Tuesday 10 September 2019

Spinoza vol 3 ebook: Conclusion; Concluding Remarks; Bibliography


Conclusion:


Although I have attempted to give quite a comprehensive understanding of the TP from a feminist perspective, I cannot claim to have left no stone unturned, covering every single passage of potential feminist or political interest in the TP. Nevertheless, I have attempted to put forward a method of feminist interpretation which can be applied to any section of the TP with much the same result as the ones I have selected for this volume, thus methodologically covering the whole TP. One such example is in chapter 7 (section 25) Spinoza’s apparent claim that all monarchs should be kings, the throne being handed down from father to son, seemingly precluding daughters from becoming queens:

In Latin, this reads as:

“Imperii facies una eademque servari, et consequenter rex unus et eiusdem sexus, et imperium indivisibile esse debet.*) Quod autem dixerim, ut filius regis natu maior patri iure succedat, vel (si nulli sint liberi) qui regi sanguine proximus est, patet tam ex artic. 13. praeced. cap., quam quia regis electio, quae a multitudine fit, aeterna, si fieri potest, esse debet. Alias necessario fiet, ut summa imperii potestas saepe ad multitudinem transeat, quae mutatio summa est, et consequenter periculosissima.”[i]

Elwes’s translation reads:

“The form of the dominion ought to be kept one and the same, and, consequently, there should be but one king, and that of the same sex, and the dominion should be indivisible. But as to my saying that the king's eldest son should succeed his father by right, or (if there be no issue) the nearest to him in blood, it is clear as well from Chap. VI. Sec. 13, as because the election of the king made by the multitude should, if possible, last for ever. Otherwise it will necessarily happen, that the supreme authority of the dominion will frequently pass to the multitude, which is an extreme and, therefore, exceedingly dangerous change.”[ii]

Shirley’s version goes further by explicitly specifying a male king:

“The form of the state must be preserved unchanged; and so there must be but one king, a male, and the sovereignty must be indivisible. I have said that the king’s eldest son should succeed his father by right; or else, if the king is without issue, his nearest kinsman. This is evident not only from Section 13 of the previous Chapter but also because the election of a king by the people should, if possible, be for all time; otherwise it will necessarily come about that the sovereignty of the state will frequently pass into the hands of the people, a drastic and therefore a very dangerous development.”[iii]

Thus, while Elwes gives the impression that the ruler would remain the same sex, which by implication would be a male because he refers to kings, Shirley explicitly depicts Spinoza as expressly stating “there must be but one king, a male”, thereby excluding women becoming queens altogether.

But this is not what the Latin text says. Spinoza never writes a man. The Latin words in question are:

“rex unus et eiusdem sexus”[iv]

None of these words mean man, so Shirley has taken translator’s licence and inserted that understanding of this passage himself. Therefore, I shall not interpret Spinoza as specifying men in my analytic-Jewish-feminist interpretation because it is not in the original text. Eiusdem literally means ‘the same’ and is in the genitive, which gives the meaning ‘of the same’. Sexus means sex so Elwes is providing a literal, accurate translation when he states “of the same sex”[v]. As for the word rex, it is not as simple as the one, commonly understood, meaning of a king. The meaning of rex, regis can refer to a range of titles, from male specific ones, such as king, prince, to gender neutral roles, such as “unconstitutional ruler, despot, absolute monarch, tyrant” when attempting to rule certain Republics[vi]. It can be used positively to refer to the “head, chief, leader”, and be used so generally, that it includes not just humans but also animals or rivers, such as reference to a main river[vii]. It can also be used to depict, for instance, Roman gods, a wealthy patron, a nation or merely refer to members of a royal family[viii]. It is considered acceptable to translate Livy as referring to both sexes when translating “reges exitos” as “the king and queen[ix], which clearly shows that rex can sometimes refer to queens as well. Hence, on my interpretation, I leave an open mind as to whether Spinoza meant rex only to refer to kings. I suggest this passage is more gender neutral than it first appears.

