Spinoza Vol 2 ebook Chapter 2: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Lymph Analogy

Chapter 2: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Lymph Analogy

In letter 32, Spinoza wrote to Henry Oldenburg (1665 in Latin), answering his request for further explanation about Spinoza’s views on parts and wholes. Spinoza’s clarification in this letter, I think, is consistent with his views in the Ethics on parts and wholes yet does not merely restate the same notions and arguments. Spinoza manages to shed light on his views and reasoning process in a readable, accessible way which, I find, helps one understand and picture what he has in mind, making this a useful letter to examine alongside his Ethics.

Oldenburg wanted to know why and how we seem to learn about/become acquainted with/recognise parts and wholes. More specifically, Spinoza frames his question as two-fold:

1.  In what way do parts/portions/pieces (pars, partis) of nature fit together, harmonize/agree with (conveniat from convenio) their whole (entire/total/complete/all parts together) (toto from totus)?
2. In what way do the parts cohere/combine together (cohaereat from cohaereo)?[i]

In answer to the first puzzle stated above, Spinoza begins his clarification by reaffirming the claim he made in a former letter that, strictly speaking, he cannot know how parts of nature fit together to make the whole of nature because that would entail knowing the whole of nature and all its parts first, which is impossible. So this gives an overview of Spinoza’s approach to the possibility of knowing how parts and wholes go together in nature. His view seems to reject the possibility of knowing this accurately and fully and addresses the fitting together aspect of the word convenio. I suggest Spinoza then addresses the harmonizing meaning of the word convenio by first stating a proposition which is logically prior (prius) to his following arguments[ii]. Namely, that Spinoza does not bestow/attribute (tribuere) beauty, ugliness, order/rank/class or confusion/disorder to nature[iii]. A further meaning of tribuere is to divide so perhaps Spinoza is also explaining that he does not divide nature up into beautiful, ugly, ordered and disordered parts. Describing nature in this way is a work of the imagination which is why we bestow such descriptions on the world despite them not being strictly true of the world[iv]. This is important to bear in mind when situating Spinoza within seventeenth century philosophy because it shows that his views are contrary to those of, for instance, Leibnitz who argued for pre-established harmony and claimed that the world was in fact ordered, despite appearing disordered.

The question remains, how can parts agree with their whole? Spinoza explains that, when he writes about the relationship between parts and the whole of nature, he is claiming that the nature of the parts is such that they adapt/adjust to (accommodant) the nature of the whole[v]. In this way, they are said to fit together/unify/be in agreement/harmonise between each other (inter se consentiant) as a whole[vi]. When parts of nature seem to have a discrepancy/differ/are out of sync/tune with one another, it is because we have formed distinct ideas of them in our minds, leading us to think of the parts as a whole instead of a part[vii]. 

In answer to the second puzzle above, Spinoza briefly explains that parts combine/cohere together in the sense that their laws of nature adapt/adjust to other parts so they do not oppose (contrarientur, an infrequently used medieval Latin word) one another[viii].

Spinoza then expands on this by giving two analogies. The first analogy is the Lymph Analogy which I discuss in this chapter. The second analogy is the Worm Analogy which I analyse in the following chapter.  

