal truths of reason”
and “imitations of a divine blessedness” despite their “inadequate cognition”
through the central laws taught in scripture which clarify the content of true
religion for them[v]. So
I see Spinoza as thinking that the multitude and the philosophers climb the
same mountain to reach the same summit, just using different, but equally
valid, paths to get there. I think Susan James[vi]
usefully clarifies this process further by highlighting that justice and
charity are properties that the multitude can grasp from divine law and
descriptions of God that appeal to their imagination and that they can then
realistically emulate themselves. I reserve judgement whether, technically
speaking, this constitutes an adequate idea of God per se since, as Susan James[vii]
insightfully points out, anthropomorphic concepts of a just and charitable God
and other such properties do not reflect the philosopher’s more abstract
concept of Divine attributes. Nevertheless, I agree with Susan James[viii]
when she also argues that despite this lack of rigorous philosophical
methodology and precision, such uses of the imagination to understand God can
suffice and are key to the multitude gaining epistemic access to the contents
of divine law and how to obey it.
This may shed light on what
Scruton[ix]
calls Spinoza’s “dual justification”, one based on philosophy and one based on
religion, for his “single conception of the state”. Scruton[x]
views the reason for this dual approach as being Spinoza’s acknowledgement that
since human nature is governed by the imagination and intellect, Spinoza thinks
he needs to appeal to both faculties in order to argue convincingly, so chooses
types of justifications that match up with these faculties. Nonetheless, I
agree with Jaspers that for Spinoza, ideally, “as many men as possible should
be philosophers, living in the perfection of reason based on knowledge of God”[xi].
However, I also agree with Jaspers that Spinoza is realistic about the slim
possibility of this and that given “norms are ambivalent”, life is changeable
and “there are several models” available, one should recognize and value that
“there is more than one path to betterment”[xii]
and that philosopher and multitude alike “are obedient” albeit in “two
different ways”[xiii].
This also vitally gives people an active role in the shaping of their life and
principles rather than being passive victims of whatever “fortune” comes their
way, which would lead to a superstitious mentality that focuses on “God’s
external aid”[xiv].
This would promote negative affects and suppress development of the
understanding and attainment of wisdom[xv] as Spinoza maintains in his book, Ethics. I interpret Spinoza as arguing that some emotions
are particularly counterproductive and contrary to reason in that they inhibit
one’s capacity to think[xvi].
Nevertheless, some affects are good and compatible with reason. So I put
forward the suggestion that this doesn’t apply to all types of affects, but
only those which are reason inhibitors, hence, I don’t see Spinoza as being a
Stoic about the passions. Spinoza also distinguishes between emotions, passions
and affects[xvii].
I suggest that Spinoza’s account of the affects may be more akin to Hume’s[xviii]
account of calm and violent passions than it might appear to be.
Three things that Spinoza quotes
Solomon as specifying that such a person will comprehend are “righteousness,
and judgement and equity” alongside “every good path”[xix].
So, I suggest Spinoza is saying that, by developing one’s God-given intellect
to attain wisdom and knowledge of God, irrespective of how one attained this
knowledge and how limited it is in terms of how many true beliefs one holds
about God, a person still grasps the fundamental ethical and political
principles and so becomes righteous, rational as well as compassionate and
employs good judgement. Such a person will be an asset to the state because
their conduct promotes political security and stability.
Spinoza also highlights a tension
between the authority of the sovereign and the obedience of the subject. I
agree with Susan James[xx]
that Spinoza is portraying this tension as a delicate equilibrium between the
two because either side can tip the scales and adversely affect the stability
of the state. This is because, much as the power seems to be stacked in the
sovereign’s favour, Spinoza shows the complexities of how there needs to be a
healthy balance of freedom and power between the sovereign and the subject in
order that the political and societal structure promotes the welfare of both.
Spinoza sets out the following dilemma which arises as a semi-conclusion from
his premise that’s based on his observation that “all actions spring from a
man’s deliberation with himself”[xxi]
and so:
“…either dominion does not exist,
and has no rights over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in
which it can prevail on men who decide to obey it.”[xxii]
To analyse this quote I shall
first reformulate it in a minimalistic way as essentially claiming the
following disjunctive of the form ~A & ~B v if B then A (either not A and
not B are true or A and B are true where A stands for the property of having a dominion
and B stands for having rights over subjects):
Either a sovereign has no
dominion over its subjects and no rights over its subjects or if a sovereign
can have rights over its subjects then a sovereign’s dominion is all
encompassing
However, Spinoza’s claim is more
complex than this. It is not just a matter of a sovereign being able to
exercise rights, power, and dominion over subjects merely in virtue of being a
sovereign. The subjects themselves hold a certain power as to whether they
choose to conform to the sovereign’s authority. Nevertheless, this applies in
limited ways, sometimes in admirable ways and sometimes not. For instance,
Spinoza warns that if subjects are only controlled by negative emotions rather
than their reason then this emotional instability endangers the stability of
the state[xxiii].
This is because the sovereign then becomes somewhat at the mercy of the “fickle
disposition of the multitude” whose cooperation and attitude towards the
sovereign will blow with the wind and make them unreliable[xxiv].
