Panentheism and Spinoza

One distortion of his views arising from religious quarrels that I think Spinoza suffers from is the notion that his philosophy is somewhat pantheistic which can also lead to the mistaken notion that he was an atheist. As I explained when answering a follow-up question after I presented my paper ‘Was Spinoza a Forerunner to Darwin’ at Groningen University 2016, I am working on a reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics and writings on God and nature which shows that he was not a pantheist, although he may have agreed with a type of panentheism which is compatible with Judaism. A reason for this is proposition 15 in the first part of his Ethics which states “Whatever is, is in God…” (EIp15)¹. In other words, everything is in God and God is in everything because everything only exists as a result of God. Moreover, in White’s translator’s note to EIp29s, he states that the expressions natura naturata and natura naturans “signify by the same verb the oneness of God and the world, and yet at the same time to mark by a difference of inflexion that there was not absolute identity.”² Indeed, Spinoza wrote to Oldenburg³ (letter 73) affirming that he did not equate God with nature in his terminology. This would mean that Spinoza cannot be a pantheist because pantheism sees God and the world as being identical. Furthermore, the Panentheistic description of God inhering in things in the world, as opposed to pantheism which would see things in the world as being identical to God, resembles Spinoza’s description of things being a mode of God and godliness inhering in things. An example of this difference: the Pantheist would think this tree in front of me is one and the same thing as God. Whereas the Panentheist would think that the tree is a tree but that it has the property of God in it and that its existence comes from God.  

On reading around, I discovered that Martial Guéroult (1891-1976) suggested Spinoza may have been more panentheistic than pantheistic so I shall look into his writings on this. However, I shall be connecting panentheistic elements in Spinoza’s writings with Judaism especially since it appears around the same passages where Spinoza emphasizes that God is one and that “nothing can either be or be conceived without God” (EIp15)⁴. I have been working on to what extent the concept of Tzimtzum⁵ in Judaism can be found in Spinoza’s passages on God conceiving.    

On this picture, God is transcendent in the sense that God is different, unique, perfect with a different quality of attributes, a bit like Spinoza’s analogy of the difference between the “celestial constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks” (EIp17s)⁶. However, God is not transcendent in the sense of being outside of the world.

To illustrate this, I think of Spinoza’s claim that everything is in God yet not identical to God to be a bit like an Eulerian circle which shows a smaller circle, call it x and think of it as the world, within a larger circle, call it y and think of it as God. In this way, x and y are not identical, and the world, represented by the smaller circle x, is within God, represented by the larger circle y. And there is nothing outside of God since God is the main circle, y, but God is not strictly speaking outside of the world because that would be like being outside of Himself since God is the larger circle and is encompassing the whole world rather than being outside of it in the sense of being an external circle, z, which doesn’t overlap with the world, circle x. Or, to see the visual representation of this, see this image available at:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d0/EulerDiagram.svg/1280px-EulerDiagram.svg.png. 

Here, God would be like the red circle, the world would be like the yellow circle and the blue circle is like the mistaken notion, according to Spinoza, of God being outside of the world. The adjustment to this mathematical representation is that the yellow circle representing the world only exists through and because of the red circle representing God and everything in the yellow circle is a mode (property) of the red circle. And perhaps, if it were to fit with Tzimtzum, then the yellow circle exists because it has been created in the sense of it being conceived out of and by the red circle, rather than it being created in the sense of the blue circle bringing it into existence from outside of itself. In this way, God can be the only substance (substance monism), whereas if God were like the blue circle, this would lead to substance dualism which Spinoza rejects. Another Spinozian adjustment would be that the red circle representing God causes everything that happens in the yellow circle, representing the world, by acting in it through the laws of nature (not through emotion or willing).

Also, this style of Euler diagram suits panentheism because it retains the different identities between God and the world and reflects the language of the world being in God. It also avoids the possible panentheist language describing the world as a part of God which would be a problem for Spinoza given that he rejects breaking up wholes into parts yet it retains the underlying panentheist view. I imagine that the pantheist diagram would look like the red circle and the blue circle are the same size and completely overlapping, making it impossible to refer to one as x and the other as y because they would be identical. (Again, the blue circle would represent the mistaken notion of God being outside of the world completely and being referred to as z.)   

¹Spinoza, Benedict de., ‘Ethics’, translated by White, W. H., revised by Stirling, A. H., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, Wordsworth editions, (2001) p14

²ibid footnote 4 on p28

³letters between Spinoza and Oldenburg available at:

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1661.pdf and for this passage on God and nature see p104-5 in this pdf.