I support my interpretation of this passage by showing that it also coheres with an earlier passage in the TP, namely chapter 6, section 38.  The latter is highly relevant to the following chapter 7, section 25, as they both refer to the blood relatives who can succeed the monarch/king. Spinoza’s chapter 6, section 38 briefly states:

“Si rex liberis masculis orbus obierit, ille, qui ipsi sanguine proximus, heres imperii habendus”[x]

Elwes renders this as:

“If the king die leaving no male issue, let the next to him in blood be held the heir to the dominion”[xi]

Shirley translates this as:

“If the king dies without male issue, the nearest to him by blood must be regarded as heir to the throne”[xii]

Once again, this passage may seem clearly male-biased, but is it? I suggest it could be read in the following way. When the convention of declaring the first male born to be the heir cannot be followed (because the king/monarch has no sons) then the next closest blood relative of the king/monarch is the heir to the throne (whether they are male or female). I’m not sure why Shirley shifts from nearest blood relative to kinsman between chapters 6 and 7, despite Spinoza using the same phrasing[xiii]. This adds to the emphasis on male language in chapter 7 unnecessarily. Referring to blood relatives in no way excludes women becoming queen, and the passages merely assume the common convention in royal society that first born males become the heir, which is only realistic for Spinoza’s era. Therefore, in terms of the possible feminist concern that Spinoza is assuming males would be first in line to the throne, this would merely be factually accurate in his era. Such assumptions are not of concern because it is symptomatic of society itself, not Spinoza’s attitudes. Indeed, even until very recently in the UK, it was convention that male children received priority in line of succession, up until the birth of Prince George in 2013.  

An analysis of the Latin in chapter 6, section 38, supports my argument. Ille is masculine singular but its meaning is strictly speaking ‘that’, rather than ‘he’, so not clearly referring to a male person. Even if it were, the masculine form is very often used to refer to both sexes, due to linguistic convention. So one could translate it as ‘that person’ which need not only refer to men despite the masculine gender being used grammatically. The next relevant gender word is ipsi but that could be masculine, feminine or neuter, thus, could refer to either men or women. As for the mention of the nearest in blood (sanguine proximus), this is expressed generally, not specifying men. Spinoza could have specified men, for instance by using the word masculis as he has done previously. By not doing so, one could read this gender inclusively, as referring to both heirs and heiresses. Thus, on my charitable reading and interpretation, Spinoza’s reference to the next closest blood relative who can be heir to the throne (in both sections 25 and 38 cited above) includes both sexes as potential heirs.

In addition, keeping to the same sex, conversely, also leaves open the possibility that all monarchs could be women. So, on this additional layer of reading, Spinoza is certainly not excluding queens outright. Perhaps queens would suffer less opposition because there would be no male eligible competition or feeling of disappointment from men who were hoping for a king rather than a queen. Mary Queen of Scots endured misogyny concerning her reign as a woman. The minister and theologian John Knox wrote ‘The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstruous Regiment of Women’ (published 1558) to rouse men against women ruling as queens, employing extreme, misogynistic, emotive language to ensure male-only rule. Although his actions did not result in preventing all women becoming queens, it did cause severe political disturbance and triggered a series of fatal problems for Mary Queen of Scots and her mother. Knox even called for the execution of Mary Queen of Scots once she was dethroned.

Also, as I discussed in chapter 1, Spinoza rightly does not think the opposite sexes gel with each other, which could be what motivates Spinoza’s point about the problems with changing between kings and queens ruling. Opposition to queens has caused political instability in the past. How do we solve the problem?  One finds oneself asking the controversial question: Should all monarchs be queens or kings? Perhaps Spinoza wishes to raise the intriguing question: Is the problem really which sex is ruling or is the problem greater when switching the sex of the monarch between reigns? In chapter 4, I discussed the role of convention in social acceptance and gender when analysing the passage on eunuchs being less socially accepted than women. This shows the gendered way even men are perceived when they are more effeminate than other men. Thus, Spinoza may be, once again, showing the role of perception and gendered expectation based on what people are accustomed to seeing in positions of political power. Where people were used to seeing women in political roles, before experiencing a switch of leadership to a group they were not used to seeing in power (eunuchs), bias and prejudice crept in.

Indeed, even if Elwes’s and Shirley’s translations were representative of Spinoza’s meaning, it could be read charitably in the light of historical context. Spinoza could be merely making the observation that states were nervous about switching between male and female ruling monarchs in case it accidentally led to dissolution of the monarchy through confusion over succession rights. This can be seen by the situation in England around Henry VIII’s rule: “England had not so far had a ruling queen, and the dynasty was not secure enough to run the risk of handing the Crown on to a woman, risking disputed succession or domination of a foreign power through marriage.”[xiv] This was unnecessarily alarmist because both of his daughters became queens, namely Mary I and Elizabeth I.