This creates instability for both sovereign and subjects and makes for very
difficult conditions for ruling a state. Spinoza additionally points out that,
during biblical times, sovereigns would try to avoid the inconsistent emotions
of their subjects by portraying themselves as demi-gods to be worshipped
thereby creating a sacred kingship.
Indeed, the powerful portrayal of
a sovereign as a divine demi-god has been used even as recently as the
twenty-first century despite us being in a more technologically and
educationally advanced era which far
outstrips what was possible back in biblical times. This, I think, shows how
Spinoza may be right in arguing that superstitious reverence is always an
aspect of human nature with the potential to grip a nation under certain
circumstances. However Spinoza argues[xxv],
using Biblical examples, that this political stability tactic has been
inherently unstable because it encourages negative emotions that interfere with
reasoning such as credulity and fear leading to a superstitious frame of mind.
As we have seen, if subjects are led by their negative emotions instead of
reason, and are prone to superstition, then this fluctuating state of mind will
make them inconsistent citizens that unhinge political stability, which is
self-defeating and counterproductive for the sovereign. Nowadays with
globalisation, political instability in one country often causes political
instability, including arms races and wars across the world, in any other given
country and takes on an even more complex pattern of political friction than
ever could have been imagined in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, I
suspect Spinoza’s basic principles would still apply, albeit perhaps be
replicated more times over, since globalization means there can be a bigger
ripple effect from each individual political instability.
However, Spinoza also accounts
for the dilemma faced by subjects when their sovereign is a “heathen” who
commands them to worship in a way which clearly infringes Divine law and is
tantamount to false worship and false religion[xxvi].
In cases where there is, what Spinoza sees as, a clash between “human law” and
“Divine law” and where there are no sufficiently clear and distinct ideas about
the contents of Divine law for such a scenario, Spinoza decides that human law
should prevail and be obeyed in the interest of avoiding confused ideas and
false religion wrongly dominating within the state[xxvii].
This may be because Spinoza sees the key moment that determines obedience to
the sovereign as being when subjects transfer their right to the sovereign. For
instance, the Hebrews “absolutely transferred to Moses their right to consult
God and interpret His commands” and claimed to “promise obedience to all that
God … shall tell Moses”[xxviii].
In this way, Moses was “elected”[xxix]
by the Hebrew people and was “the sole promulgator and interpreter of the
Divine laws and consequently also the sovereign judge”[xxx].
This was one of the ways in which the Hebrews transitioned politically from a
state of nature to a nation which, on Spinoza’s account, constituted a
Theocratic Republic with democratic systems in place. For instance, Spinoza
cites that the “Hebrews … retained … in their own hands the right of
sovereignty” and that they had a democratic “method and plan by which the
government was carried on”[xxxi].
This was due to the way they transferred their rights in unison:
“Hebrews did not transfer their
rights to any other person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their rights
equally, and cried out in one voice”[xxxii]
Nevertheless, what about when a
sovereign audaciously flouts or disobeys Divine law? Spinoza briefly alludes to
the example of disobedience against King Nebuchadnezzar in the Book of Daniel[xxxiii].
I suspect the event Spinoza may have in mind is when the King commands three
Hebrew men and the Israelites to bow down and worship the king’s new idol but
the three men refuse to obey the sovereign[xxxiv].
So, according to Spinoza’s categories of law he’s outlined, they obeyed Divine
law instead of human law. Spinoza sees this as an exception to the general rule
of letting human law take precedence because they had clear revelation and help
from God[xxxv].
So, when applied to resisting King Nebuchadnezzar, those who disobeyed him were
saved and survived but those who mistakenly thought the King was divine in some
way perished and died despite obeying his command to commit idolatry. An
interesting contrast to the King Nebuchadnezzar example is Spinoza’s analysis
of the worshipping of the golden calf in chapter 17 of his TTP[xxxvi].
Originally, priesthood was open to anyone (that is, presumably any man) who
wished to assume the role. However, after all the male Israelites, except for
those related to Aaron, worshipped the golden calf, only the descendants of
Aaron were allowed to be priests[xxxvii].
Much as there is a reasoning behind this decision, Spinoza sees this split in
status between the Israelites as perhaps being the beginning of a conflict
within the Hebrew people that eventually led to political insecurity that
resulted in their downfall[xxxviii].
This expands on Spinoza’s
argument about true and false worship earlier on in his TTP. In chapter 12,
Spinoza[xxxix]
argues that the worshipping of the golden calf, which constitutes false
worship, broke the covenant with God and reduced the tablets from being sacred
to being just mere stone. This illustrates how political instability, and
instances of false religion, have their roots in false worship. Also, Spinoza
interestingly highlights that the mind-set which one is in affects the sanctity
of an object or how one is worshipping:
“…nothing is in itself absolutely
sacred, or profane, and unclear, apart from the mind, but only relative
thereto”[xl]
This Spinoza applies to outward
worship, such as the golden calf or a temple, as well as words in scripture. Hence,
how one treats and interprets words in scripture also constitutes a form of
worship for Spinoza. Words gain or lose sanctity in the same way that objects
can and he applies the word worship to doing so. For example, Spinoza
criticises:
Spinoza also applies false
worship of words to Christianity and Judaism alike:
“let them cease to worship the
letter”[xlii]
I suggest then, that in his TTP,
and especially in chapter 12, Spinoza considers incorrect scriptural reading as
a type of false worship. This builds on Part 1 where I also extended this to
Spinoza perhaps warning against generally misperceiving, epistemologically
speaking, the properties of the Hebrew Bible itself and that this can also lead
to a type of false worship.