⁴Spinoza, Benedict de., ‘Ethics’, translated by White, W. H., revised by Stirling, A. H., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, Wordsworth editions, (2001) p14

⁵Tzimtzum: the idea that God contracted Himself and partially withdrew Himself to provide a conceptual space within which the world could exist. Although it is a kabbalistic explanation for the final stages when God created the world, I don’t interpret Spinoza as a Kabbalist because it is a type of Jewish mysticism and Spinoza is very much into reason so I think is more generally in line with Jewish Rationalism. However, it is possible he may have drawn some metaphysical inspiration from such descriptions, given that the notion of Tzimtzum predates Spinoza’s era. 

⁶Spinoza, Benedict de., ‘Ethics’, translated by White, W. H., revised by Stirling, A. H., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, Wordsworth editions, (2001) p20

Freedom of Thought, Speech and Teaching in Spinoza

I see my philosophy research as an organic, on-going, life-long process which means that I like to keep revisiting and adding to my thoughts, rather than it being an open and shut, linear process. The core of my research always remains the same, be it my interpretation, purpose and so on, but it grows and develops over time. So, my Spinoza Research Diary blog reflects this. Although I began formulating my Analytic-Jewish interpretation of Spinoza back in 2014, I enjoy continually updating my thoughts and arguments to support my research. Therefore, for instance, although the controversy over Rabbi Dweck happened in 2017, I find that it still informs my fundamental interpretative approach to Spinoza, which I started to explore in 2014, and informs my papers, especially my 2015-2017 paper ‘Who Was Spinoza?’¹.  

Since my last blog post, the ruling on Rabbi Dweck has decided that he can remain the Senior Rabbi for the Spanish and Portuguese Sephardi Community. However, I think many details within the decision about the restrictions Rabbi Dweck now consequentially has imposed on him is of great concern for freedom of thought and speech, which is something that Spinoza valued. As Frazer² summarises:

“But Rabbi Dweck has had to pay a high price — he has had to relinquish being a dayan on the Sephardi Beth Din, and to agree to submit the contents of his public lectures to a member of the review committee. He has also agreed not to return to his former congregation in New Jersey to be a summer scholar-in-residence, as he has done for the past three years.”

Limitations on “intellectual freedom”³ was something that Spinoza was not prepared to compromise which is why he declined an offer to be a professor at the University of Heidelberg. So I don’t find it surprising that Spinoza didn’t fight to lift his excommunication, or accept any job position which came with possible censorship. We can see that even today, freedom of intellectual thought is sometimes curbed by over-authoritarian institutions. Possibly Spinoza thought that his synagogue would have only lifted the excommunication if there were strings attached, given that it is rumoured that there was an attempt previously “to bribe him into conformity. A pension of one thousand florins was offered him if he would remain quiet and appear now and again in the synagogue.”⁴ So I don’t think Spinoza’s apparent disinterest in lifting the excommunication is surprising or indicative of any lack of motivation for leading a Jewish life. It may simply have been, amongst other things, to preserve his freedom of thought, especially his intellectual thought, and to avoid potential censoring of his philosophy.

Indeed, Spinoza didn’t even see such suppression as strictly speaking possible because he finds that “no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and judgement, or be compelled so to do.”⁵ So it would be pointless for him, or any one other, to renounce these freedoms. Furthermore, according to Spinoza’s philosophy, as I understand it, it would be counterproductive and dishonest to think one thing but to say another. It would also be unmanageable and risk catastrophic outcomes because Spinoza argues that “…no one can abdicate his freedom of judgement and feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of his own thoughts, it follows that men thinking in diverse and contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep silence.”⁶ I find it interesting that Spinoza also extends freedom of thought and speech to the realm of teaching as well, given his statements such as “…a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such a freedom were granted.”⁷ This passage in Spinoza’s TTP made me realise that perhaps the freedom to teach what you think may be an undervalued and often overlooked freedom and is more a part of academic freedom as well as freedom of thought and speech than is recognised. I suspect pedagogical freedom also functions in a similar manner to other freedoms, for instance, it should not involve the promotion or spreading of hatred. So these passages in Spinoza have inspired me to write a paper on Spinoza on freedoms, speech, virtues and vices, including the freedom to teach what one thinks⁸. 