The Lymph Analogy is a concise biological analogy of the whole, represented by the blood stream, and parts, represented by things in the blood[ix]. Through this analogy, Spinoza shows how one and the same thing can be thought of as either a part or a whole, depending on how we examine it. Spinoza illustrates this by discussing the biological phenomenon of absorbing lymphs, chyle and so on into the bloodstream[x]. Clearly Spinoza was excellent at science in general, not just physics and optics and matters relating to his profession as a lens grinder. As can be seen by his correspondence, Spinoza enjoyed discussing and receiving news about not just philosophy but also about cutting edge scientific knowledge and discoveries[xi]. Spinoza debated a variety of scientific disciplines and topics in his correspondence, ranging from astronomy, chemistry experiments, physics, optics as well as biology. He was up to date on the latest discoveries, one of which was the lymphatic circulatory system, discovered around the mid-17^th century. Although lymphatic vessels were first suggested in the 3^rd century by Herophilus and lymph nodes had been discussed as early as the 5^th century, theories about such lymphs consisting in an entire circulatory system were considered one of the most important medical discoveries, alongside the blood circulatory system (early 17^th century)[xii]. In this letter (32) Spinoza is writing to Oldenburg, the secretary for the Royal Society in London which debated experimental science and natural philosophy. Oldenburg was at the centre of correspondence between scientists from all over Europe, thus he received information about the latest thoughts and experiments in that field. Therefore, in this letter, Spinoza assumes Oldenburg has a detailed knowledge of biology so that his metaphysical analogies could be fully appreciated by him. So, I shall briefly elucidate the biological, physiological, biochemical, anatomical knowledge Spinoza assumes in his analogy in Letter 32. Moreover, assessing the overall accuracy of Spinoza’s biology is relevant to analysing how successful his analogies are because the premises of an analogy need to be true for an argument to be compelling[xiii]. Here, Spinoza’s argument by analogy is trying to establish that lymphs and chyle are examples of things in the world which can be thought of as either parts or wholes, depending on how you reason about them.  

Lymph refers to a type of fluid which passes into the lymphatic system. They travel around various systems in the body, such as the gastrointestinal tract, the lymphatic system and the blood circulatory system, they also enter tissues and lymphatic organs and play a vital role in our immune system[xiv].  Lymphs undergo processes and carry out various tasks. Among the tasks they perform are combating infection, regulating fluid and carrying fats around the body[xv].

Chyle is a lymph which is transporting fats and travels through the small intestine wall into the bloodstream. To give a sense of scale, they are so minute that they are only about one micron in size[xvi] (which is 0.001 millimetres).

The relevance of this for Spinoza’s Lymph and Worm analogies is that it means the lymph and chyle have come from a different system outside of the bloodstream before entering the bloodstream. Another key phenomenon which makes the lymph and chyle a good metaphor is that Spinoza wishes to use them as an example of something which can be contemplated either as wholes (because they are a distinct things with different names, lymphs and chyles) or as a part (because they are a fluid which is part of the bloodstream). In this way, lymphs and chyles are a great example of something which can be considered as a part or a whole so fulfils the requirement of providing true premises. I would like to suggest that this also informs us what Spinoza may mean by the phrase “under this aspect”[xvii] ie we consider it one way or another way, looking at it from different angles to grasp another dimension to it. In this way, when we imagine them and contemplate them in their capacity of being a lymph or a chyle, we imagine them to be wholes. For instance, we think about them as particles and compare how lymphs differ in size and character from a chyle[xviii]. Conversely, we imagine them being parts because they are able to “unite, and form one fluid”[xix] which, in turn, becomes a part of the bloodstream.

Thus the lymph analogy is similar to Spinoza’s water analogy in his Ethics which I discuss in Chapter 1. Both the water and the lymph analogies use the example of flowing fluids whose parts are perhaps impossible for us to distinguish from the whole and any such attempt to delineate parts of the fluid are thought up by the imagination and superimposed onto nature. So, maybe Spinoza wants us to conceptualise ourselves as a water droplet in a large, interconnected, ever flowing river – adapting, surviving, having a connected affinity with both the world around us and God who causes everything and conceived us and the universe into existence.

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., ed. C.H. Bruder, EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol. II (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844), 184–85, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.

[ii] Spinoza, II:185.

[iii] Spinoza, II:185.

[iv] Spinoza, II:185.

[v] Spinoza, II:185.

[vi] Spinoza, II:185.

[vii] Spinoza, II:185.

[viii] Spinoza, II:185.

[ix] Spinoza, II:185.

[x] Spinoza, II:185.

[xi] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE.

