Spinoza vol 2 ebook Chapter 5: Knowledge, True Piety and the Soul and their Role in Living Well, Dying Well and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics

Chapter 5: Knowledge, True Piety and the Soul and their Role in Living Well, Dying Well and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics

Following on from Chapter 1, I think retaining the language of degrees in EVp38 deepens the meaning behind how increasing our adequate knowledge helps combat evil and our negative affects. As Elwes[i] has brought out in his translation choices, one of the key ideas in EVp38 is that possessing second and third varieties of knowledge proportionally reduces how many evil, malicious, harmful affects we feel. Conversely, this implies that the more inadequate ideas we have, the more likely we are to suffer from harmful negative affects. I argue that this provides us with a useful conceptual barometer to analyse evil and the relationship between knowledge and piety in Spinoza’s ethics.

Earlier in the Ethics, Spinoza delineates what good and evil are and describes them in relation to our nature. That which agrees with our nature is good, if it is contrary to it then it is evil and if something diverges from our nature then it is indifferent, in other words, neither good nor evil (EIVp31d and s). In addition, we cannot have certain knowledge of good or evil per se, but we can tell whether something might be good or evil by looking at it in relation to knowledge. In EIVp27 and its demonstration, Spinoza argues that if something enables and is compatible with knowledge, then it is good and if something works as a knowledge-blocker (eg EIVp73s “hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions…”[ii]), then it is evil. In this way, I think EVp38 builds on EIVp27 and p31 and so by looking at these propositions together, it helps us appreciate how Spinoza deepens his idea. Earlier in EIV, Spinoza states that good and evil relate to our nature and are somewhat co-dependent with knowledge before adding in EVp38 that this co-dependency is so close that it increases and decreases in degrees. Thus, I think it is helpful to see the relationship between true, adequate knowledge and good and evil as being a matter of a fine, small tweaking of degree rather than seeing it as general, sharply delineated categories.

Is Spinoza  trying to convey the message that we should focus our efforts on gaining true, adequate ideas and knowledge in order to lead a good life and live well by showing that second and third varieties of knowledge have more far reaching consequences than one might realise? Yes, because knowledge is closely tied to our emotions, meaning that knowledge indirectly impacts on us, our choices and our actions through the vehicle of influencing our emotions. To analyse the concepts here more deeply, it is perhaps useful to examine this in relation to EVp41s. Here, Spinoza argues against the common misconception that:

“Pietatem igitur et religionem et absolute omnia, quae ad animi fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt, quae post mortem deponere, et pretium servitutis, nempe pietatis et religionis, accipere sperant.” (EVp41s[iii])

I provide the Latin here because there are small but important differences between English versions of this proposition. The most significant being the addition of the word morality (Curley 1996 and Bennett 2017) which isn’t in the Latin and calling animus, animi, mind, character or soul. Here are a selection of translations:

“In their view, then, morality, religion, and absolutely everything related to strength of character are burdens that they hope to put down after death, when they also hope to be receive a reward for their bondage, that is, for their morality and religion.” (Bennett 2017)[iv]

 “Morality, then, and religion, and absolutely everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to put down after death, which they also hope to receive a reward for their bondage, that is, for their morality and religion.” (Curley 1996)[v]    

“They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is for their piety and religion;…” (Elwes 1901)[vi]

“Piety, therefore, and religion, and absolutely all those things that are related to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens which they hope to be able to lay aside after death; hoping to receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, for their piety and religion.” (White, Stirling 2001)[vii]

So I examined the Latin words and found the White and Stirling version to be the most representative. My literal translation of the options of the Latin text meanings is: 

Therefore/accordingly/consequently, piety and religion and absolutely everything, which refers to a courageous/strength of soul, they believe to be burdens/oppressive, which they cast aside after death, and hope to receive [something] worthwhile for their servitude/bondage, ie true piety and religion.

Although all of the above translations chose reward, I decided to keep to the same usage of pretium as Spinoza uses throughout the Ethics. He usually uses pretium to state that he thinks something is worth his while to discuss or point out, for instance in EIIp13s, EIIp49s, EIIIp50s. So its alternative meaning of reward, although perfectly correct, would be a one-off exception in the context of Spinoza’s Ethics. So, I suggest, Spinoza need not be arguing against people expecting a reward after death. He may be merely pointing out that people should not consider piety as a burden to be endured in their life, in the hope it will be worthwhile in the end, after death. I think Spinoza’s objection here is that to regard piety and religion as a burden turns it into a means to an end rather than being of intrinsic value which is worthwhile for its own sake. If one feels only too pleased about the prospect of leaving it behind on death then one’s heart is not in the right place and it possibly involves just going through the motions of pious-looking behaviour during your lifetime. Spinoza probably sees this as insincere and insincere piety and religion is not true piety and religion. Again, if one’s main motivation for piety is a fear of death and the punishment or divine retribution it entails, then one is not doing good deeds and following divine commandments out of a love of God and wanting to be a good person. Spinoza words this as “ex legis divinae praescripto” literally meaning out of divine law precepts (EVp41s[viii]). In Orthodox Judaism, both pious and ethical behaviour are often manifested in doing what is called mitvot whose meaning is related to commandments of Jewish Law. Doing a mitzvah can range from typical pious, religious behaviour such as saying blessings to more general ethical behaviour such as helping someone, which also displays kindness, a central feature of Orthodox Judaism called chessed. So, is Spinoza arguing against people believing in reward after death? I suggest not, because Spinoza may be claiming something more complex here. He is perhaps attempting to bring out the importance of having the right attitude towards piety and religion by seeing the intrinsic value in doing God’s commandments and gaining knowledge of God. I do not think Spinoza is claiming that piety and religion are not worthwhile, but rather that they are worthwhile in themselves. I also suspect that Spinoza would not wish to dwell on punishment after death given his excommunication which carried with it the implication that he may not enjoy a world to come.

