Chapter 6: Spinoza on the Personal and the
Political (TP)
In this chapter, I analyse
Spinoza’s parallel between the personal and the political in his TP: just as a
father should not treat his children as his property, so a dominion is not a
ruler’s property within which slavery, brutality and cruelty are allowed to
thrive, leaving misery and despair in its wake. Thus, as part of the
analytic-feminist strand of my interpretation, I shall examine to what extent
Spinoza makes use of showing how domestic household arrangements are analogous
to a state or empire. In both the private and political cases, Spinoza seems to
me to be taking a stance which I think is compatible with contemporary feminism
and human rights by refuting the concept of the patriarchal head of the family,
state or empire owning and ruling over his family or subjects in a master-slave
dominance relation. I suggest Spinoza’s arguments against patriarchal dominance
in both the private and public spheres can both inform feminist theory and
provide reasons for refuting paternalism in ethics and politics.
First I will focus on the
personal, private, domestic household aspect of Spinoza’s argument contra an
all-powerful, patriarch subordinating others into a slave-like condition. To do
this, I shall concentrate on the following passage (Pa1):
“Sed si servitium, barbaries et
solitudo pax appellanda sit, nihil hominibus pace miserius. Plures sane et
acerbiores contentiones inter parentes et liberos, quam inter dominos et servos
moveri solent, nec tamen oeconomiae interest, ius paternum in dominium mutare,
et liberos perinde ac servos habere. Servitutis igitur, non pacis, interest,
omnem potestatem ad unum transferre. Nam pax, ut iam diximus, non in belli
privatione, sed in animorum unione sive concordia consistit.”[i]
(TP chapter 6 section 4; Pa1)
Elwes translates this as:
“Yet if slavery, barbarism, and
desolation are to be called peace, men can have no worse misfortune. No doubt
there are usually more and sharper quarrels between parents and children, than
between masters and slaves; yet it advances not the art of housekeeping, to
change a father's right into a right of property, and count children but as
slaves. Slavery then, not peace, is furthered by handing over to one man the
whole authority. For peace, as we said before, consists not in mere absence of
war, but in a union or agreement of minds”[ii]
Shirley has much the same
translation but with a few variations:
“But if slavery, barbarism, and
desolation are to be called peace, there can be nothing more wretched for
mankind than peace. Doubtless more frequent and more bitter quarrels are wont
to arise between parents and children than between masters and slaves. Yet it
is not to the advantage of household management to change paternal right into
the right of ownership and to treat children as if they were slaves. It is
slavery, then, not peace that is promoted by transferring all power to one man;
for peace, as we have already said, consists not in the absence of war but in
the union or harmony of minds.”[iii]
I think the above translations
are broadly representative of the structure and meaning of the Latin. However,
I would like to highlight some differences in vocabulary and bring out possible
concepts behind the text which do not seem to come through in the above translations.
I shall analyse the Latin words and their English translations with the purpose
of assisting readers of Spinoza (in English translation) to track the truth and
meaning of his philosophical arguments in Latin and to have the relevant word
associations in their mind so they can link together topics appearing in
different sections, chapters or treatises.
Firstly, I suggest brutality may
be a more helpful word than barbarism for the Latin word barbaries because it
has a more general application than barbarism which is laden with stereotypical
connotations of groups deemed to be less civilised than others. Brutality,
therefore, has more explanatory use since it can be applied to various
societies and eras, no matter how cultured or civilised they may appear or
claim to be. Brutality is also a behavioural theme in the state of nature so it
is a word that can be used when comparing pre and post political societies and is
used in discourse on the social contract. In this way, I think brutality is a
more politically relevant term and it is also a pertinent, applicable word for
both domestic and public contexts thus it is easier to see how it relates to
concepts and issues in feminism.
Secondly, other options for the
word solitudo apart from desolation include solitude /loneliness /deprivation /wilderness.
I think it is helpful for readers of Spinoza to be aware of these alternate connotations
of the word solitudo because they relate more specifically to further topics in
social and political philosophy, such as the social contract (wilderness),
justice (deprivation) and the need for social contact/interaction between
members of society (solitude, loneliness). In terms of which word fits
Spinoza’s vocabulary usage in his political philosophy, solitude may be the most
consistent one. Elwes does use the word “wilderness”[iv]
in the context of the Exodus in Spinoza’s TTP chapter 3 where the Latin word in
this case is “deserta”[v].