So, Spinoza has given two
contrasting Biblical situations[xliv],
namely King Nebuchadnezzar and the golden calf, which illustrate the pivotal role
of true and false worship for true religion, political stability and
subject-sovereign interaction. Much as Spinoza argues for outward worship being
under the jurisdiction of the sovereign, I maintain that this is largely to
combat the confused, inadequate ideas involved in false religion which can give
rise to religious fanaticism in the vain hope that this will ensure political
stability and peace. Nevertheless, if outward worship involves clear and
distinct ideas of true religion, such as an adequate idea of the content of
revelation and guidance from God, then Spinoza seems to value both Divine law
and outward worship enough to support insurrection against a sovereign,
particularly if that sovereign is tyrannical.
In conclusion, I hope I have
shown in Part 2, by analytically delving into the role of true worship for true
religion and political stability, that Spinoza does outline some key
definitions, concepts, principles and conditions during his discussion of true
worship that should be applicable to almost any religious and or political
scenario in any era. I have also argued for the centrality and important role
true worship plays in Spinoza’s TTP, with a particular focus on its impact on
true religion and political stability. Moreover, his arguments in the TTP also
raise and explore questions that are still relevant today such as, to what
extent can true worship, true religion and political stability take into
consideration the potential need and value of reasoned civil disobedience under
certain circumstances? There are justifiable cases, such as the resistance
against the Nazis in Vichy, France[xlv]
which show how occasionally, resistance can be the more moral option that
better aims at political stability and is the only way to fulfil Spinoza’s
doctrine of love thy neighbour, irrespective of background or religion. Perhaps
Spinoza does not elaborate enough on the complexities of the clash between
Divine law and human law. Nevertheless, I think a broader definition and
concept of true worship makes it easier to see how Spinoza’s arguments can be
applied not only to other Biblical examples and seventeenth century
Netherlands, but also twenty-first century contemporary societies. In Part 2, I
maintain that Spinoza’s arguments in his TTP do go a long way towards helping
one to evaluate political and religious clashes in society in every era,
especially those involving some type of worship. I think worship is perhaps an
underrated but vital factor that underlies and shapes many of the political
conflicts analysed in political philosophy and world politics. However, there
can never be any neat answers as to how a sovereign should keep control of and
prevent religious extremism without inadvertently oppressing its subjects.
[i] Spinoza, IV, 67.
[ii] Spinoza, 67.
[iii] Spinoza, 67.
[iv] Scruton, Spinoza, 93.
[v] Scruton, 93.
[vi] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise, 194.
[vii] James, 193.
[viii]
James, 193.
[ix] Scruton, Spinoza, 92.
[x] Scruton, 92.
[xi] Jaspers, Spinoza, II:64.
[xii] Jaspers, II:64.
[xiii]
Jaspers, II:75.
[xiv] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, IV, 67.
[xv] Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White,
Stirling), chap. IV.
[xvi] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise.
[xvii]
Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White,
Stirling).
[xviii]
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
ed. Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, 2nd edition (Great Britain: Oxford Clarendon
Press, 1978).
[xix] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, IV, 67.
[xx] James, Spinoza on Philosophy,
Religion, and Politics, The Theologico-Political Treatise, 285.
[xxi] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XVII,
215.
[xxii]
Spinoza, 215.
[xxiii]
Spinoza, XVII, 216.
[xxiv]
Spinoza, 216.
[xxv] Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes.
[xxvi]
Spinoza, XVI, 212.
[xxvii]
Spinoza, XVII, 211.
[xxviii]
Spinoza, XVII, 220.
[xxix]
Spinoza, 221.
[xxx] Spinoza, 220.
[xxxi]
Spinoza, 220.
[xxxii]
Spinoza, 220.
[xxxiii]
Spinoza, XVI, 212.
[xxxiv]
Scherman and Zlotowitz, Tanach (The
Torah/Prophets/Writings, the Twenty-Four Books of the Bible Newly Translated
and Annotated), sec. Book of Daniel, 1781-5.
[xxxv]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes, XVI,
211-12.
[xxxvi]
Spinoza, XVII, 232-5.
[xxxvii]
Spinoza, 232–35.
[xxxviii]
Spinoza, 232–35.
[xxxix]
Spinoza, chap. XII.
[xl] Spinoza, XII, 167.
[xli] Spinoza, XII, 166.
[xlii]
Spinoza, XII, 169.
[xliii]
Spinoza, XII, 172.
[xliv]
Spinoza, TTP Trans. Elwes.
[xlv] Caroline Moorehead, Village of
Secrets: Defying the Nazis in Vichy France, paperback edition 2015
(Vintage, 2015).
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