Another interesting extra potential layer of meaning could be that pretium can also mean prayer and accipere can also mean listen or hear. So I wonder whether Spinoza chose these words over others because they carry the implicit meaning of having your prayers heard. This would fit with his strong emphasis on piety and religion throughout this proposition. Spinoza may consider praying with the sole intention of trying to avoid punishment or gain something out of it as not true piety, but rather, as using religion to get what you want. True piety and religion is about becoming closer to God, loving and knowing God. Indeed, Spinoza opens this proposition by arguing that piety and religion are the foremost, best, principal reason / consideration even if we were unaware that our mind (mentem) is eternal. He shows in EVp41s how preposterous a means-end approach is when he shows the logical absurdity of dispensing with reason on the false assumption or belief that “the mind is not eternal or immortal”[ix] (mentes cum corpore interire[x], literally, mind dies/perishes/ceases/ruined the body). Thus, I maintain that his refutation of people thinking like this and logically showing it to be absurd gives textual evidence that Spinoza must have held the reverse belief. In other words, Spinoza must have believed in the eternal, immortality of the mind and argued for enhancing our reasoning capacities because he saw this as being a way of living which fitted with immortality. Although Spinoza here uses the Latin word for mind, I think Spinoza did not just argue for the immortality and eternity of mind but also of the soul. This is easy to overlook because Spinoza uses various related phrases to refer to the immortality of the soul rather than the phrase itself so the concept of the immortality of the soul in his Ethics can be overlooked or dismissed and explained away.

A further related problem is that the Latin words for mind and soul are not translated consistently between translators and even within the same translation edition. There are also differences between languages as can be seen in White’s footnote to his translator’s preface when he discusses “a difficult passage” in Spinoza’s Ethics[xi]. Here he gives the Latin sentence, which includes the word anima then highlights Auerbach’s “as usual a perfectly literal translation” in which he translates anima as “Seele”[xii] (soul).  He then provides Saisset’s French translation, which chooses “l’ame” (soul) and states that he is “lucid” and “perfectly understands the Latin”[xiii].  Despite both these accurate translations preserving the meaning of the Latin word as soul, White opted for translating it as mind even though he is happy to translate it as soul, at times, in the Ethics, for instance in the last proposition in EV. He seems to wish to give the same usage as the English translation example he gives in this footnote, where Sir Fredrick Pollock uses “mind” instead of soul because he feels the first usage of ipsius refers to an idea[xiv]. However, I think the problem with this is that it results in giving the overall impression that Spinoza has mentioned the soul explicitly less often than he in fact did. So I suggest that, to give a full account of Spinoza on the soul, one needs to map the account onto where and when Spinoza actually used which words and why, otherwise it is impossible to accurately assess Spinoza’s description of what the soul is like. This in itself is a complex but informative task because there are two different words for soul in Latin. One is anima, animae meaning soul/spirit/vital principle/life/breathing/wind. This is similar to the Jewish concept of ruach meaning soul, wind, breath of life. Spinoza uses this word but more sparingly and often when he wrote about Descartes’s views rather than his own. The other word for soul is animus, animi meaning soul/ mind/ intellect/ feelings/ heart/ spirit/ courage/ character/ air. This too suits the Jewish notion of an intellectual soul, that the heart is the seat of the intellect and that you pray to God with all your heart and soul/mind. Courage and spirit may be connotations Spinoza would wish to imply given that he uses the related word animositatem (meaning boldness/courage/spirit) in this proposition (EVp41) as being vital to living well, alongside piety, religion and generositatem[xv] (excellence/generosity).   