This is correct, one can choose wilderness or desert for deserta. However, when
Spinoza writes in chapter 5 of his TP about slavery and peace, Elwes chooses
the word desert for solitudo, even though it would be a huge stretch of the
meaning of solitudo:
“Besides that commonwealth, whose
peace depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like
sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a
commonwealth.”[vi]
(TP chapter 5 section 4) (Pa2)
The Latin word Elwes has
translated here as commonwealth is civitas which, strictly speaking in this
context, means community, city, town or state. Thus, solitude would be a better
word choice which would contrast well with community. Spinoza does not relate
this passage to the Exodus so evoking it with the word desert while contrasting
it with a commonwealth may make the reader assume Spinoza is alluding to the
Exodus or the state of nature when this is not apparent in the Latin text. Yet
elsewhere in Spinoza’s TP Elwes does use the word solitude for solitudinis and
solitudine:
“But since fear of solitude
exists in all men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend
himself, and procure the necessities of life, it follows that men naturally
aspire to the civil state”[vii]
(TP chapter 6 section 1) (Pa3)
So why translate solitudo
differently between Spinoza’s passages, for example Pa2 and Pa3? To do so makes
it harder for readers to track Spinoza’s train of thought and concept of solitude/loneliness.
In Pa3 solitude is contrasted with the civil state and Spinoza goes on to write
about political “quarrels”:
“Accordingly, from the quarrels
and seditions which are often stirred up in a commonwealth, it never results
that the citizens dissolve it”[viii]
“Ex discordiis igitur et
seditionibus, quae in civitate saepe
concitantur, nunquam fit, ut cives civitatem dissolvent”[ix]
Shirley also uses the word
quarrel both here and in Pa1. So both Elwes and Shirley give the impression
that Spinoza is writing about the same type of quarrels in Pa1 and just after
Pa3. However, I think treating both instances of quarrels in exactly the same
way means the reader loses some of the nuances in Spinoza’s philosophy. He does
not use the same Latin word to describe the two different types of quarrels. In
Pa1, the personal quarrels are more passionate, heated arguments “acerbiores
contentiones”[x] as
opposed to political dissension “discordiis” in Pa3[xi].
Elwes’s word choice of desolation
not only appears in Pa1, but can be seen elsewhere, albeit for different Latin
words, for instance, in chapter 5 of Spinoza’s TTP:
“For when the prophet saw and
foretold that the desolation of the
city was at hand, he said that God only delights in those who know and
understand that He exercises loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in
the earth, and that such persons only are worthy of praise. (Jer. ix. 23.) As
though God had said that, after the desolation
of the city, He would require nothing special from the Jews beyond the natural
law by which all men are bound.”[xii]
(TTP chapter 5) (bold print mine
to make it quicker to see at a glance, not in original) (Pa4)
The potential problem with this,
I suggest, is that Spinoza’s readers are liable to mentally associate Pa4 with
Pa1 because they both refer to desolation in the context of destruction and a
lack of peace. It is apt to use desolation for destructum and vastationem in
the context of Pa4, even though these words literally mean destroying.
Nevertheless, solitudo does not mean desolation or destruction so perhaps Pa1
should be in keeping with Pa3 by also using the word solitude in Pa1. Hence,
although generally one may translate the same word in different ways depending
on the context, I’m not sure these shifts in meaning assist clarity and
consistency, or reflect the subtle changes in context.
Putting it together, the overall
sense of this sentence in Pa1 is: There is nothing more miserable for human
beings than a concept of peace which includes slavery, brutality, and solitude/loneliness.
(I use the gender inclusive phrase human beings here rather than man or mankind
not to provide a more contemporary version of Spinoza but because it is a
literal translation of hominibus.)
Thirdly, at the end of Pa1 we see
that Spinoza’s focus in Pa1 is the point that people should not transfer all or
too much power to one man, be it personal (husband, father) or political
(ruler, king). True peace, Spinoza maintains, is not achieved by everyone
transferring (transferre) their power /rule /strength /ability /opportunity
(potestatem) to one man (unum)[xiii].
There need not be a state of peace, merely in virtue of there not being a state
of war (literally privation of war: belli privatione[xiv]),
whether in the domestic or political sphere. Thus he concludes Pa1 by
maintaining that true peace is a unity/oneness/togetherness (unione) or mutual
agreement/harmony/peaceful union (concordia) of intellectual souls (animorum
from animus)[xv]:
So Spinoza’s point here is that
peace/harmony is not in accordance with (being) free (from) war /warfare /battle
/military force /arms /combat /fighting, but (rather) consists of/depends on/
corresponds to/ comes about/exists/ is established (maybe also remains
applicable/valid) by rational souls uniting as one, mutually agreeing on being
united together in an harmoniously peaceful rapport/union. This, for Spinoza,
is what true peace is. In this passage, Spinoza mentions he has asserted this
previously in his TP. One section, I suggest, which he may have in mind is
section 4-6 in his previous chapter[xvi].