Earlier in history, there had been an opening for a woman to succeed the throne in the 12th century, but she was never crowned queen because there was too much opposition. During confusion of succession rights, King Henry I of England conferred the status of heiress to Empress Mathilda and made his court swear loyalty to her and her descendants to ensure she would become queen. Despite this, the court and barons broke their loyalty to Empress Mathilda after his death and her male cousin, Stephen, (1135-1154) took the crown, with the support of the English Church. She fought back and won the battle by capturing him but was again unable to be coroneted at Westminster, this time due to opposition from mobs in London. In the end, she was jumped over in the line of succession, as the crown passed from her cousin to her son. She was clearly highly capable of being queen, as can be seen by the fact that she was initially political advisor to her son when he was king and provided assistance with the Becket controversy. Reserving the throne exclusively for kings is not just a thing of the past. Even in modern-day Japan, Princess Aiko is unable to become queen, despite being the daughter of the emperor, because only men can rule and attend the ceremony. The dowry system still exists and women have to marry a Japanese nobleman (although there are none remaining). So she also has to stay single to keep her royal title[xv].   

Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated above, there may be another explanation for this passage. Hence, I suggest, Spinoza was not excluding women from becoming queens. Again, using the same methodology as I have throughout this volume, a close examination of the Latin reveals some alternative readings which may explain Spinoza’s true meaning, and show he was not expounding sexism.



Concluding Remarks:




In this volume 3, I have extended the topic of life and death into the political and social life and death of women. I have analysed specific passages in Spinoza’s TP to bring out the extra or alternative layers of meaning in his political philosophy and attempted to show that Spinoza was not advocating the Masculine Philosophy that others in his era were beginning to overtly support. I have, for the first time in this series, expanded on and clarified the feminist strand of my analytic-Jewish-feminist interpretation of Spinoza, and demonstrated how it tackles Spinoza’s philosophy. By untangling the literal Latin meanings of Spinoza’s words from their English translations of the TP, I respond to the interpretative need, highlighted by Barbone and Rice, for Spinozian scholarship to map analyses of Spinoza’s philosophical concepts and arguments onto his actual words and to guard against misinterpretation and uncharitable criticisms of his political philosophy. I have tried to give both an in-depth examination of his TP, and his attitudes towards gender and women, as well as provide a broad overview of how Spinoza views gender, women and patriarchal society in a variety of passages across his TP. In this way, I hope to have provided readers with a different perspective on the interplay between feminism, gender and political philosophy to be found in Spinoza’s TP. I hold the view that feminism need not take exception to Spinoza’s philosophy but, on the contrary, can draw inspiration from his concepts of justice, power and rights. By bringing out these philosophical concepts, I have highlighted the distinctively philosophical tone of Spinoza’s TP.















[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., ed. C.H. Bruder, EDITI ONIBUS PRINCIPIBUS DENUO EDIDIT, EDITIO STEREOTYPA, (google e-book), vol. II (Leipzig, Germany: TYPIS ET SUMTIBUS BERNH. TAUCHNITZ JUN., 1844), 95, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadzEPDWXpqdc1w64BhFzajGArDBTQxm7-OplWX-YAvgSP9r0aWjRuX_tWKyc91-v3Gs_dl8Bj6OsIx-MXggSVv8YstyN_hv_92hGuIgl7pjaissVrP4yATRaHCCUioseMVU8P140b-vRAVXK3X2671uEoDyNHgJNglQzeqMHaWArZG409KntocN2v_33hMNHHIie-SfXal-O7pNaaJTNnYo5Vdp_tP0ZStSFL2ajcir8s3q1LHnTpfqUrXkIlOd7woTP-bA2LMP2J729nBFPsQz-WHMOw.
[ii] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. I, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1891), 339, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/1321.01_Bk.pdf.
[iii] Benedictus de Spinoza, Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 88.
[iv] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:95.
[v] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, I:339.
[vi] D. P Simpson, Cassell’s Latin-English, English-Latin Dictionary (London: Cassell, 1987), 522.
[vii] Simpson, 522.
[viii] Simpson, 522.
[ix] Simpson, 522.
[x] Spinoza, Opera: DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE, TRACTATUS POLITICUS, EPISTOLAE., II:83.
[xi] Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, I:326.
[xii] Spinoza, Political Treatise, 74.
[xiii] Spinoza, Political Treatise.
[xiv] website content writers for The Royal Household, ‘Henry VIII (r.1509-1547)’, Royal, The Royal Household, No date given, https://www.royal.uk/henry-viii.
[xv] Matt Roper, ‘World’s Loneliest Royal Princess Banned from Marriage and Ruling Her Country’, Mirror Online, 13 May 2019, https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/worlds-loneliest-royal-princess-banned-from-marriage-and-ruling-her-country/ar-AABirOt?ocid=spartandhp.