[xii] C. T. Ambrose, ‘Rudbeck’s Complaint - A 17th-Century Latin Letter Relating to Basic Immunology’, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Scandinavian Journal of Immunology 66, no. 4 (October 2007): 487, https://doi.org/doi: 10.1111/j.1365-3083.2007.01969.x.

[xiii] Anthony Weston, A Rulebook for Arguments, 4th edition (Indianapolis, IN, USA: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2009), 20–21.

[xiv] ‘Lymph’, Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 31 July 2008), https://www.britannica.com/science/lymph.

[xv] ‘Fluid’, Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 6 January 2012), https://www.britannica.com/science/fluid-biology.

[xvi] ‘Chyle’, Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 16 February 2016), https://www.britannica.com/science/chyle.

[xvii] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 291, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[xviii] Spinoza, II:291.

[xix] Spinoza, II:291.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook Chapter 1: Living Well: The Language of Degrees and The Water Analogy

Chapter 1: Living Well: The Language of Degrees and The Water Analogy

The word eo has many possible meanings. However, I am drawn to its potential sense of conveying a barometer of degree which adjusts its percentage accordingly. This is partly because I think this meaning fits the comparative structure of this sentence. It compares how, the more (plures) we have of X, the less (minus) we have Y and Z. Support for this reading and translation of Spinoza I think can be found in Elwes’s translation choice of expressing this comparison as proportional:

“In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.” (EVpXXXVIII)[i]

This translation captures the sense in which I suggest Spinoza was arguing for a principle which holds that there is a proportional adjustment in the percentage of evil/malicious/harmful affects we feel, including a fear of death, in accordance with the amount of second and third types of knowledge we possess. In the scholium to EVp38, Spinoza again reinforces this message by concluding that, although death is hurtful, it becomes less or more hurtful in accordance with the amount of adequate knowledge that we possess. Spinoza also continues to develop this argument slightly further on in EV, making it a main argument in the Ethics. The demonstration to EVp38 shows that what survives death is our essence. In terms of our mind, our essence is knowledge. In this way, the more knowledge we have, the more we boost our essence and since this essence is eternal, more of us becomes eternal. So, this sense of degree and proportion permeates the whole of the proposition and results in demonstrating that the more adequate knowledge we seek and understand in this life, the more eternal we shall be after death because by increasing our adequate ideas, and thereby our knowledge of God and the world which flows from God, the more we are enhancing our rational soul which is immortal and eternal.   

The word qui just five words later than eo in EVp38 (see the interlinear text in the introduction to this section) can also carry an implication of degree. Thus, we could interpret this as referring to affects which have any degree of harmful, hurtful evil in them. I think this captures the sense of this passage, given that qui is unlikely to mean ‘kind’ in a strong sense if it also means ‘degree’. Someone might argue: Surely one could translate it as kinds of emotion? My initial answer would be that, if one were to accept this, qui would only mean kind in a weak sense and so would not be sufficient textual evidence in itself to build an argument which treats these kinds as though they are strongly distinct categories. I read Spinoza as rejecting sharp categorical metaphysical distinctions (such as the mereology of parts and wholes, ontological categories and natural kinds) in virtue of his substance monism. For accessibility and clarity, I may sometimes refer to kinds of knowledge in Spinoza but this is in order to use the same vocabulary as secondary literature on him. However, strictly speaking, I prefer not to read Spinoza as carving up knowledge into kinds for the same reason as I think he avoids strong categorizing. In terms of giving a literal sense of Spinoza’s chosen words, I suggest perhaps interpreting genere in the context of knowledge as something along the lines of there being three main varieties of knowledge because it is more ontologically flexible, unified and feels less like an artificial, hypothetical kind. I especially have metaphysical and logical concerns about using the language of parts when philosophising about Spinoza’s metaphysics, other than perhaps in a loose sense when lacking a more convenient word in English. This is because the language of parts in metaphysics all too easily leads to talk of parts and wholes, otherwise known as the topic of mereology. I struggle to see mereology as being a good fit for Spinoza’s style of substance monism, which rejects the notion of carving up the one substance, especially given that this would entail dividing up God and the natural world which is conceived by and contained within God. To accept parts would be to break-up the unity of God which Spinoza argues so strongly for in EI. Spinoza explains at length in EIp15s how, although we imagine (or picture) things such as substance or quantity to be “finite, divisible and compounded of parts”, the intellect shows us they are in fact “infinite, one, and indivisible” (EIp15s)[ii]:

“If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very, difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all, who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally.” [iii] 

He then goes on to illustrate this with his analogy of water:

“For instance, water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted. I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact, founded on the same assumption as the first-- namely, that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts.” [iv] (EIp15s)

This passage I think illustrates how Spinoza’s metaphysics argues against sharp divisions, carving up substance, reality and things in the world into parts of a whole, rather like slices of a pizza. Instead, Spinoza is arguing for a more flexible yet unified metaphysics. Like water, everything runs together and is related to one another and what we imagine are parts of it are really just distinguishable modes which cannot be separated off from or divided from the overall whole. These modes seem to go in and out of existence (in the same way as people are born and die) but are eternal in virtue of their relation to substance (similarly, people are eternal in relation to God). Spinoza writes the word modus many times in the Ethics and defines it as “the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself”, modifications being a translation of the Latin affectiones, as explained in Elwes’s footnote to this definition (EId5)[v]. It is best translated as mode, other than when, perhaps, manner or way would be a more accessible word to use for English speaking readers because Latin words have more layers of meaning than the English equivalent reveals[vi].

Moreover, if we were to choose to translate eo in EVp38, for instance, as therefore/consequently/for that reason or as somehow flowing from us, I think we would lose the sense of contrast set up by the sentence structure of plures…minus…minus. Nevertheless, I suggest the notion of emotions flowing from us is still something to bear in mind and hold in conjunction with the notion of degrees. I think there is a sense in which emotions pour out of people so this description of eo captures an aspect of understanding human nature in detail. This was a major overall aim Spinoza had in philosophy. He goes to great lengths to examine human nature, almost down to a scientifically accurate method about laws of nature, as far as was possible in his era, especially given that psychology (including rigorous case studies) was not yet a distinct, independent discipline in the seventeenth century but was still often a sub-discipline within philosophy. Overall though, the advantage of translating both eo and qui as degree is that it keeps the language and metaphysics of degree consistently running throughout the sentence, which highlights a consistency in Spinoza’s philosophical thoughts, arguments and methodology.

This is important because secondary literature on Spinoza is not in agreement about textual evidence to support reading Spinoza in terms of degrees or kinds, modes or parts. Indeed, given that Spinoza explicitly and repeatedly uses the Latin word pars, it is argued that Spinoza can be better understood as arguing in the vocabulary of parts. However, I have suggested that EVp38 provides textual evidence of Spinoza writing explicitly in the language of degrees because it is plausible that Spinoza did argue in terms of degree given that the Latin word eo and qui carry a sense of degree and can be literally translated as such. A Latin word which specifies kinds of matter is elementum, elementi, a word Spinoza doesn’t really make use of except when discussing Euclid’s work on mathematics. Given this, amongst other reasons, I suggest the language of degrees is a better fit for Spinoza’s metaphysics and epistemology.

Thus, the relevance of the language of degrees not parts and varieties not kinds to the topic of life and death is that we need to develop the second and third varieties of knowledge in order to adjust the degree to which we suffer from harmful affects, including a fear of death. This approach to life is an aspect of living well and also helps us after death because we have boosted the amount of adequate ideas we have, hence, we will enjoy more eternity.  

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 266, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[ii] Spinoza, II:58.

[iii] Spinoza, II:58.

[iv] Spinoza, II:58.

[v] Spinoza, II:45.