Although character is an optional meaning for animi, I agree with White and Stirling that soul suits EVp41s[xvi], especially given that here Spinoza is emphasizing piety and religion, as well as in the Ethics in general, which ends on discussions about the soul in the White and Stirling translation[xvii]. I claim that, if Spinoza had wanted to convey the word character without religious connotations and without evoking the soul, and more in the sense of Ancient Greek philosophy of virtue and character, he would have used a different word. There are many Latin words to choose from, ranging from virtus, virtutis (strength, power, courage, bravery, worth, manliness, virtue, character, excellence); ingenium, ingeni(i) (nature, innate quality,  natural disposition or capacity, character, talent); persona, personae  (character, personality); natura, naturae (nature, birth, character); mos, moris (custom, habit, manner, character, behaviour, morals); ars, artis (skill, craft, art, science, knowledge, method, way, character). Indeed, Spinoza does make use of these words in other places so he knew these words but didn’t choose to use them in this context. Animus also relates to courage (and he highlights this aspect of animus by paring it with fortitudinem, meaning firmness/strength/courage/valour). Additionally, it carries the meaning of spirit and air, making it akin to the word ruach in Hebrew. 

I argue that soul is the most plausible translation of animus because Spinoza uses this word when giving a demonstration for the eternity of the soul in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, a short text written earlier and seen as a precursor to the Ethics. So, I suggest there is a continuation between Spinoza’s views on the soul there and in the Ethics and that the Ethics may be assuming some arguments in the Emendation. Perhaps character has a role to play in understanding animus, but in a different way from our usual understanding of phrases such as strength of character. I maintain that it is the Orthodox Jewish combination of ethical and religious conduct going hand in hand as being aspects of God’s commandments, rather than as separate notions.

In this sense, animus is a well-chosen word for Spinoza because he can simultaneously imply pious, ethical and intellectual elements of the soul. Thus animus, I maintain, is best translated and understood as the rational soul. The significance of this is that Spinoza uses the notion of “animi acquiescentia” (which I shall call repose of the intellectual soul) when concluding his Ethics and uses it to distinguish between an ignorant person and a wise person who lives well and never ceases to exist[xviii].

---

[i] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, II vols, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[ii] Spinoza, II:236.

[iii] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera, Renati des cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata metaphysica  Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, ed. C.H. Bruder, EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-book), vol. I (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843), 414, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.

[iv] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, ed. Jonathan Bennett, pdf ebook (Canada: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com, 2017), http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1665part5.pdf.

[v] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books (England, UK: Penguin Books, 1996), 180.

[vi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:269.

[vii] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), 255.

[viii] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414.

[ix] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:269.

[x] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414–15.

[xi] W.H. White, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), XLIII.

[xii] White, XLIII.

[xiii] White, XLIII.

[xiv] White, XLIII.

[xv] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:414.

[xvi] Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White, Stirling), 255.

[xvii] Spinoza, 256.

[xviii] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:415–16.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook Chapter 4: The Psychological Impact of Fear and Anxiety on Freedom, Living Wisely, Dying Well and Attaining Eternity in Spinoza’s Ethics

Chapter 4: The Psychological Impact of Fear and Anxiety on Freedom, Living Wisely, Dying Well and Attaining Eternity in Spinoza’s Ethics  

In this chapter, I shall explore how EVp38 highlights the relationship between knowledge (cognitionis) and fear of death (mortem … timet). Breaking the concepts down, we see that the phrase fear of death in this proposition involves narrowing down negative emotions to a verb that particularly specifies fear (timeo), while the noun death (mors) incorporates the topics of corpses and, more generally, annihilation. Fear is a negative, harmful affect so builds on the general problem of negative affects raised earlier in the proposition EVp38. In his definitions of the affects in EIII, Spinoza lists two different words, both of which can carry the meaning of fear.

So what are the possible meanings of these two words? The first definition, which involves fear, is the thirteenth definition, “metus”[i] which can mean fear, dread, apprehension, anxiety, and terror. It can also refer to religious awe although this is usually in poetry. The second definition which involves fear is “timor”, which appears in definition thirty nine[ii], and comes from the verb timeo. The literal meaning of timor is mainly fear and dread although this can include apprehension, alarm, anxiety. Timor can also sometimes carry the meaning of timidity although this is a lesser-used equivalent word in English. It can be used in personification and when conveying that an object arouses fear, terror or anxiety, especially when used in poetry. It can be used to convey an emotion for positive reasons too, namely awe, reverence, veneration and is related to the word timoratus meaning that one is full of reverence towards God, god-fearing, devout and reverent. As far as I can gather, Spinoza does not use two other main words for fear which he could have used, such as terror, terroris meaning terror/fear/alarm/panic and pavor, pavoris meaning fear/panic.