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Xenophon. Xenophon: in seven volumes. 4: Memorabilia. - Oeconomicus. - Symposium. - Apology. Reprinted. The Loeb classical library 168. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press [u.a.], 2002.

Monday 9 September 2019

Spinoza vol 3 ebook: Chapter 8: Feminist Interpretation of Spinoza On Oppression


Chapter 8: Feminist Interpretation of Spinoza On Oppression  

Following on from my previous chapter, I shall expand on the theme of oppression and rights. In chapter 7, I gave a textual analysis of chapter 1 section 5 (TP)[i] of Spinoza’s arguments in the original Latin. Here, I wish to take the same section but this time I shall attempt to illustrate how Spinoza’s political philosophy in his TP can inform feminism, feminist philosophy and jurisprudence because oppression is a key issue in these research areas. In so doing, I will also show the relevance of Spinoza’s philosophy to feminism today because, I maintain, Spinoza’s arguments can cross-apply to contemporary feminism and feminist jurisprudence, even in passages where he is not directly addressing women’s social situation. By testing Spinoza’s notions on feminist accounts, I will demonstrate the strength and truth of his arguments through suggesting ways Spinozianism can resolve logical tensions between them. Moreover, I hope to make evident the practical relevance and possible application of Spinoza’s concepts, thus establishing a further dimension to the analytic-feminist strand of my interpretation of Spinoza. I also suggest two claims: One, that Spinoza’s principle of defending rights for all in his TP gives philosophical underpinning and support to the aims of intersectional feminism. Two, that Spinoza’s philosophy can motivate the normative claim that intersectional feminism must strive to go further than simply being inclusive, it must embrace a broad definition of woman and treat all women as equals. Each intersectional feminist should, by definition, fight for and uphold all women’s rights as strongly as she does for the rights that are relevant to her life and identities.

Indeed, it is evident that, if women’s rights were fought for and upheld by everyone in society, rather than leaving it up to feminist movements to fight for, secure and maintain, as is often the case, then there would be more justice in society, be it ethical, social, political or legal. This Spinozian principle of upholding the rights of all, I maintain, highlights the need to encompass all of humanity into the concept of human rights, applying rights to both men and women without sex discrimination, as well as applying it to intersex and those who identify as non-binary and trans. It encompasses rights “irrespective of race, age, sexual orientation, ability or class”[ii] or marital status. I would also add religion (including women in religious institutions, for example, convents, cloistered or not, who are often forgotten, so can, as a result, be even more vulnerable). Rights for all also extends meaningfully into intersectional feminism and feminist philosophy of law and jurisprudence to avoid falling into “‘essentialism’ or ‘ethnocentricism’” in feminism whereby the female experience is sometimes erroneously reduced to one stereotype, often a white, cis, heterosexual female rather than reflecting all women[iii]. This was a criticism famously elaborated by Audrey Lorde, who, as a “black, lesbian feminist socialist writer”[iv], noticed that descriptions of the so-called female experience were failing to be inclusive enough of women of various identities. Nevertheless, Leslie Bender puts less emphasis on this concern, because she feels there is a great deal to be gained from examining “common experiences and patterns that emerge from shared tellings of life events”[v]. The potential value of this approach is: “What were experienced as personal hurts individually suffered reveal themselves as a collective experience of oppression”[vi]. Indeed, there is empirical evidence of patriarchal oppression being a sociological phenomenon which forms a global pattern. This pattern extends to trans women who, once they are perceived or identified as female, begin to suffer the same distinctive forms of female sexual harassment, abuse and violence, including fatalities. All this, I think, provides empirical grounds to argue that the existence of a diverse and completely inclusive sisterhood is not a myth, but is in fact a reality.

Both Bender and Lorde make important points but there remains a logical tension between their two approaches which needs resolving to reflect such empirical evidence of patterns of female oppression (very often involving various forms of economic oppression) across all continents, societies, cultures, traditions, religions, and identities. Should feminism examine women’s experiences through identity differences (a Lorde-like approach)? Or through finding a general umbrella of common ground between all women (a Bender-like approach)? Is it possible to balance the advantages of embracing all women’s identities explicitly (as opposed to making implicit assumptions) without losing a sense of the sisterhood? A concept Lorde questions as potentially being “a pretence of homogeneity of experience”[vii]. 