There, in chapter 5, one finds a series of important points which, I think, we
need to bear in mind, not only when reading chapter 6 of the TP but also when
reading all of Spinoza’s works as a cohesive, consistent whole body of
philosophy. One vital point relevant to Pa1 is that Spinoza claims there is a
moral difference between peace and a lack of war, because peace “is a virtue”[xvii].
Moreover, in section 4 of chapter 5, one sees the same distinction between a
lack of war and true peace as one sees in chapter 6. For instance, if the
passion of fear makes people feel prevented from “taking arms”, they are merely
living “free from war” not in “peace”[xviii].
Therefore, I claim, Pa1 plays a pivotal role in Spinoza’s philosophy of life
and death through the topics of peace and war and by the way it relates to the
other passages I’ve cited in this chapter.
Fourthly, a word which does not
appear in the English translation of Pa1 is solent, meaning to be in the habit
of something. This is an informative addition because it tells us that Spinoza
thought that the social dynamics and power relations between people form
habitual ways of behaving which impact on how they relate to one another. Thus,
those who have inferior status are less able to air their grievances when
relating to someone of higher social standing, such as, in Spinoza’s example,
slaves to a master. Spinoza further explores this dynamic (arising from
conferring too much power onto one man who takes a paternalistic, patriarchal
role) through the division of roles in a household. He argues against paternal
right giving a father the right to behave anyway he wants, exercising arbitrary
power. In Pa1, we see the phrase ius paternum. Breaking this down, paternum
comes from paternus meaning father or paternal. The word ius means right as
well as law and justice. So I suggest the Spinozian concept of an all-powerful
paternal right impacts detrimentally on judicial systems and on the concept of
justice. Moreover, Spinoza is against using such paternal right as a means to
gain ownership, ruling over his family like a head of state rules over a
dominion. It is perhaps through this concept of ownership that Spinoza finds a
parallel between father-family, master-slave, ruler-subjects. This is evident when
Spinoza likens the condition of children of a paternalistic father to that of
slaves, both in the way they are thought of and managed. Such parallels were
common in Ancient times, where a pater familias was “A Roman head of household”
who “had extensive legal powers over slaves as well as women and children,
including even adult sons.”[xix]
Shirley is in keeping with this theme by translating oeconomiae as household
management[xx],
which, I think, is better than Elwes’s phrase “the art of housekeeping”[xxi]
which conjures up thoughts of dusters, cleaning products and scrubbing
floors. I don’t think this is what
Spinoza had in mind though when depicting this management of family life.
Spinoza chose the word oeconomiae which, more specifically, can refer to
domestic economy. Economics did not become a discipline in its own right until
the 18th century so during Spinoza’s lifetime, it was still perhaps
considered part of ethics and politics, as it was in Ancient times. Xenophon (Plato's generation) wrote Oeconomicus[xxii], an often overlooked text, despite being one of the first to discuss the
combination of economics and household management. He writes it in the style of
Socratic dialogue, in which Critobulus claims knowledge of the economics of
household and agricultural management is a distinct field of study in its own
right[xxiii].
This text is perhaps overshadowed by Aristotle’s Oeconomica[xxiv]
which parallels domestic finance with political finance by discussing family households,
wives, slaves, personal, royal and political economy. Spinoza is briefly
treating the topic of household arrangement and finances very differently from
these ancient philosophers by arguing against this patriarchal set-up rather
than just accepting it as the norm.
Spinoza’s outlook is also in
contrast to his contemporary, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who held
the opposing view of the personal and the political. The Ancient concept of
pater familias continued into the 17th century. Moreover, in the UK,
it was not until the 19th century that mothers gained any parental
rights at all on divorce. The 1839 Custody of Infants Act (considered to
possibly be the first feminist law in the UK[xxv])
was the first to give mothers limited rights, such as being considered for
custody of children under 7 years of age and child access thereafter[xxvi].
However, it was not until The 1873 Infant Custody Act that the concept of the
child’s welfare took precedence over the concept of parental right and the age
limit for a mother’s child custody and access rose to under 16s[xxvii].
Nevertheless, married women only began to receive some protection from their
husband’s domestic violence after the introduction of Matrimonial Causes Act of
1878 which gave them a separation and legal protection from their husband[xxviii].