Why does this matter? It gives us a more complex, nuanced idea of what Spinoza may have meant by fearing death and how it relates to attempting to live well and die well. I think it might also impact generally on the way we read Spinoza and understand him, especially since translations of Spinoza’s definitions of the affects in EIII varies. White and Sterling[iii] translate both metus in definition thirteen and timor in definition thirty nine as fear. I think this is confusing and unhelpful because it gives the erroneous impression that Spinoza repeats himself and conflates his terms by  en  explore how liate scrub up giving two different definitions of the same word. Curley[iv] and Elwes[v] chose to give the two definitions separate senses, making metus mean fear and timor mean timidity. This has the advantage of keeping the definitions separate and showing that Spinoza uses two different words and does not conflate his terms. Timidity is not a central meaning of timor but perhaps somewhat gives us the flavour of Spinoza’s definition of it. Nevertheless, a drawback is that using timidity could somewhat disassociate timor from its direct meaning of fear. Thereby, making timor sound more like a personality trait rather than something arising from a fear of an object external to you which is impacting on your emotions and judgement in a way that you need to learn to control. Timidity may be a by-product of this situation and reaction but, I claim, that Spinoza’s definition of timor is more layered than the simple definition of being too timid would suggest.   

Hence, I shall now analyse: How does Spinoza word his philosophical definitions of metus and timor and how does it relate to the linguistic meanings and connotations of these words? What does this tell us about Spinoza’s views on thinking about and fearing death? 

Spinoza defines the word metus as “tristitia”[vi] whose main meaning is sadness, although tristitia is also used in Latin to mean mournfulness, sorrow, grief, melancholy, gloom, dejection, moroseness and it has similar connotations to its synonym severitas, so both can imply severity, sternness and harshness. Spinoza himself generally defines tristitia in his third definition of the affects in EIII as referring to people passing from a greater, more powerful ideal or perfection to a lesser one[vii]. He specifies that one suffers from metus erratically, because he adds the adjective inconstans meaning changeable, inconstant, inconsistent, capricious[viii]. Metus originates from ideas of the future or past whose outcome/fate/success we doubt to some degree[ix]. In his definition[x], he refers back to EIIIp18s2 so we are meant to expand his definition by relating it to this scholium. EIIIp18s2[xi] adds that metus springs from an image of a doubtful/ dubious/ uncertain/ variable/ dangerous/ critical (dubiae) thing/event (rei). If one were to remove the element of doubt then metus would become despair[xii].

However, when Spinoza defines timor in EIIIdef39, he narrows his definition to an ambition/eagerness/ (carnal) desire to take the path of a lesser evil to avoid/evade a greater evil (malum, which can also mean apple so perhaps has connotations of Adam and Eve especially since Spinoza discussed the Garden of Eden in the Ethics) out of fear (metuimus from metuo, related to metus). To gain further insight into the meaning of timor, Spinoza refers us to EIIIp39s[xiii]. There we see a more detailed example of how timor impacts on judgement and actions. Spinoza uses the verb form of timor, which is timeat from timeo and not metus. He gives the example of someone who is filled with hate but after considering/planning it, meditating/reflecting on it, s/he chooses not to injure another for fear that they will suffer a greater evil themselves than their intended target (EIIIp39s[xiv]).

This example makes me question whether timidity is a good fit here for what Spinoza is describing with the word timor. In this example in EIIIp39s, the person does not come across as timid but rather seems to be under the influence of strongly negative passions such as hate, and perhaps revenge, while being very self-centred, worrying more about how it will impact on themselves rather than truly reflecting on the right thing to do. The person may be timid, in the sense of lacking courage to do a certain action (call it φ), but it is not very timid of them to want to φ purely out of hatred for another. Indeed, it’s probably best that they decide against φing! Acting out of hatred for another cannot lead to ethical action or justice. For instance, Spinoza argues that judges should make a ruling by seeing the wider picture and considering and loving what is in the “public well-being” and use their rational faculties to decide such matters, rather than act out of “hatred or anger” (EIVp63c,d[xv]). In this way, we can better avoid evil by aligning our desire with reason (EIVp63c[xvi]). Since Spinoza argues in EIVp64[xvii] that knowledge of evil is always inadequate knowledge (especially, I maintain, since evil does not give us knowledge of God because evil is not an attribute of God), perhaps the problem Spinoza is exploring here is that thinking about φ and choosing to φ or not to φ becomes fraught if one is in the grips of negative affects such as hatred and anger and therefore working off inadequate knowledge. Yet φing is a recurrent aspect of life and letting fear lead one into inadequate knowledge and negative affects, which consequently muddles ones cognition and judgement, makes one less intelligent and inhibits one’s ability to live well, acquire true, adequate knowledge and act piously and ethically. It also reduces our eternity by lowering the percentage of second and third kinds of knowledge we possess so decreasing the eternity of our mind and soul. So we not only live less well, we also die less well and are less eternal after life.