I find the interference with Rabbi Dweck’s freedom of thought and speech, by checking and possibly censuring his views in his public lectures, together with terminating his scholar-in-residence, unacceptable. When learning about Spinoza and the 17^th century context he was in when he wrote about freedom of thought and speech, it is easy to assume that society has sufficiently progressed since then that, although freedom of speech and thought are still highly relevant and problematic these days, there is somehow more consensus on their value and less authoritarian restrictions imposed upon it, other than when it is very needed, for instance, to prevent clear cases of hate speech. We assume that Spinoza’s fears about publishing his thoughts in his treatises and censorship is something that would not have been an issue had Spinoza lived in the 21^st century. Yet the case of Rabbi Dweck shows otherwise. He has to now second guess what he is and is not allowed to express as an opinion in 2017 and beyond. He did not commit hate speech, but rather was attempting to increase toleration and good-will and prevent homophobic prejudice. His heart was genuinely in the right place and he was putting forward a sincerely held rational argument with the aim of combatting hatred and bigotry. So I think he fulfilled Spinoza’s general stipulation concerning political philosophy that “he may even speak against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger, or hatred…”⁹. Yet this ruling does not include any sanctions on those who spoke with contempt and hatred against him despite Judaism being strongly opposed to what is called lachon hara, broadly equating to gossiping and “scandal-mongering”¹⁰, mainly because they often have very detrimental effects on both individuals and groups or society. Given this Jewish aversion to spreading and listening to idle and mostly negative gossip, I am surprised that anyone in the Jewish community would have listened to or believed the gossip that the two people from his synagogue came back with after they grilled Spinoza about his religious outlook¹¹. Following Jewish tradition, it is the disparaging and malicious gossip that the Jewish community should have treated with suspicion, rather than any beliefs Spinoza was claimed to have held.    

I worry about the implementation of justice. A person is punished for sincerely expressing views which are both supportive of feminism and the LGBT community, so intending to alleviate prejudice and hatred against certain sections of society. Yet those who openly attack someone simply because their views differ from theirs are not held to account. Spinoza’s wise observation that “Every man’s understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates”¹² is still not widely appreciated today, both within and outside of religious debates. This is also completely unnecessary in a religion such as Judaism which does not have any set doctrine and has a tradition of studying and celebrating Rabbinic dispute and the conflicting interpretations it contains on scripture and religious law. If it is possible that a case, such as Rabbi Dweck with all his knowledge and experience, can occur in the UK in 2017, then it is still more plausible that when Spinoza’s community brandished his views as heretical, these claims about Spinoza may not only have been grossly distorted but also prejudiced against his liberal-mindedness and more due to a lack of toleration of diverse opinions than Spinoza holding any unacceptable or un-Jewish thoughts. Indeed, Spinoza wisely sums up such controversies when he declined the professorship at Heidelberg University:

“ ‘religious quarrels’, he added, ‘do not arise so much from ardent zeal for religion, as from men’s various dispositions and love of contradiction, which causes them habitually to distort and condemn everything, however rightly it may have been said. I have experienced this in my private and secluded station;….”¹³      

¹ Kaucky, L., 2015-2017, ‘Who Was Spinoza?’, available at:

 https://www.academia.edu/31139859/Who_Was_Spinoza_draft_paper_2015_2017.pdf

² Frazer, J., 19/07/2017, 12:10 pm ‘Rabbi Dweck can stay as Sephardi leader after rabbinic ruling’ available at:

http://jewishnews.timesofisrael.com/rabbi-dweck-can-stay-as-sephardi-leader-after-rabbinic-ruling/

³Scruton, R., (1986) ‘Spinoza’, Past Masters, Oxford University Press, p14

⁴ White, H. W. (2001) translator’s preface to Spinoza, ‘Ethics’, Wordsworth Editions limited, pXXI in Spinoza, Benedict de., ‘Ethics’, translated by White, W. H., revised by Stirling, A. H., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, Wordsworth editions, (2001)

⁵Spinoza, Benedict de., A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, Dover Philosophical Classics, Dover Publications Inc Mineola New York (2004) p257

⁶ibid p258

⁷ibid

⁸my project outline is available at:

 https://www.academia.edu/33174790/On_the_possible_Role_of_Empathy_in_Preventing_the_Vice_of_Hate_Speech_abstract_and_work_in_progress_2016-2017

In a forthcoming paper, I shall also be examining Spinoza on vices and the virtue of freedom of thought:

“…what question was ever settled so wisely that no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it may be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated – vices as they are – because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments how much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed!”

Spinoza, Benedict de., A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, Dover Philosophical Classics, Dover Publications Inc Mineola New York (2004) p261

⁹Spinoza, Benedict de., A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, Dover Philosophical Classics, Dover Publications Inc Mineola New York (2004) p259

¹⁰ for more details see:

 http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/gossip-rumors-and-lashon-hara-evil-speech/

¹¹Scruton, R., (1986) ‘Spinoza’, Past Masters, Oxford University Press, p7-8

¹²Spinoza, Benedict de., A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, Dover Philosophical Classics, Dover Publications Inc Mineola New York (2004) p257

¹³Scruton, R., (1986) ‘Spinoza’, Past Masters, Oxford University Press, p13-14