I wish to resolve this logical tension in a way which goes further than the answer of intersectional feminism by drawing on Spinoza’s political and ethical principle of actively defending and upholding others’ rights as one’s own throughout one’s lifetime. In this way, I attempt to show how Spinoza has the philosophical concepts to fill a possible theoretical gap in intersectional feminism.

 I think intersectional feminism can successfully address the error of universalising one concept of ‘woman’ at the expense of including women of all identities and by acknowledging how their additional identities impact on their experience of being a woman. I think its long-term key to success is to be actively inclusive of all of the parallel identities women have (not prioritising some over others) as well as being fully inclusive of all gender identities (intersex who self-identify as female; transwomen (and possibly transmen and transboys); non-binary women, for example, agender women; gender fluid women (gender identity changes over time); multigender women. However, what I think intersectionality possibly struggles to address, is the accompanying concept and ethos of the sisterhood, defined as “a strong feeling of friendship and support among women who are involved in action to improve women's rights”[viii].

This would be akin to Spinoza’s principle of love thy neighbour which he thought all religions could adopt and relate to one another in accordance with it. Thus, it is a principle, if taken in Spinoza’s sense of it, which is inclusive of all religious beliefs. In Spinoza’s era, society was religion-based and non-belief or atheism was often outlawed. A present day application of this principle can be adapted to suit modern and global society which includes a greater variety of belief systems and none. Therefore, I think a contemporary application of his principle to a feminist concept of a sisterhood would run along the same lines.

However, it is one thing merely to aim at non-discrimination by ensuring feminism does not implicitly perpetuate forms of oppression itself by excluding and silencing sections of the female population. It is quite another to truly perceive and accept all women (especially those who are conscious of women’s oppression and act to improve women’s rights) as your equal and fight for their women’s rights just as you would your own. I think intersectional feminism is the best placed to attempt to resolve the former, that is, the internal discrimination/oppression problem. Their aim of inclusivity has addressed past issues of, for instance, the silencing and exclusion of lesbians and black feminists from attending or participating actively and socially within feminist groups. Such problems were highlighted by radical lesbian feminists who protested the exclusion of lesbians and lesbian issues from the Second Congress to Unite Women in the USA in 1970. Bell Hook famously raised awareness of how racial and class oppression intersects with women’s oppression and feminism in her seminal book ‘Ain't I a Woman?: Black women and feminism’[ix]. However, I maintain that it remains unclear to what extent intersectional feminism resolves the second tension, namely, how an intersectional sisterhood is created and maintained. Although it is beneficial to have both a variety of feminist schools of thought as well as feminist sub-groups where women who share the same identities as each other can share and address the additional patterns of oppression they suffer, this can sometimes result in a lack of cohesion and sense of sisterhood within the general umbrella of feminism.

Nevertheless, there are campaigns such as One Billion Rising, a global campaign against reproductive and sexual oppression, abuse and violence against all women, including “cisgender, transgender, and those who hold fluid identities that are subject to gender-based violence” and LGBTQIA+ communities[x]. Within this campaign, one can see Spinoza’s concepts in practice.

Firstly, that oppression and violence deprive one of independence:

 “each is so long independent, as he can guard against oppression by another”[xi]

(TP, chapter 2, section 15)

“everyone is … so far independent, as he is able to repel all violence”[xii]

(TP, chapter 2 section 9)

The links between oppression, violence and women’s levels of independence can be seen in the One Billion Rising campaign which seeks to empower women by freeing them to reach a greater level of independence through knowing their rights and powers, which help them overcome past, current and possibly even future oppression and violence. It is specifically aimed at the oppression of women and girls by men and tracking these patterns of women’s oppression across a wide range of “systemic violence in economic, political, socio-cultural, environmental and ideological spheres”[xiii]. This can be seen in their 2019 manifesto which focuses on ending: “Rape, Battery, Incest, Sexual Harassment, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), Sexual Slavery and Trafficking, Child Marriage, Femicide, Sexual, Gender and Reproductive Oppression, Violence Towards LGBTQIA+ Communities, Toxic Masculinity, Poverty/ Economic Injustice/ Labor Exploitation, Climate Destruction and Environmental Plunder, Racism, Hate and Discrimination, Religious Fundamentalism, State and Institutional Violence/ Militarization/ War, Forced Displacement/ Immigrant and Migrant Abuse.” [xiv] This list illustrates the extent of women’s oppression globally across every aspect and area of life within this patriarchal world we live in. The Youth section of the movement goes even further by including university campuses, slut shaming, bullying and sexism, misogyny, demanding women’s access to open spaces without fear, the right to education (throughout school and higher education to PhD), objectification and stereotyping of women and girls and domestic violence, and many more issues[xv].