Furthermore, a main difference which strikes me between Spinoza’s two words for fear is that timor is more related to cognition than metus. Interestingly, for the topic of free will, it is describing choosing between two options (call them whether to φ or ψ) and choices of action (φing or ψing). So Spinoza must be leaving room for freedom of choice and action within his account of necessity. Metus is used to help define timor hence timor is perhaps also different in the sense that, although it is also a term of fear, in Spinoza’s definitions, it helps him refer to the negative impact fear has on our cognitive capacities and hence our life choices and decision-making of whether to φ or not. The question remains: Why did he choose both metus as well as timor for his main definitions of the affect, fear? I maintain that Spinoza uses the more all-encompassing word for fear, metus, as a definition because he is giving an overall definition of fear from which he extracts timor, giving it a narrower definition to show the cognitive impact of the negative affect of fear and anxiety. Then he can expand on both these aspects of fear more clearly to construct various arguments to fit the context when discussing a topic. For instance, in EIVp67 and its demonstration[xviii] Spinoza could have used the noun timor, timoris meaning fear/dread (which would be in keeping with its related verb timeo, timere, timui which he uses in EVp38, see “timet”[xix]) when discussing a fear of death in relation to wise or free people, but instead, he uses metus. However, in EVp38, he uses timeo when discussing a fear/dread of death. By analysing Spinoza’s definitions, it becomes clearer that timor, with its cognitive and epistemological implications of thinking and knowing how to act, fits with the clash between true, adequate knowledge and fear which Spinoza is highlighting in EVp38 and elsewhere in the Ethics. In his works, there is often a close tie between knowledge and fear which works both ways. True, adequate knowledge helps reduce fear while inadequate ideas generate fear and superstition. Conversely, combatting fear and superstition promotes true, adequate knowledge whereas a rise in fear and superstition, be it in our individual life or collectively as a society, reduces our intelligence and perpetuates false, inadequate ideas. Although Spinoza gives examples of individuals, it is cross-applicable to the collective in wider society. Spinoza is showing the damaging effects of fear on people, irrespective of whether it arises from other negative affects such as hatred or whether it is the climate of fear which triggers negative affects such as anger and hatred alongside poor cognition. Moreover, Spinoza would rather one does not act out of fear or try to evade evil, even if the result is that a person is φing by bringing about a good (EIVp63[xx]). So, leaving aside the aspect of hatred in EIIIp39s for a moment, one can see how timor and metus could cloud anyone’s intellect through negativity and poor coping strategies in the face of stress, fear and, I suggest, anxiety. Both metus and timor can refer to anxiety but, given his definitions, I suggest my above examination helps us to distinguish between feeling anxious or fearful (metus) and acting out of fear and anxiety (timor), revealing the practical application of Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion on living and dying well.

Thus: Is Spinoza somewhat philosophising about the psychology of stress and anxiety and how to alleviate it yourself, by managing your negative affects, including reducing the effect fear has on your cognition and judgement, in order to live well and die well? I contend that Spinoza has captured a common but lesser-known aspect of human nature and psychology with his analysis of fear and its impact on mental cognition and knowledge. I think this is impressive and insightful of Spinoza, especially since it is still an on-going debate in psychology today. I suggest that findings in recent studies perhaps support Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion and psychology which I have outlined above.  

Scientific research has shown that fear and stress has a detrimental impact on cognition and memory. The fight or flight reaction is designed to help us act rather than reason, especially when it involves using our reasoning faculties to take in, understand and remember new knowledge[xxi]. Spinoza specifically discusses the now well-known psychological phenomenon of fight or flight. In EIVp69c, Spinoza maintains:

“The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.”[xxii]

Such presence of mind is an ability which is just as relevant today as it was in Spinoza’s era and is a very important survival skill. In this way, Spinoza picks up on something fundamental in psychology when developing his account of the free man, living well and wisely despite conflict or any dangerous situations which may arise. Psychology research has discovered that fear can make people “suffer cognitive paralysis, resulting in complete inaction.”[xxiii] A familiar example of this in daily life is when a fire alarm goes off in a building and people stop what they are doing but, instead of evacuating the building,  slump into inaction and negativity. Even if it later turns out to be a false alarm, your overall survival strategy should be to go through standard evacuation procedures calmly and efficiently. Although you may encounter several false alarms and may not want to look silly constantly evacuating unnecessarily, it only takes one correct alert to be fatal and you will not find out which one that is until it is too late. Therefore, people are advised to leave their office when the alarm goes off, whether they feel like doing so or not[xxiv]. However, extrapolating from the aforementioned scientific research, I deduce that actively beginning an evacuation is more likely to be the response of stress-hardy people who, unlike the majority of people, are less prone to freezing during dangerous, stressful, fear-inducing situations. Furthermore, I maintain that Spinoza would advise that one should not just think of oneself when the alarm goes off but help those slower to respond so “they escape from the dangers”[xxv].