[vi] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, transl. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), translator’s preface, XVII.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook Part 1: Life and Death in Spinoza’s Ethics and Letter 32: Introduction

Part 1: Life and Death in Spinoza’s Ethics and Letter 32     

Introduction

In section 1, shall examine the topic of life and death in Spinoza’s Ethics with a focus on EVp38 as well as Spinoza's Letter 32 to Oldenburg and EVp41 and its scholium. I suggest that EVp38, including its demonstration and scholium, is a concise yet pivotal passage in Spinoza’s Ethics which gives us an overview of his philosophy of life and how to combat a fear of death.  So, I wish to examine it in greater depth and analyse it together with some further related propositions which give a picture of Spinoza’s views on living well, attitudes to death and how to use our intellect during our lifetime to enhance the immortality and eternity of our soul after death. 

I shall start with the proposition:

“Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere Mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt patitur, et mortem minus timet.” (EVp38, accents omited^[i])

Below is my interlinear translation options of the above to provide the possible literal meanings of these Latin words: 

Put together as a sentence, my suggested translation is:

Therefore the more objects/things/properties/matters the mind/intellect/reason/judgement understands/ realises from second and third varieties of knowledge, the lesser the degree one actually suffers oneself from affects which are anything of the evil/malicious/harmful kind/degree and the less [one] dreads/fears death [being annihilated/a corpse]. (My literal transl of EVp38)

This sentence contains several important points which I shall now examine in turn over the course of this section. 

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza and Henri Krop, Spinoza Ethica, 8th edition (Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam : Prometheus, Bert Bakker, 2015), 506.

My Blog ebook: Research Thoughts on... Spinoza - Volume 2

Research Thoughts on... 

Spinoza - Volume 2 

Life, Death, Immortality and the Soul

Liba Kaucky

Series: Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 2

Sole author: Liba Kaucky

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First published 2018 by Liba (Libuse) Kaucky as a blog ebook on blogger.com at My Spinoza Research Diary blog, available at: 
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Current titles in this series:

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 1

Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd – Volume 1

Forthcoming titles:

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 3

Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd - Volume 2 

I would like to dedicate this book to my mother, Jana, without whose endless love, continual encouragement and support this book would not have been possible. I want to take this opportunity to thank her for always being there for me throughout life’s ups and downs and for always having total belief in me and giving me the confidence to follow my dreams. I love you!

Contents

AUTHOR’S NOTE  

EDITORIAL NOTE

PREFACE

PART 1: Life and Death in Spinoza's Ethics and Letter 32: Introduction

http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/part-1-life-and-deathin-spinozas-ethics.html 

Chapter 1: Living Well: The Language of Degrees and The Water Analogy

http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-1-living.html 

Chapter 2: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Lymph Analogy

http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-2-spinozas.html

Chapter 3: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Worm  Analogy

http://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-3-spinozas.html

Chapter 4:  The Psychological Impact of Fear and Anxiety on Freedom, Living Wisely, Dying Well and Attaining Eternity in Spinoza’s Ethics

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-4.html

Chapter 5: Knowledge, True Piety and the Soul and their Role in Living Well, Dying Well and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/09/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-5-knowledge.html

Part 2: The Soul in Spinoza's Short Treatise upon God, Man, and His Well-Being: Introduction 

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/11/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-part-2-soul-in.html

Chapter 6: The Immortality of the Soul in the Short Treatise (Chapter 23)

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/11/chapter-6-immortality-of-thesoul-in.html

Chapter 7: My Logic Framework Analysis of Spinoza’s Preface to Part 2 of his Short Treatise

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/12/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-7-my-logic.html

Chapter 8: How Can We Evaluate Spinoza on Immortality and the Soul from his Preface to Part 2 of his Short Treatise?

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/12/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-8-how-can.html

Chapter 9: Spinoza’s Appendix 2 ‘On the Human Soul’ in his Short Treatise 

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/12/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-9-spinozas.html

Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks on Volume 2

https://myspinozaresearchdiary.blogspot.com/2018/12/spinoza-vol-2-ebook-chapter-10.html

Author’s Note

I can be contacted at:

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The purpose of writing this ebook and publishing it on my blog is to encourage wider access and participation in philosophy and philosophical research, not just within but also outside of academic institutions regardless of educational background. This is one of the reasons I have included open access sources for Spinoza’s texts and translations of them and cited them alongside printed copies.