Secondly, One Billion Rising provides empirical support for the possibility of and necessity for a diverse and inclusive sisterhood within which all women fight alongside each other for women’s rights for all women. (Men can support the cause by joining the Men Rising campaign which supports ending oppression of all women and girls[xvi].) The main aim of a sisterhood is to redress the gender injustice in patriarchal society. In this way, it fulfils Spinoza’s requirement of love thy neighbour, which in practice means justice for all[xvii]. Transposed into present day feminism, this requirement specifies that there should be justice for people of all sex and gender identities, rather than a bias in favour of the archetypal “reasonable man”[xviii] who is modelled on the (cis white heterosexual) male sex, while claiming to represent all.  

A more detailed description of Spinoza’s argument is perhaps that people should align their (positive) passions with the double-meaning principle of love thy neighbour/defend and uphold their rights as your own[xix]. The rationale of this principle should also prevail over the (negative) passions. If this principle were applied to the law courts, as Spinoza suggests[xx], then I think that discrimination on the basis of sex (biological sex or sex identity) would be eradicated. It would potentially bring about true rights for all because men would not lose any rights, but, unlike the current global situation, women’s rights would be recognised and upheld to the same level as men’s rights. As the principle states for all, this would hold true, regardless of the person’s gender identity as well as other identities, such as racial and sexual orientation. Given Spinoza’s arguments for religious toleration in his TTP, this would also guard against discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. This, I maintain, provides a theoretical and practical framework which can both strengthen the current legal ideal of non-discrimination and gender neutrality but actively address the shortcomings of the legal system of upholding its ideal. Spinoza’s principle of upholding and defending rights for all just as (passionately) as you do your own, if applied consistently, addresses the concerns of all three main contemporary feminist movements:

First wave feminism sees the social and legal gender problem as being caused by a “male monopoly of law” which introduces “inequalities” into an otherwise objective, fair system[xxi].

“For second phase feminists, of differing political persuasions, the root problem with law lies in its pretended impartiality, objectivity and rationality.”[xxii]

Third wave feminism puts legal gender inequality down to hidden gender biases meaning that although the “law is gendered”, this is compounded by inconsistencies in application which make it difficult to track gender discrimination[xxiii].

Spinoza, I suggest, gives us a way of transcending all three explanations, because, no matter which account of the root cause holds true, in all three explanations, it holds true that women’s rights are not upheld and defended to the same degree and to the same extent as men’s rights, across all other identities, such as race, class, age. Thus, regardless of different identities between women, they share a common form of oppression, namely, gender oppression. I refer to it as gender oppression rather than sex oppression because it not only relates to being biologically female, but also extends into gender identity, such as transwomen. Transwomen suffer an alarmingly high rate of violence, often fatal, once they identify as, or are perceived as female by men.

Hence, Spinoza resolves the logical tension between Lorde and Bender’s statements[xxiv] by homing in on two approaches to the problem. One, by arguing that the principle of justice for all must be consistently applied in society throughout people’s lifetime, by individuals and justice systems, not just as an ideal but in practice. The (negative) passions must not be allowed to introduce bias and injustice, whether it be on a personal, legal or political level. Two, by explicitly writing about oppression, Spinoza is fulfilling the general political criteria that: “..in order to advance any political movement, there exists the need to raise the consciousness of those being oppressed.”[xxv] Furthermore, Spinoza’s philosophy answers the feminist call for raising awareness and increasing knowledge of oppression: “By identifying sites of…oppression, feminist scholars….demonstrated further the supremacy which men have traditionally assumed and maintained in society”[xxvi] and still do. As I discussed in chapter 6, Spinoza shows awareness of gender oppression in the private sphere, when he argues against the role of the patriarchal, head of the household who treats his family as his property. This is an impressive argument for a man living in the 17th century, given that feminists today are still having to refute gender biased notions of a woman’s appropriate role in the home that are often based on the same Aristotelian-style idea of gendered, binary biological limitations that Spinoza, back then, rejected. Moreover, Spinoza’s philosophy also maintains that everyone has the same nature, thus he is not suggesting a binary or gendered concept of women and men’s nature. He also has a positive concept of nature and God’s relation to it.