Perhaps another cause of misresponding to pressure situations could be related to Morgan’s discovery in a study carried out in 2006[xxvi]. He found that the side-effect of fear on cognitive ability and information retention meant participants struggled to see the wider picture and tended to only remember and focus on small specifics which changed the way they would, for instance, reproduce a drawing from memory[xxvii]. This concurs with other studies carried out which show the impact fear and anxiety has on memory and cognitive performance[xxviii]. Some suggested approaches for alleviating anxiety and depression and reducing the negative impact it has on the intellect is, I claim, in line with Spinoza. I argue that Spinoza’s appreciation of the complexity of fear, anxiety and depression being a combination of emotional, behavioural and cognitive factors is supported by a number of studies and experiments carried out in modern psychology. This field is still a work in progress and there is much still to be done. However, some studies have shown that making changes to your cognitive approach is often particularly effective and important for both physical and mental health, regardless of whether someone is clinically or non-clinically depressed or anxious[xxix]. Even mild, non-clinical depression or anxiety can adversely impact on intellectual performance, for instance in exams, so examination bodies and institutions are advised to do everything they can to help reduce potential stressors so it does not lower students’ academic performance[xxx]. In terms of therapeutic approaches and what individuals can do to help themselves, some experiment results indicate the importance of dealing with doubt and negativity while reshuffling one’s cognitive functioning, alongside dealing with emotional factors[xxxi]. Hence, I think Spinoza was right to combat depression, anxiety and factors impeding cognitive and intellectual development by taking the same three factors as modern psychology does into account, namely, emotional, cognitive and behavioural. These three factors, I maintain, are not only reflected in his double definition of fear and related responses (metus, timor), but also in his descriptions of various emotional, behavioural as well as cognitive thought processes which he argues need addressing in order to live well.   

When it comes to more extreme, dangerous fight or flight situations, studies have found that it is useful for people to learn how to cope during extreme fear-inducing situations, as, for instance, soldiers do, because you are significantly less likely to make potentially fatal errors and you generally increase your survival chances, although differences remain even between skilled soldiers[xxxii]. Reactions to fear-inducing scenarios vary more markedly among untrained people, in relation to their prior cognitive abilities and personality traits[xxxiii].

There is, however, disagreement about how anxious people fare.

Robinson finds that anxious people perform worse because their cognition and memory is too preoccupied with thinking about their fear of dying[xxxiv]. In this way, Robinson’s plausible account of the anxious experiencing a decrease in their cognitive abilities through a fear of death, I think, lends support to Spinoza’s claim in EIVp67 that a free, wise person would not dwell on thinking about death or be overtaken by negative affects, including worrying about and fearing death.

However, Derakhshan adds that anxious people have one extra skill over non-anxious people. Derakhshan argues that people who suffer from anxiety have the “advantage” of being better at detecting something hostile and acting swiftly[xxxv]. Nevertheless, I’m not convinced that anxious people always accurately perceive who and what is and is not hostile and react appropriately. Surely they may either be prone to panicking or be made to panic. Or simply assume the worst due to their negative brain pattern or based on bad experiences in the past, rather than inferring it accurately from the people and situation presented to them. However, I agree that they need not be passive victims who require others to deal with potential situations for them, given that anxious people possibly retain the ability to detect and act on a problem, in other words, think and act for themselves under pressure. Indeed, throughout the Ethics, Spinoza encourages the wisdom of pursuing an independent, rational, measured approach over irrational, hysterical reactions, brought-on by fear and negative affects, which impair wisdom and knowledge and directly or indirectly generate evil. This is a central message of EVp38 which highlights the connection between knowledge and negative affects, encompassing anxiety, dread and fear, including a fear of death.

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[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera, Renati des cartes principia philosophiae more geometrico demonstrata Cogitata metaphysica  Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, ed. C.H. Bruder, EX EDITIONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT EDITIO STEREOTYPA. (google e-book), vol. I (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1843), 320, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QaepYJ2v89MStBAazNfXFlh7XPUFnaSpDsdzbmMb4u8oZ4OmK4Wf3qk49paF5UhkgDGPR-WCy1g3iJtEYf8FSV6uKDrfcAhNPaej4SHS_GB-AKc6L0dbARc08wB15nPpojJE1BHJoSMMnqO5KrXeTM1bCZSqG4dgkeKN-791cBRdLqfymhDLPcXpm3tA6nCh14r7Vqor_6Q5aD6Tal8Jp-5cIESXEEfw-aJVpRq01WBZu-CT7KvAnYUGv6qTXDcGgVuk6D2tGhqM_JNWxQKuY5hx30cClePoudB83HZjCouCbaOC9_c.

[ii] Spinoza, I:325.

[iii] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White and A.K. Stirling, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), 149, 155.

[iv] Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books (England, UK: Penguin Books, 1996), 106, 111.

[v] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 167, 182, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.

[vi] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:320.

[vii] Spinoza, I:317.

[viii] Spinoza, I:320.

[ix] Spinoza, I:320.

[x] Spinoza, I:320.

[xi] Spinoza, I:286.

[xii] Spinoza, I:286.

[xiii] Spinoza, I:299–300.

[xiv] Spinoza, I:299–300.

[xv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:231.

[xvi] Spinoza, II:230.

[xvii] Spinoza, II:231.

[xviii] Spinoza, Ethics (Transl. White, Stirling), 212.

[xix] Spinoza, Opera: Ethics, I:411.

[xx] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:230.

[xxi] Michael Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’, New Scientist, 13 May 2017.