Editorial Note

 In this ebook, for consistency, I have used the standard contemporary citation of Spinoza’s Ethics by referring to all his scholiums as scholiums rather than occasionally referring to them as notes, as in the 1901 edition of Spinoza’s Ethics. Page references I provide in the references at the end will make this edition of Elwes’s note type scholiums easy to find for readers who wish to read the 1901 ebook primary text of the Ethics alongside this ebook. 

This edition of volume 2 was published here on my Spinoza blog chapter by chapter on a regular basis.

Preface

This blog ebook has been based on my abstract ‘Spinoza on how to live well and die well’ which I submitted 19th October 2015 to the joint conference of the European Society for Early Modern Philosophy and the British Society for the History of Philosophy: Life and Death in Early Modern Philosophy which took place on the 14^th-16th April 2016 at the University of London, UK and was organised by Professor Susan James.

I have been working on the topic of life and death and related issues in Spinoza ever since and so this abstract has become the basis for this volume 2 ebook. As in the previous volume, I translate parts of Spinoza’s Latin text to elucidate the meaning behind his words so that, hopefully, I can come closer to understanding Spinoza’s works. In order to do this, I call upon knowledge I gained at the Open University on their undergraduate level course final year module in Latin. In this volume, I have introduced an interlinear translation format so that the Latin together with my translation can be seen at a glance.

There are two people I’d like to thank.

Firstly, Professor Susan James to whom I am deeply indebted for her inspiring lectures and talks on Spinoza and in the History of Early Modern Philosophy in general which have given me the impetus to go on to do research (as an independent scholar) in philosophy after graduation. From her lectures, I learned the old-fashioned Cambridge University-style of looking at a topic/philosopher with breadth which taught me to read widely and see how things inter-relate, whether between texts by the same philosopher or between philosophers and centuries. Historical context was also seen as important when trying to understand a particular philosopher.  Philosophers’ arguments were analysed and fleshed out. Their texts examined with a charitable reading, no twisting the text or adding anything that you would like to see there that isn’t. 

Her ability to explain complex thoughts/ideas/terminology meant she didn’t ‘dumb down’ but gently brought you up to her level. This has all greatly influenced my approach to reading and researching Early Modern Philosophy texts. Failing to ask a question at her Q&A’s was not an option and would be met with a humorous: I see you all understand everything perfectly. This made me ensure I always had at least one question to ask and could demonstrate I had actually read the primary text as well as the secondary literature. There were no short cuts with her because you would be found out. You couldn’t bluff your way through and you still can’t! She liked you to develop your own ideas, spot hidden layers of complexity in the text together with having a robust argument about it that would withstand a sceptical: How does that work? Is that plausible? Having your text with you was something she encouraged but having it sitting on your table wasn’t enough. She’d expect you to have read it in detail, prior to the lecture, with your brain engaged. Even a chapter title was analysed – Why is it worded the way it is and what’s it telling us about the chapter and book? You can never assume a question from her is as easy as it appears at first blush.

Her approach taught me to always be on my toes and wide-awake and concentrate throughout her lectures or I’d miss a vital step in her train of thought. Her lectures would incrementally become more complex as the lecture progressed so you needed to keep up with her, actively and intensively thinking and asking yourself questions not just sitting there letting it wash over you. I carried this invaluable training through into all lectures, talks and conferences. This enabled me to learn a great deal very quickly. Although thoroughly Cambridge, Professor Susan James, nevertheless, went on to create her own style and niche in philosophy. I have tried to model myself on her by creating my own style and voice as well as finding my own niche in the world of philosophy. I think she is a great role model not only for me but all aspiring women philosophers.

My knowledge of Spinoza is continually being enhanced by the many excellent talks and discussions at her London Spinoza Circle which she began in October 2015. I appreciate being part of this vibrant community she has created where enthusiasts and scholars of Spinoza regularly come together to enjoy exchanging ideas about him.