In contrast, Oldenburg introduced the notion of a “Masculine Philosophy” as an “explicit goal” of the Royal Society[xxvii]. Many male natural philosophers/scientists, such as Boyle, Bacon and Descartes, reinforced the misogyny behind this new approach to natural and scientific research with their gendered language[xxviii]. Science and philosophy (since there was less distinction between the two fields in that era) were to go from being “passive and weak” “female” disciplines to being “active” male disciplines [xxix]. They looked upon women as being analogous to the natural world and thought both should be effectively tamed and oppressed by men. Nature was referred to using feminine pronouns and Bacon encouraged men to “capture” and “hound her”, “bind her to [mans] service and make her [man’s] slave”[xxx]. Descartes advocated mastering and possessing nature while Boyle went so far as to claim that men should “bring nature to be serviceable to [men’s] particular ends, whether of health, or riches, or sensual delight”[xxxi].

The result of such attitudes in the Royal Society and among male scientists (who were also becoming reviewers once Oldenburg began the peer review system) in that era lead to a rise in sexism against women scientists which still lingers on today[xxxii].

One aspect of this sexism in STEM is turning so-called “norms of masculine behavior” into “norms of scientific behavior” and “method”[xxxiii]. These norms, which are claimed to be contradictory to “norms of feminine behavior” include learning to be “objective, impartial, logical, unemotional, disinterested, and independent”[xxxiv]. However, as one sees in Spinoza’s arguments for independence, this is part of living a good human life, free from various forms of oppression. Consequently, by labelling independence a male trait, I argue that patriarchy is fundamentally oppressing women and restricting their capacity to be free and reach their full potential. Moreover, I think this constitutes good grounds for encouraging women to be independent researchers in their chosen discipline, to free them from biased patriarchal systems and institutions as well as to show that women are not, by nature, unsuited to independent thinking, researching or living. Otherwise, the sexist stereotype persists that women are only suited to being dependent, such as seeking help from others or collaborating with others, which simply is not the case.

Furthermore, as can be seen with women philosophers such as Lady Mary Shepherd (18th-19th century), women are perfectly capable and well-suited to excelling in “objective, impartial, logical”[xxxv] thought, amongst other things, so this gender bias about their cognitive abilities must not be used to make women lack confidence in subjects which require these attributes. I would not advocate removing these qualities from being valued in research, on the basis that they are male qualities, because I reject the notion that they are inherently male qualities, they are merely qualities that can be learnt by all, whether the person identifies as male, female or non-binary. The focus for progress in science, philosophy and other disciplines should, instead, be on removing gendered language, notions (including what constitutes male and female traits so both these and gender neutral traits can be valued), stereotypes and bias so everyone can reach their full potential.

Behavioural stereotypes also mean that “Western scientists are expected to be aggressive and competitive, and jeopardize their careers when they do not exhibit these traits”[xxxvi], which puts women scientists and women philosophers (and women in other careers where these traits are needed to progress) at a disadvantage. By penalising women for displaying (or criticising them for allegedly possessing or displaying) aggression or competitiveness, women are substantially held back in their careers from this attitude alone. Such disadvantages are also in addition to other biases they suffer, such as not being perceived as specialists or knowledgeable, experiencing gendered harassment, unjustifiable pay gaps and so on. Meanwhile, the same behaviour is normalised or rewarded when exhibited by men, giving them a head start and psychological advantages, such as, being labelled and perceived as more independent, intelligent, impartial, expert and logical.

A second aspect of sexism in STEM, philosophy and academia in general, is that barriers faced by women are far more extensive than just the original patriarchal ideology of oppressing women and nature expressed by Oldenburg, Boyle, Bacon and others. (Although not so by Spinoza.) It became a pattern of oppression of women which impacted on their “access to universities” (including appallingly “restrictive admissions”), and then only offering them “menial research roles”, “less financial assistance” on top of “exclusion” from, for instance, “meetings and collaborations and information networks”[xxxvii]. All of which reinforced and compounded the limiting, gendered behavioural norms aforementioned.