[xxii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:233.

[xxiii] Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’, 33.

[xxiv] Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.

[xxv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:210.

[xxvi] Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.

[xxvii] Bond.

[xxviii] Esther F. Akinsola and Augustina D. Nwajei, ‘Test Anxiety, Depression and Academic Performance: Assessment and Management Using Relaxation and Cognitive Restructuring Techniques’, Psychology 4, no. 6A1 (2013): 18–24, https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.46A1003.

[xxix] Akinsola and Nwajei, 23.

[xxx] Akinsola and Nwajei, 23.

[xxxi] Akinsola and Nwajei, ‘Test Anxiety, Depression and Academic Performance: Assessment and Management Using Relaxation and Cognitive Restructuring Techniques’.

[xxxii] Bond, ‘In the Face of Danger’.

[xxxiii] Bond.

[xxxiv] Bond.

[xxxv] Bond, 35.

Spinoza vol 2 ebook Chapter 3: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Worm Analogy

Chapter 3: Spinoza’s Letter to Oldenburg (32): Parts and Wholes - The Worm  Analogy

The second analogy is a slight tweaking of the first analogy because it merely adds our place in the world into the analogy of the universe. Spinoza asks Oldenburg to imagine a worm (vermiculum[i], literally meaning grub or lava) living inside the blood stream system he described in his first analogy. I have already suggested Spinoza’s premises are adequately biologically true for the purposes of his first analogy. Given that he extends these same facts into his worm analogy, the latter is also based on adequately biologically true facts for the purpose of this second analogy.

I interpret Spinoza as imagining that the worm represents a human; lymphs and chyles represent x and y things in the world; the blood stream represents the part of the world we live in; and the other bodily systems, such as the digestive system, represent what lies beyond the world we live in and see in our daily lives. Spinoza is enthusiastic about astronomy in his letters so I suggest Spinoza may have thought of the blood stream as being akin to planet earth while the other organs and systems in the body are akin to other planets (and galaxies). Spinoza does not explain what the entire body would represent. Perhaps this would be the unknown whole he does not expect to understand completely. On this view, the body would represent the entire universe and all its galaxies and distant stars and phenomenon. Perhaps it would represent God given that Spinoza’s argues everything is in God. So, following that reasoning, I think the body, representing the totality of everything, would be God and anything in the entire universe would be in God. Perhaps Spinoza did not want to state this explicitly in case Oldenburg (a German Theologian) and others became confused and assumed Spinoza was likening God to an extended, material, physical, non-mental substance which would not be his intention, given his views in the Ethics.   

I base my interpretation of the hypothetical worm being like a human on Spinoza’s explicit claim in this letter 32 which parallels the way the worm in this analogy lives in the bloodstream with the way we live “in a part of the universe”[ii]. This is an important premise in Spinoza’s analogy because it explicitly states a likeness between the hypothetical worm’s experiences of life and human experience of life. For Spinoza’s analogy to be plausible, this likeness needs to be similar enough in terms of showing “relevant similarities”[iii]. There may be dissimilarities as long as they are not a “relevant difference”[iv]. I suggest Spinoza’s Lymph and Worm analogies are adequately similar to human experience, reasoning and the structure of the world or universe in relevant ways, such as, basing our reasoning on sensory experience, for example sight, and hence, potentially ignorant of what lies beyond empirical data and experience. This style of argumentation is, I maintain, consistent with Spinoza being a Rationalist philosopher as opposed to an Empiricist.  

How does the worm view the world of the bloodstream and try to understand it in relevantly similar ways to humans? It relies on raw empirical information gathered “by sight” to then engage in the method of reasoning from observation (“ratione” meaning reasoning/method; “ad” meaning by/according to; “observandum” meaning watch/observe).[v] The worm sees how “particula”[vi] (meaning a small part or particle/atom) interact with one another. The worm would not know or understand (“nec scire”[vii]) how all the parts are regulated (controlled/governed) by the whole (entire/universal) nature of the blood (“quomodo partes omnes ab universali natura sanguinis moderantur”[viii]). And the worm would also not know that, in turn/reciprocally/mutually, the whole nature of the blood ends up compelled (congealing) to adapt itself in order that there be a certain/fixed/reliable/determined reasoning/rule of agreement/harmony/unison between each other (“et invicem, prout universalis natura sanguinis exigit, se accommodare coguntur, ut certa ratione inter se consentiant”[ix]). I have added the suggestion of congealing as a possible translation of the word coguntur as a way of reading what Spinoza may be saying, or may be including as an extra layer of meaning. This is because, not only is this a translation option as a literal meaning of cogitur, but also it captures the relevant biological phenomenon, described in a 19^th century Encyclopaedia, that both blood and lymphs can coagulate forming clots and serums[x]. Whether Spinoza intended to refer to coagulation or not, I think this brings out Spinoza’s point that things in the universe have a mutual, reciprocal, adaptable relationship with one another and that seemingly distinct things can be regulated by the same fixed, determined (perhaps pre-determined) rules (eg the laws of nature concerning coagulation) which produce agreement between apparently different things which gives rise to unity in the world[xi]. Furthermore, Spinoza’s choice of lymph and chyle is a pertinent one. They are wholes in the sense they have different names, can be referred to separately and are not identical to one another (do not have all the same properties or functions as each other). Nonetheless, they are not entirely separate as types of fluid because chyle is a type of lymph and both are composed of the same things, however, the lymphs are made up of additional things too[xii]. So, metaphysically and logically speaking, they are partially identical (share some of the same properties or predicates) and partially non-identical (have some different properties or predicates) so are similar but not strictly identical. This could be why Spinoza thought they were a great problem case to use as an analogy and thought experiment by inviting us to hypothesise: what if/suppose we come across these types of problem cases in the world, do we, like this worm, fall into the same errors in our reasoning about parts and wholes?