I’d also like to thank my undergraduate dissertation supervisor and final year tutor in the History of Philosophy, Professor Anthony Price. He also encouraged close study of the text (including being comfortable with the odd Greek word or two in Ancient Greek Philosophy) and was constantly φing and ψing. His words still ring in my ears: Is it in the text? This emphasis on the original primary text has held me in good stead as I approach my own research in Early Modern Philosophy, especially Spinoza, Lady Mary Shepherd and Hume. Our supervisions were an academically lively, sometimes academically adversarial, debate which forced me to have to justify my stance and arguments. However, he was always ready to discuss and consider, exploring all possible angles asking: What if? Would it work under all conditions? Is it in the text? Where? Is it clearly in the text not just wishful thinking? Are you thinking it through yourself rather than relying on secondary literature which can be wrong? That was an eye-opener. When a student, there is a tendency to think secondary literature is always a true depiction of the text. Both he and Professor Susan James always emphasized thinking for yourself and finding your own interpretation that is as unbiased as possible and so represents the philosopher in their true light. He was keen on exploring diverse opinions despite holding strong opinions himself. It was an intense hour of constant dialogue between us. His supervisions taught me to enjoy both calm, relaxed, explorative philosophising together as well as adversarial debate. I think both are important in philosophy. His unconventional style by today’s standards, old-fashioned Oxford University approach increased my confidence and ability in asking and answering questions at Q&A sessions, constructing plausible arguments and defending my theses, all of which I find useful now when trying to hold my own against professors in my field.  

It is due to both Professor Susan James and Professor Anthony Price that I have gone on to focus my research on primary texts rather than secondary literature.

So, between the two professors I was lucky to receive two different yet complementary styles rooted in the Oxbridge tradition. The one thing they both emphasized was: Is it in the text, where, how and why? They were objective and neutral in their approach not wishing to super-impose the contemporary views/opinions, ideologies of others or their own onto the text. Both allowed you the freedom to find your own voice, and interpretation rather than parrot theirs. They encouraged you to find your own style, and how or what methodology you preferred to use. This has been invaluable in my own research and has given me confidence to carry out research in philosophy straight after graduating.

My continued thanks to Professor Oystein Linnebo for his Metaphysics lectures which taught me not only Metaphysics (Level 6) but also how to incorporate logic into my essays. I also learnt a great deal about logic and how to logically structure  my philosophical arguments and interpretations by listening to his paper, and other speakers’ papers, when attending the conference ‘Varieties of Higher-Order Logic’ (in conjunction with the ERC Plurals, Predicates and Paradoxes research project) in London, 18-19^th June 2010. All this has enabled me to understand complex logic and incorporate it into my research papers and books. I have found this a highly useful skill and an important one in the field of philosophy.

My overarching philosophical aim in writing up my research in an accessible manner is to open up the debate that Spinoza was and remained throughout his life a religiously devout Jew and that evidence of this can be found in his texts. This is seen as a highly controversial stance and one that is not taken up by even those who think Spinoza was not an atheist and that Jewish ideas are present in his text. However, I wish to press this further in my Analytic-Jewish interpretation of Spinoza, and present the idea that Spinoza’s texts are based on his Jewish faith, which, in my opinion, he never wandered away from, and that by having a better appreciation of Judaism, especially that practised in 17th century Netherlands, we come closer to understanding this complex philosopher. In order to achieve my aim, over the course of these volumes, I shall closely analyse his texts not only in translation but also in Latin, which was the language he chose to write in to reach a wide audience, as well as some of his Hebrew additions to the Latin. I hope by doing this, I can understand Spinoza’s thoughts, ideas and arguments in a rational, unprejudiced way, unprejudiced as in not pre-judging the layers of meaning within his writings. 

This ebook is volume 2 of my series ‘Research Thoughts on… Spinoza’, and deals with three main subject areas: life, death and immortality.