Spinoza, however, in chapter 1, section 5 of his TP, I think, is showing awareness of widespread oppression in the public sphere, including the legal world of the law courts. Given that Spinoza saw how gendered the law is through his legal battle with his sister over their inheritance and yet, rather than use his male privilege against her, he gave her more than she was legally entitled to receive, I suggest Spinoza’s discussion of oppression in the public and legal sphere in section 5, implicitly includes women’s oppression. Likewise, Spinoza’s natural philosophy and metaphysics (amongst other branches of philosophy he engages in) are not imbued with elements of the 17th century Royal Society’s sexism. As I have argued in this volume, Spinoza’s politics is not advocating misogyny and to claim otherwise, I have suggested, is a misreading of his original Latin texts. Additionally, I do not agree with Barbone and Rice’s claim that Spinoza’s political philosophy possibly forgets about rights for social groups (“such as ‘women’s rights’, ‘gay rights’, etc.”) by referring to individuals in his “conception of right”[xxxviii]. I think there is textual evidence to the contrary. It is apparent that Spinoza accounts for different religious groups and people of various cultural identities and norms living alongside each other, especially in his TTP.

Hence, as I have argued, Spinoza’s philosophy is well-suited to the development of feminist concepts and arguments, such as the ones I have offered in this chapter. When Spinoza does address sexist systems or concepts in society, he does not argue for creating masculine societal norms, as Bacon and Boyle advocated. Spinoza’s arguments, I think, can help resolve the tensions within the concept of a sisterhood. Both conceptually and in practice, the same principle of rights for all must still apply between all members of the sisterhood who identify as women (including transwomen and intersex who identify as women). Each member of the sisterhood must, therefore, defend and uphold the rights of all women, of all identities and cultures, across the world, including indigenous women. As a result, by creating a sisterhood based on diversity of experience, we both retain intersectionality while gaining an understanding of the distinctively female “collective experience of oppression” that Bender suggests[xxxix], but in all its various forms, giving a richer picture of the female condition. In this way, Spinoza’s philosophy of justice, (amongst other features of his philosophy) I think, is not only relevant to political, social and moral philosophy, but can also be a source of inspiration for feminist philosophy.





[i] Benedict de Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, ed. J. van Vloten and JPN Land, Editio Altera, Tomus Primus (Netherlands: Hagae comitum, M. Nijhoff, 1895), 270–71, https://archive.org/details/Spinoza1895Opera2VlotenLand2ed/page/n7.
[ii] Hilaire Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 1st edition (London: Cavendish Publ, 1998), 20.
[iii] Barnett, 20.
[iv] Barnett, 20.
[v] Barnett, 20.
[vi] Barnett, 20.
[vii] Barnett, 20.
[viii] N/A, ‘Sisterhood’, in Cambridge Dictionary (UK: Cambridge University Press, N/A), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sisterhood.
[ix] bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, Nachdr., Pluto Classics (London: Pluto Press, 2001).
[x] N/A, ‘The 2019 Campaign  RISING: FROM A CAMPAIGN, TO A WAY OF LIFE’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/about/campaign/.
[xi] Benedict de Spinoza, THE CHIEF WORKS of BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, REVISED EDITION. London, UK, vol. I, BOHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. SPINOZA’S WORKS. (London: york street, covent garden: GEORGE BELL & SONS, 1891), 296, http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/1321.01_Bk.pdf.
[xii] Spinoza, I:295.
[xiii] N/A, ‘The 2019 Campaign  RISING: FROM A CAMPAIGN, TO A WAY OF LIFE’.
[xiv] N/A.
[xv] N/A, ‘Youth Rising’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/resources/youth-rising/.
[xvi] N/A, ‘Men Rising’, Campaign; educational, One Billion Rising, 2019, https://www.onebillionrising.org/resources/men-rising/.
[xvii] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.
[xviii] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 6.
[xix] Spinoza, Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 270–71.
[xx] Spinoza, 270–71.
[xxi] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 5.
[xxii] Barnett, 6.
[xxiii] Barnett, 7.
[xxiv] Barnett, 20.
[xxv] Barnett, 12.
[xxvi] Barnett, 4.
[xxvii] Janet A. Kourany, ‘Philosophy of Science: A New Program for Philosophy of Science, in Many Voices’, in Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions, ed. Janet A. Kourany (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998), 231.
[xxviii] Kourany, 231–32.
[xxix] Kourany, 231.
[xxx] Kourany, 231.
[xxxi] Kourany, 231–32.
[xxxii] Kourany, 232.
[xxxiii] Kourany, 232.
[xxxiv] Kourany, 232.
[xxxv] Kourany, 232.
[xxxvi] Kourany, 232.
[xxxvii] Kourany, 232–33.
[xxxviii] Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Introduction’, in Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2000), 18, footnote 61.
[xxxix] Barnett, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, 20.