As I mentioned earlier, lymph and chyle come from a system outside of the bloodstream and Spinoza uses this fact to illustrate the limitations of reasoning from experience and how, as a result, we may misunderstand causation.

We, like the worm, assume from experience that our world is all there is and causation happens within this world. We forget there may be causes from the wider universe which is somewhat external to our world and yet impacts on the bits of the world we experience. This leads us to think of our world/bloodstream as a whole rather than a part of something else[xiii]. This self-contained view of the world/bloodstream makes us see it as quite stagnant, except for some changes which occur between parts within his system, for instance, between chyles and lymphs[xiv]. 

However, Spinoza points out that the bloodstream is not stagnant and can modify itself and its particles in relation to causes external to it[xv]. On this picture, the bloodstream is now seen as a part rather than a whole[xvi]. With this claim, Spinoza has added a final layer to his analogy and concludes his discussion of wholes and parts. To understand Spinoza’s argument by analogy, I think we need to imagine how parts in the blood relate to the whole bloodstream as well as imagining the bloodstream being a part of something greater than itself. So it seems as though Spinoza is showing the complexity of parts and wholes by illustrating how there can be parts of parts and so, without complete, adequate knowledge of everything that exists, we cannot accurately identify and know what is a part or a whole. So when we use the language of parts and wholes, we are using our imagination to carve up the world into parts and wholes and projecting that onto the world. Hence, we are closer to attaining adequate knowledge of the world and how to live if we think and talk in terms of complex modes of the one substance, God.

Spinoza extends his conclusions from his lymph and worm analogies to draw two further related conclusions.

One, blood works as a good analogy for natural bodies in that they are also in a reciprocal relationship with others and the universe as a whole. Like the bloodstream, natural bodies must exist and operate in accordance with fixed proportions so they fit together, harmonise, agree, both with other bodies as well as with the universe as a whole[xvii]. It can be said that such bodies and systems are parts of the whole universe because, unlike the infinite universe, natural bodies and systems, such as the bloodstream, are finite and limited[xviii]. Conversely, the whole of the universe is infinitely powerful and can undergo infinite modifications and variations[xix]. Furthermore, Spinoza echoes what he writes in Ethics 1 by claiming that parts pertain/extend/relate to substance (which is infinite) and they depend on it to be conceived and exist[xx].

This leads Spinoza to his second related conclusion which he assumes is evident from his prior arguments. Spinoza maintains that the human mind and body are a part of nature[xxi]. He supports this claim about the human mind by arguing that there exists an infinite power of thinking which both contains nature as a whole and exists in nature[xxii]. Both nature and infinite thought come from the realm of ideas[xxiii]. Within this, the human mind is partially identical and partially non-identical with infinite understanding because it does not have all the same properties and one can use different predicates when talking about them. Thus, although it is identical with it in some ways, it is not strictly identical because, unlike the infinite understanding, it only perceives the human body and has a finite understanding.

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[i] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:185.

[ii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:291.

[iii] Weston, A Rulebook for Arguments, 21.

[iv] Weston, 21.

[v] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:291.

[vi] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:185.

[vii] Spinoza, II:185.

[viii] Spinoza, II:185.

[ix] Spinoza, II:185.

[x] George Ripley and Charles A. Dana, ‘Lymph’, ed. George Ripley and Charles A. Dana, The American Cyclopaedia - Popular Dictionary Of General Knowledge (D. Appleton And Company, 1873), https://chestofbooks.com/reference/American-Cyclopaedia-7/Lymph.html.

[xi] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:185.

[xii] Ripley and Dana, ‘Lymph’.

[xiii] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, II:291.

[xiv] Spinoza, II:291.

[xv] Spinoza, II:291.

[xvi] Spinoza, II:291.

[xvii] Spinoza, II:291–92.

[xviii] Spinoza, II:292.

[xix] Spinoza, II:292.

[xx] Spinoza, II:292.

[xxi] Spinoza, II:292.

[xxii] Spinoza, II:292.

[xxiii] Spinoza, II:292.