Indeed, Hobbes grounded his views on power in “patriarchalism”[xxix]
and saw nothing wrong with children being in a slave-master type relationship
with a parent or guardian and likewise argued in favour of sovereigns ruling
with an iron fist over their subjects in his Elements of Law. As Peter King
rightly points out in Hobbes’s philosophy, “power acquired by force—Hobbes
calls it “dominion”—comes in two forms: master over servant, and parent over
child”[xxx].
In this way, “For Hobbes, childhood is a period of servitude we would call
slavery.”[xxxi]
“Furthermore, freedom from dominion is conceptually identical for servants and
for children, as Hobbes states in De Cive 9.7”[xxxii].
Hence, just as a slave needs to be officially freed from their master to no
longer be a slave, so “Adulthood, therefore, does not release one from filial
bonds of obedience; an explicit act of emancipation is required.”[xxxiii]
Apparently, Spinoza had a copy of
Hobbes’s De Cive in his library[xxxiv].
Generally, I do not think the books a philosopher has in their library are of
great significance. A philosopher can have many books in their home library that
they have not read but merely dipped into or may own for reference purposes
only to assist philosophical discussions with others. In Spinoza’s letters, we
see him attempting to find books merely to follow up a point or example someone
has raised. So possible books owned are unlikely to provide a neat list of
influences on a philosopher because it does not tell us which of them they read
in detail or what their assessment was of them. For instance, Spinoza had an
awareness of Ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, yet he was dismissive of
them in a letter to Boxel so they were clearly not an influence on his philosophy:
“The authority of Plato,
Aristotle, and Socrates is not worth much to me.”[xxxv]
Likewise, I have texts of Nietzsche,
Kant and Leibniz in my home library but these philosophers have neither interested
me nor influenced me. They are merely there for general philosophical knowledge
and as a source of reference.
So, the question remains: Is
Spinoza criticising Hobbes here when he refutes the Hobbesian all-powerful
patriarchal head of the household and tyrannical, absolutist monarchs? Here, I
think, this is the case. I maintain that it is impressively advanced of Spinoza
to argue against the notion of fathers having dominion over their family. Such
dominion includes paternal ownership and children being objectified as the mere
property of their father, alongside other chattels, rather than as human beings
who have feelings and thoughts. In the UK, “Until 1839, when a husband and wife
separated, the children were deemed to be the property of the man”[xxxvi]
so Spinoza was definitely ahead of his time in his non-patriarchal outlook!
Indeed, the dangers of patriarchy
are still an on-going debate in feminism and domestic violence campaigns. Two
such campaigners, Luke and Ryan Hart, explain the dangers of “patriarchal”
“belief systems” that give fathers and husbands the feeling that they have the
right and power to rule over their family[xxxvii].
Spinoza was right to extend this to economics within the private, domestic
sphere because it is only very recently that financial abuse has been
acknowledged as an officially recognised form of domestic violence. As Luke and
Ryan Hart said of their abusive father, his: “control included financial abuse,
isolating his family, accusing his wife of being gay or having an affair if she
met friends after work” as well as interfering with his wife’s work and
relationships and even “banning his sons from talking to” others and curtailing
both his sons’ earnings[xxxviii].
I suggest there are parallels to
be drawn between some Roman notions of the pater familias and Hobbes’s
paternalistic head of the household. “Roman fathers had in theory the power of
life and death over their children, a power that Athenian masters did not have
over their slaves.”[xxxix]
Similarly, Hobbes sees a child’s life and death as being in the hands of their
parent, especially the father given Hobbes’s patriarchal world view and given
that in the 17th century, it is the father who has parental rights,
unlike the mother. In a modern day context, patriarchal world views have led male
domestic abusers to believe they are “entitled” to obedience from their wives
and children and that they have power over life to the extent that disobedience
is “punishable by death”[xl].
This can be broadened out to
paternalism in general where the pater familias concept is extended to
controlling adults in the private and public sphere irrespective of that
person’s will. By treating adult relatives and even non-relatives as children
who need advice, guidance and someone to act on their behalf, paternalism
restricts the autonomy and freedom of those adults, so adversely impacting on
both individuals and the collective through society and politics.
Thus, in this chapter I have furthered
the analytic-feminist strand of my interpretation of Spinoza. I have also
attempted to demonstrate how Spinoza shows a philosophical way forward which
feminist philosophy can draw on when constructing arguments about the personal
and political.
[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera: DE
INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., ed. C.H. Bruder,
EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol.
II (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844), 75,
https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.
[ii] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS
of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK,
vol. I, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street,
covent garden: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1891), 317,
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/1321.01_Bk.pdf.
[iii] Benedictus de Spinoza et al., Political
Treatise (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 65.
[iv] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:54.
[v] Benedict de Spinoza, OPERA: TRACTATUS
THEOLOGICO - POLITICUS. COMPENDIUM GRAMMATICES LINGUAE HEBRAEAE., EDITI
ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol. III
(Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1846), 59,
https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QacE8SDsXSxDv_mlktJb68z9c6Kfxnn11M9rjyKJagSi-1h3konJKQNSvm_0MIhRTdihCHrOk849LY5fQU-P-M4UDeaUiCrLFz_NUTHk5MbSk-yI839tTy2_4bCeWVrmWCGj3RvJn4Ma9vyhhail9I4XPYFuBVkvDbRassb1ugmECEDF-1qr2mH1JRdIQj4KKzQmUjQnfdEVWI7o2dHXv7IQnI6N93NGrh36IYZDwjtfamtm5MJ5Uc0oPC5oBnD8VxUYaUi88X3iwbO9Jp7XAiStdVfwBg.
[vi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:314.
[vii] Spinoza, I:316.
[viii]
Spinoza, I:316.
[ix] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS
EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:74.
[x] Spinoza, II:75.
[xi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:316.
[xii] Spinoza, Opera: TTP, III:72.
[xiii]
Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS
EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:75.
[xiv] Spinoza, II:75.
[xv] Spinoza, II:75.
[xvi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:314–15.
[xvii]
Spinoza, I:314.
[xviii]
Spinoza, I:314.
[xix] M. S. Lane, Greek and Roman Political
Ideas, A Pelican Introduction 5 (London, England ; New York: Pelican, an
imprint of Penguin Books, 2014), 249.
[xx] Spinoza et al., Political Treatise,
65.
[xxi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT
DE SPINOZA, 1891, I:317.
[xxii]
Xenophon, Xenophon: in seven volumes.
4: Memorabilia. - Oeconomicus. - Symposium. - Apology, Reprinted, The Loeb
classical library 168 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press [u.a.], 2002).
[xxiii]
Xenophon, 363.
[xxiv]
Aristotle and E.S. Forster, Oeconomica
(Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1920),
https://archive.org/details/oeconomica01arisuoft/page/n7.
[xxv] ‘Women and Children – Custody of Children
Act 1839’, Educational, Intriguing History, 3 January 2012,
https://www.intriguing-history.com/women-children-custody-of-children-act/.
[xxvi]
N/A, ‘Custody Rights and Domestic
Violence’, political, www.parliment.uk, no date given,
https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/relationships/overview/custodyrights/.
[xxvii]
N/A.
[xxviii]
N/A.
[xxix]
Peter King, ‘Thomas Hobbes’s Children’,
in The Philosopher’s Child: Critical Perspectives in the Western Tradition,
ed. Susan M. Turner and Gareth B. Matthews (Rochester, NY: University of
Rochester Press, 1998), 3,
http://www.individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Hobbes_on_Children.pdf.
[xxx] King, 2.
[xxxi]
King, 2.
[xxxii]
King, 2.
[xxxiii]
King, 2.
[xxxiv]
Don Garrett, ‘“Promising” Ideas: Hobbes
and Contract in Spinoza’s Political Philosophy’, in Spinoza’s
‘Theological-Political Treatise’: a Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed
and Michael A. Rosenthal, Cambridge Critical Guides (Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 193,
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/garrett/papers/Promising%20Ideas_Hobbes%20and%20Contract%20in%20Spinoza’s%20Political%20Philosophy.pdf.
[xxxv]
Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS
of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK,
vol. II, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street,
covent garden new york: 66, fifth avenue, and bombay: 53, esplanade road
cambridge: deighton, bell & co: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1901), 388,
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1711/1321.02_Bk.pdf.
[xxxvi]
‘Women and Children – Custody of Children
Act 1839’.
[xxxvii]
Maya Oppenheim, ‘Online Hate Spurred on
Our Father to Kill Our Mother and Sister, Say His Sons’, Independent, 25 May 2019,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/luke-ryan-hart-father-murder-mother-sister-spalding-a8928471.html.
[xxxviii]
Oppenheim.
[xxxix]
Lane, Greek and Roman Political Ideas,
41.
[xl] Oppenheim, ‘Online Hate Spurred on Our
Father to Kill Our Mother and Sister, Say His
Sons’.
